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This thesis presents the design and validation of model-based fault detection and
isolation (FDI) approach for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). In safety-critical sys-
tems such as chemical, nuclear plants and passenger aircraft, FDI is typically founded
on hardware redundancy. In hardware redundancy, multiple actuators are spatially
distributed to localise faults quickly, and sensor measurements are compared for
consistency. The primary drawback with hardware redundancy is the increased
installation complexity, weight, and costs. With modern computing technologies,
model-based FDI offers a cost-effective, iterative and efficient FDI design process,
verifiable with high fidelity computer-aided simulation (CAS).
This thesis investigates the application of the Two-Stage Kalman filter (TSKF)
to the problem of FDI. The TSKF solves the main deficiencies faced with the aug-
mented state Kalman filter (ASKF), namely, numerical instability in ill-conditioned
systems, and computational inefficiency where large parameter vectors are aug-
mented. The TSKF approach utilises two parallel reduced-order KFs to estimate
the system state and the parameter vectors separately. The UAV’s two rudders are
not "isolable" because they produce identical moments. A novel active FDI (AFDI)
method is proposed to isolate rudder actuator faults.
The FDI displays high noise sensitivity under the severe Dryden turbulence
model, resulting in high false detection and missed detection rates. A novel adap-
tive technique is proposed to improve the robustness and sensitivity of the FDI.
Unlike most methods which rely on a single scaling factor, the proposed adaptation
technique employs multiple factors to weight the spread of fault parameter covari-
ance matrix in the direction of flow of information, resulting in selective adaptation.
Fault parameter variations are nonuniform in time and space. A static alarm
threshold will induce high false alarms or missed alarms when set to low or too
high, respectively. A novel adaptive threshold based on the normalised innovation
squared (NIS) is proposed. A Monte Carlo campaign is carried out to validate the
FDI while fault-sizes, the aircraft’s physical parameters, and disturbances are scat-
tered, each with a distinct mean dispersion. The proposed strategy exhibits high




Hierdie tesis beskryf die ontwerp en validering van ‘n model-gebaseerde foutop-
sporing en isolasie (“fault deteciton and isolation (FDI)”) tegniek vir onbemande
lugvoertuie (“unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)”). In veiligheidskritieke stelsels
soos chemiese aanlegte, kernkragaanlegte, en passasiersvliegtuie, word FDI gewoon-
lik gebaseer op hardeware-oortolligheid. Vir hardeware-oortolligheid word verskeie
aktueerders ruimtelik versprei om foute vinnig op te spoor, en sensormetings word
vergelyk vir ooreenstemming. Die primêre nadeel van hardeware-oortolligheid is
die verhoogde installasie-kompleksiteit, gewig en koste. Met moderne rekenaarteg-
nologieë bied model-gebaseerde FDI ’n koste-effektiewe, iteratiewe en doeltref-
fende FDI-ontwerpproses met ‘n hoë betroubaarheid wat bevestig kan word met
rekenaargesteunde simulasie.
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die toepassing van die twee-stadium Kalman filter (“two-
stage Kalman filter (TSKF)”) op die probleem van FDI. Die TSKF los die belangrik-
ste tekortkominge van die uitgebredie-toestand Kalman-filter (“augmented state
Kalman filter (ASKF)”) op, naamlik numeriese onstabiliteit in swak gekondisioneerde
stelsels, en berekeningsondoeltreffendheid waar groot parametervektore bygevoeg
word. Die TSKF-benadering gebruik twee parallelle Kalman filters met vermin-
derde orde om die stelseltoestand en die parametervektore afsonderlik af te skat.
Die UAV se twee roere (“rudders”) is egter nie “isoleerbaar” nie omdat dit hulle
identiese draaimoment veroorsaak. ’n Nuwe aktiewe FDI-metode (AFDI) word
voorgestel om die roeraktueerderfoute te isoleer.
Die FDI vertoon hoë sensitiwiteit vir geraas vanaf erge turbulensie soos gemod-
elleer deur die Dryden-turbulensie-model, wat lei tot ‘n groot aantal vals deteksies
en gemiste deteksies. ’n Nuwe aanpassingstegniek word voorgestel om die robu-
ustheid en sensitiwiteit van die FDI te verbeter. Anders as die meeste metodes wat
op een enkele skaalfaktor staatmaak, gebruik die voorgestelde aanpassingstegniek
verskeie faktore om die verspreiding van die foutparameterkovariansiematriks in
die rigting van informasievloei te weeg, wat lei tot selektiewe aanpassing.
Foutparametervariasies is nie eenvormig in tyd of ruimte nie. ’n Statiese alar-




delik óf te laag óf te hoog gestel is. ’n Nuwe aanpassingsdrempel wat gebaseer is
op die genormaliseerde innovasie kwadraat (NIS) word voorgestel. ’n Monte Carlo
simulasieveldtog is uitgevoer om die FDI te toets met die foutgroottes, die fisiese
parameters van die vliegtuig, en die steurings lukraak gevarieer elk met ’n duide-
like gemiddelde verspreiding. Die voorgestelde strategie vertoon ’n hoë robuus-
theid vir geraas en sensitiwiteit vir foute, wat dui op ’n betroubare FDI.
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CBM Condition Based Maintenance
CFIT Controlled flight into Terrain
CG Centre of Gravity
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
DCM Direction Cosine Matrix
DOF Degree of Freedom
DUKF Dual Unscented Kalman Filter
EA Eigenstructure Assignment, Elevator-Aileron
EKF Extended Kalman Filter
ER Elevator-Rudder
ERSG European Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Steering Group




ESTEC European Space Research and Technology Centre
FD Fault Detector
FDD Fault Detection and Diagnosis
FDI Fault Detection and Isolation
FDIR Fault/Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery
FEEP Field Emission Electric Propulsion
FMEA Fault Mode and Effect Analysis
FTC Fault-Tolerant Control
GLR Generalised Likelihood Ratio
GNC Guidance Navigation Control
GPS Global Positioning System
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IFAC International Federation of Automatic Control
IMM Interacting Multiple Models
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance
IVHM Integrated Vehicle Health Management
JUKF Joint-Unscented Kalman Filter
KF Kalman Filter
LIP Locked in Place
LOC-I Loss of Control In-Flight;
LoE Loss of Effectiveness
LTI Linear Time-Invariant
LTV Linear Time-Varying





MMST Multiple Model Switching and Tuning
MPC Model Predictive Control
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PFTCS Passive-Fault Tolerant Control System
PIM Pseudo-Inverse Method
RAX Remote Agent
RMSE Root Mean Square Error
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RS Runway safety
SACAA South African Civil Aviation Authority
SARP Standards and Recommended Practices
SESAR-JU Single European Sky Air traffic management Research Joint
Undertaking
SHM System Health Management
TSKF Two-Stage Kalman Filter
UA Unmanned Aircraft
UAS Unmanned Aerial System
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UIO Unknown Input Observer
UKF Unscented Kalman Filter





W20 Wind speed at 20 feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
ug Disturbance velocity along the x-axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
vg Disturbance velocity along the y-axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
wg Disturbance velocity along the z-axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
pg Disturbance angular velocity about the x-axis . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
qg Disturbance angular velocity about the y-axis . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
rg Disturbance angular velocity about the z-axis . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
Lu Scale length of ug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
Lv Scale length of vg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
Lw Scale length of wg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
σu Root-mean-square intensity of ug . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
σv Root-mean-square intensity of vg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
σw Root-mean-square intensity of wg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
Times
t general notation for a continuous time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
tF time of fault occurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
tD time of fault detection time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
tdt fault detection time (delay) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
tit fault isolation time (delay) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
k discrete time instance tk = kT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
Ts sampling time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ s ]
State variables
α angle of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
β sideslip angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
φ roll angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
θ pitch angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
ψ yaw angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
p roll rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
q pitch rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
r yaw rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad/s ]
xn position north . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
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ye position east . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
zd position down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
h altitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
u longitudinal velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
v lateral velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
w normal velocity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
VT total airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m/s ]
Surfaces and engine controls input
δ collective representation of all control inputs . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
δEr right elevator deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δEl left elevator deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δAr right aileron deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δAl left aileron deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δRr right rudder deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δRl left rudder deflection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ rad ]
δprop engine propulsion setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
Aircraft parameters
m aircraft mass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg ]
I Moment of inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Ixx Moment of inertia about the roll axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Iyy Moment of inertia about the pitch axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Izz Moment of inertia about the yaw axis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Ixy Roll and pitch product of inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Ixz Roll and yaw product of inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Izy Pitch and yaw product of inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ kg.m2 ]
Sref wing platform area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m2 ]
bref wing span . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
c̄ mean aerodynamic chord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ m ]
AR Wing Aspect ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]




Fb = (xb, yb, zb) body-axes coordinate system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
Fs = (xs, ys, zs) stability-axes coordinate system . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
Fw = (xw, yw, zw) wind-axes coordinate system . . . . . . . . . . . . . [ ]
FNED = (xE, yE, zD) North-east-down coordinate system . . . . . . [ ]
Universal and atmospheric constants
g = 9.81 m/s2
ρ = 1.1323 Km−3
p0 = 1013× 102 Nm−2
a = −6.5× 10−3 K/m
T0 = 288.15 K




This chapter begins with a brief introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and their applications. Next, the chapter presents a brief overview
of past, current, and emerging advancements and innovations in UAV ap-
plications. New challenges facing UAVs are discussed to highlight the
need for the work presented in this thesis. The subject of this study is
then introduced, research objectives are defined, and a detailed literature
review of previous research in related fields is presented. The chapter con-
cludes with an overview of the research project and an outline of how the
thesis is structured.
1.1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have gained unprecedented levels of
popularity and attention in various sectors over the past few decades.
UAVs are a subset of unmanned systems (US), which are artificially pow-
ered vehicles operating either in air, maritime or ground, and more impor-
tantly, do not carry a human operator onboard. The term UAV refers both to
fully autonomous aerial vehicles (that operate on their own) and remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs).
Since their inception, the terminologies concerning UAVs have evolved
along with the aircraft. In the context of formal definitions, one of the ear-
liest references to UAVs came out of the Protocol of 15 June 1929, which
was an amendment to the Paris Convention of 13 October 1919, amend-
ing Article 15 to include "aircraft without a pilot". At the Convention on
International Civil Aviation of 1944, which replaced the Paris Convention,
the new phrase "pilotless aircraft" was adopted. Today, there are several
definitions concerning UAVs from different contexts, which present new
1
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challenges. Some definitions may be interpreted to classify recreational
toy drones in the same category as state-of-the-art military UAVs. From
a legislative viewpoint, it is clear that different regulations should apply
to recreational drones than to military or application UAVs. The burden
of establishing consistency in definitions has forced some regulators to
define what UAVs are not, in addition to defining what they are [6]. Gen-
erally, the term UAV does not include unmanned free balloons or model
aircraft used for recreational purposes and whose flight cannot be man-
aged in real-time.
A broader and recent definition is found in documents from the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), namely unmanned aircraft
(UA), defined as "an aircraft which is intended to operate with no pilot
on board" [6]. Another common term is unmanned aircraft system (UAS)
which is an umbrella term encompassing the aircraft and its supporting
systems, such as the onboard and ground flight equipment, sensors, elec-
tronics, software, ground-stations, controls, and communications systems.
Several organisations such as the ICAO, European Organisation for
the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol), European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), and others have dedicated serious efforts to establish harmony
and uniformity in the terminologies mentioned above, mainly to estab-
lish internationally accepted regulations based on Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARPs). However, today the terms UA, UAV, UAS,
RPV and sometimes drone, are often used interchangeably.
Due to their versatility, UAVs have historically been mainly directed
at military application. Indeed, the military sector has spearheaded UAV
developments for many decades since their introduction. This is primar-
ily due to the high costs associated with UAV acquisition, operation and
maintenance. Moreover, the loss of UAVs has historically been more ac-
cepted than the loss of passenger aircraft and aircrew. Removing the hu-
man component from the aircraft has been indispensable in enabling the
earliest and main applications of UAVs, namely, undertaking "dull, dirty
and dangerous"[7] or D3 missions. Dull refers to long-endurance opera-
tions that can last for several days, and perhaps in the future, for weeks
or even months. Dirty refers to hazardous assignments such as inspect-
ing chemical agents or post-disaster sites, which presents known health
risks. Dangerous refers to deployments to environments with known ex-
posures and risks of immediate loss of life (e.g. military missions). Mod-
ern conflicts have demonstrated the utility of UAVs in carrying out these
operations.
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In addition to enabling D3, the absence of aircrew in controlled flight
has enabled exploring other uses in UAVs, which would have otherwise
been riskier, unsafe, expensive or impossible with human-crewed aircraft.
The requirements for an onboard pilot results in additional design con-
straints, requiring the aircraft to have a minimum size, weight, human
safety features, and some level comfort during flight, to mention a few.
These design requirements are absent in UAVs, which has extraordinarily
expanded capabilities and reach of aviation. Other advantages of UAVs
over their piloted counterparts include the flexibility of design, manoeu-
vrability, reduced cost and time to manufacture, operate and maintain air
vehicles [8] and the ability to operate air vehicles in urban or remote envi-
ronments. As such, the fascination with UAV continues to grow amongst
researchers, manufactures and operators. With recent technological ad-
vancements, the spectrum of UAV application is expected to continue to
expand. UAVs have already found utilisation in a wide range of applica-
tions, including:
• Media and filming
• Scanning and analysis of crop yields in agriculture.
• Inspection of construction sites and activities
• Transportation and delivery of goods
• Monitoring and analysis of forests and wildlife
• UAS Road Traffic Management (URTM)
• Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (IS-
TAR)
• Inspections of marine activities, power lines, mines or dams.
• Search and rescue operations.
• Aerial imaging and mapping of environments and systems.
• Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
While D3 originated from military applications where UAVs proved
more efficient than piloted aircraft, UAVs are displaying their D3 quali-
ties in civilian airspace where they are performing increasingly complex
assignments autonomously in unknown environments.
1.2 The Future and UAVs
The application of UAVs in the civilian airspace is still a subject of much
ongoing research. Due to their versatility, there is growing interest to use
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UAVs or drones to drive innovation, new services and business models,
and global economic growth. Currently, Europe is spearheading global
efforts to establish UAV operational plans, standardisation and policy ini-
tiatives. The European Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Steering Group
(ERSG) produced a UAV integration roadmap in 2013 entitled "Roadmap
for Integration of Civil Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Avi-
ation System"[9]. In the same year, the U.S Federal Aviation Administration
produced their UAV roadmap entitled "Integration of Civil Unmanned Air-
craft Systems in the National Airspace System"[10]. These roadmaps aimed to
establish standard procedures and guidelines to ensure safe and regulated
deployment of UAVs into the respective airspace system.
The Single European Sky Air traffic management Research Joint Un-
dertaking (SESAR-JU) was established in 2015 for the purpose of develop-
ing new European air traffic management (ATM) systems and establish-
ing a blueprint to enable safe, secure and environmentally friendly oper-
ation of UAVs in low-level airspace. Recent developments in SESAR-JU
includes the U-space Blueprint [11] and European ATM Master Plan [12].
In summary, U-space institutes a structured approval plan for operating
UAV services in the European airspace. The approval process is split into
four stages, starting with the definition or conception of UAV services,
and ending at a fully integrated UAV operation. U-space works by digi-
tising and automating processes and tools to facilitate safe and secure in-
tegration of drones into airspace, including very low-level (VLL) drone
operations. On the other hand, the European ATM Master Plan focuses on
providing guidelines on key drone-related research and development (R
& D) activities that must be prioritised to support the expansion of UAV
markets and align with the integration plans.
The business benefits of establishing regulated UAV airspace are ob-
vious. Major technology companies like Google and Amazon have initi-
ated projects to investigate the integration of delivery drones in the civil-
ian airspace, extending to the consumer’s doorstep[13–15]. By leverag-
ing the latest technological advancements in computing, communication
systems, and connectivity of network systems, UAVs could transform the
modern world and available services.
Local research on UAV operation includes a study by Ingham in 2008[16],
who proposed a roadmap for operating UAVs in the South African airspace
in his PhD thesis at Stellenbosch University. In 2010, Maneschijn[17] inves-
tigated frameworks for carrying out airworthiness certification of UAV’s
for their safe integration into civilian airspace, in his PhD thesis at Stellen-
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Table 1.1: UAVs vs Piloted Aircrafts Mishap Rate per 100, 000 hrs




General Aviation Aircrafts 1
Regional/Commuter Airliners 0.1
Larger Airliners 0.01
bosch University. In terms of local legislation, the South African Civil Avi-
ation Authority (SACAA) has issued regulations for operating a"Remotely
piloted aircraft", "Toy aircraft" and "Model aircraft" [18] which the SACAA
has acknowledged may require reworking.
1.3 Reliability Considerations for UAVs
Today, there are still several challenges that remain unresolved before a
routine safe integration of UAVs into civilian airspace can be realised. In
addition to cost, supply-and-demand issues, a major stumbling block fac-
ing UAVs is their history of poor reliability [4] and the lack of accepted
regulations and standards for their certification, integration and safe op-
eration. In particular, the lack of airworthiness certification for UAVs has
been a primary impediment [16, 17]. This has prevented a routine integra-
tion of UAVs to operate within unsegregated civilian airspace, despite the
apparent benefits. Other issues for affecting progress are ethical impact
and social acceptance, lack of legal framework, including criminal or civil
liability and insurance, which are all a subject of ongoing research.
The U.S Office of Defense investigated the reliability of UAVs in a re-
port released in 2005 [19], which reported that 17% of UAV accidents were
attributable to human factors. The remaining 83% of accidents were due
to faults in the propulsive system, control surfaces, sensors, or extreme
environmental phenomena. The study also reported on class A accidents
(“significant aircraft damage or total loss”) per 100,000 hours of flight for
UAVs. The data is reproduced in Table 1.1, with corresponding data for
passenger aircraft tabled alongside for comparison. As seen from the com-
parative data, the reliability of UAVs requires improvement when com-
pared to passenger aircraft. While UAVs and passenger aircraft typically
undertake entirely different assignments, it is noteworthy that Pioneer
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suffers 33 000% more mishaps than the safest airliner aircraft. References
[17, 19–24] can be consulted for historical data on aircraft accidents.
Although passenger aircraft are more reliable than UAVs, similar reli-
ability and safety concerns have been highlighted in commercial aviation.
From analysing accident data on scheduled commercial flights, ICAO spec-
ified three accident categories that they classified as high-risk, to be pri-
oritised in their Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) for 2017 - 2019. The
three high failure categories are
• Runway safety (RS) related events
• Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT).
• Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I); and
The charts in Figure 1.1 show statistical data relating to these high-
risk accident categories until 2019. Accidents attributed to RS accounted
for almost 50 % of the total accidents while LOC-I accounted for just less
than 40 %. In particular, the trends show that LOC-I accidents have not
decreased in many years. This observation and similar observations with
UAV failure rates have led to this conclusion; to use available computing
and aviation technologies to recover aircraft in these accident situations
automatically.
Thus, reliability, maintainability, recoverability, and survivability are
to be among the primary focus areas when designing future aerial vehi-
cles. The U.S Department of Defense’s UAVs Roadmap 2005-2030 calls for
new designs focusing on self-repairing, smart flight-control systems. De-
veloping self-repairing control systems is probably the most critical mile-
stone in aerial vehicles attaining total and sustainable autonomy. Such ve-
hicles should have capabilities to be deployed to unfamiliar, unexpected,
or hazardous environments, and complete their mission despite suffering
component failure, or even a wilful attack. A key enabler towards achiev-
ing this level of autonomy will be the development of adaptable control
systems which take into account the health status and performance capa-
bilities of the aircraft in real-time, adjust and adapt the control system to
maintain some minimum performance and safety.
Robust control has been effectively applied to a wide class of control
systems to explicitly deal with uncertainties, bounded modelling errors
and system faults. However, severe system or component failures, such as
a damaged wing or stuck (locked-in-place) control surface in a UAV, can
drastically alter the aircraft’s behaviour and render it uncontrollable, lead-
ing to more catastrophic failures. Thus, new and enhanced enabling tech-
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Figure 1.1: Commercial flights accident and fatality statistics from 2008 to 2019. Source:
Adapted from [1]
nologies and control systems are required to realise “self-repairing, smart-
control systems”. Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) is one such enabling tech-
nology. FTC employs reconfigurable and adaptive control laws that au-
tomatically detect and accommodate faults to ensure the continued safe
operation of the system in the presence of some manageable system faults.
1.4 Fault Tolerant Control
FTC is an emergent sub-component of control systems, which focuses on
tolerance to systems faults. The main idea in FTC is to develop fault adap-
tation control laws designed to maintain intended or safe operation of the
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controlled system, typically at reduced performance levels, rather than
failing entirely in the event that some part of the system is faulty. In aerial
vehicles, faults may result from wear and tear of old equipment, loss of
communication, sensor failures, damage from accidents, or the interaction
with the environment such as dust, severe wind gusts or icing [21, 22, 24].
The most effective FTC systems (FTCS) include a real-time "system
health " monitoring functionality for fault detection and isolation (FDI).
The primary objective of the FDI system is to automatically detect faults as
soon as they occur, isolate their location, source or type, thereby enabling
a supervisory control system to minimise or eliminate their effects on the
overall system, to avoid loss of control or a more catastrophic failure. The
FDI provides fault information to the FTC system, which reconfigures the
controller to accommodate and adapt to the system’s faulty conditions.
Fault tolerance has historically been founded on hardware (equipment)
redundancy, especially for safety-critical systems such as chemical, nu-
clear plants or passenger aircraft. In this approach, additional (secondary,
tertiary, etc.) spare equipment and software are installed in parallel with
the primary, such that in the event of a failure of the primary, the control
system may switch to the secondary for fault tolerance. Hardware redun-
dancy can be extremely effective; however, its main drawback is increased
installation complexity, cost, weight, and maintenance, which makes it un-
suitable for small, low-cost UAVs.
1.5 Previous Research at Stellenbosch University
The Electronic Systems Laboratory (ESL), which operates at Stellenbosch
University has been engaged in research on advanced control systems in
UAVs and passenger aircraft. For research on Fault Tolerant Control, the
ESL has utilised the Meraka modular UAV as a testbed, amongst other
UAVs. The Meraka UAV was developed by Meraka Institute of the Coun-
cil for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and is fitted with an au-
topilot developed at Stellenbosch University, to carry out research focus-
ing mainly on Single Fault Survivability (SFS)[25].
The Meraka UAV is especially suited for FTC due to its intrinsic redun-
dancy built into its geometry and control surfaces configuration. The UAV
has eight control surfaces, namely, two elevators, two flaps, two rudders
and two ailerons.
All control surfaces can be controlled independently. The right and left
ailerons/elevators can be deflected up or down independently while the
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Figure 1.2: Potograph of the Meraka UAV
left and right rudders can be deflected right or left independently. The
Meraka UAV design also allows for a pitching moment to be produced
with ailerons and a rolling moment with elevators, a property which of-
fers further redundancy. Due to being located above the centre of grav-
ity, any rudder deflection will produce a pitching moment, in addition to
rolling and yawing. The redundant configuration of the Meraka UAV can
be easily comprehended by examining its geometry, as seen in Figure 1.2.
Fault Tolerant Control research at Stellenbosch University originated
with the focus to develop tools and architectures for an FTC system capa-
ble of rescuing an aircraft from undesirable flight conditions and compo-
nent failures. Figure 1.3 shows the five-layer FTC architecture developed
at Stellenbosch University, which is described in reference [26]. This thesis
contributes to the Physical Aircraft Layer, whose purpose includes system

























































Figure 1.3: Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) architecture
Some FDI and FTC procedures have already been proposed and suc-
cessfully validated with flight tests by various students at Stellenbosch
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University. In 2011, [27] Willem Basson utilised Adaptive Control to re-
cover longitudinal stability in an aircraft following a damage-induced shift
in the aircraft’s centre of gravity. In 2011, Lionel Basson [28] presented
his work on a control allocation system, which focused on minimising
the impact of faults on the reconfiguration of the guidance, navigation
and control (GNC) system in the FTC architecture described above. The
approach relied on minimising the difference between the desired and
achievable aircraft performance parameters. Pietersen and Appel [26, 29]
both investigated UAV parameter estimation using recursive least-square
approaches for FTC. However, these works did not investigate the detec-
tion or isolation of faults.
Odendaal [3] presented his work on fault isolation by utilising the
multiple-model (MM) approach. The method required a bank of nine ex-
tended Kalman filters, with each responsible for the isolation of each con-
trol surface. Multiple-model approaches have high computational require-
ments. However, modern computing technologies allowed MM approaches
to gain popularity. The parallel structure of the MM framework provides
an intrinsic fast isolation property but requires further statistical analysis
of each filter to isolate faults. Recently in 2017, Hugo [30] successfully im-
plemented an autonomous landing design for a UAV after a partial loss of
the wing, horizontal and vertical stabilisers.
1.6 Research Objectives
The primary objective of this thesis is the design and validation of model-
based FDI approaches for UAVs. The complete design of an FTCS is out-
side the scope of this thesis. Rather, the research focuses on developing a
reliable FDI design, allowing a reliable FTCS design. This study only con-
siders faults occurring in sensors and actuators. Such faults can be realis-
tically modelled, resulting in a convenient FDI design that can be cheaply
and rigorously tested in computer simulations before prototyping or im-
plementation. The FDI techniques presented are based on the mathemat-
ical analysis of the aircraft’s dynamic model. Catastrophic failures such
as structural damage may render the UAV uncontrollable, in which case
special emergency landing procedures such as by parachute have been
proposed for UAV recovery[31, 32]. Liu et al. proposed a method for un-
powered emergency landing of a UAV by spiral drop after engine failure
[33]. Catastrophic structural failures in the airframe are not considered in
this thesis.
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In UAVs, actuators are used to deflect the elevators, ailerons, flaps,
and rudders for flight control. Among known actuator faults, the loss
of effectiveness (gain-loss), offset (bias) and locked-in-place (stuck), are
among the most common faults in actuators. Therefore this study focuses
on the detection and diagnosis of actuator bias, locked-in-place (LIP) and
loss of effectiveness (gain-loss) faults in actuators. The FDI strategy devel-
oped is highly robust and capable of detecting multiple actuator faults of
any magnitude within deflection saturation limits, including faults occur-
ring concurrently. The FDI algorithm is formulated within the Two-Stage
Kalman Filter. The algorithm is further extended to enable the detection of
sensor faults by extracting fault signatures from the innovation sequence
of the TSKF.
In larger passenger aircraft, fault tolerance is typically based on hard-
ware redundancy, where multiple actuators, computers and sensors are
deployed in parallel, in a duplex, triplex or higher redundancy config-
uration to function in parallel or as backups. In this approach, identical
or related actuators are spatially distributed in a strategic way to localise
faults quickly, and sensor measurements are compared for consistency.
However, an FTCS design in small, low-cost UAVs should not signifi-
cantly increase the number of actuators, computing devices, sensors, de-
sign or installation complexity involved. For this reason, this thesis con-
siders model-based FDI.
Even without hardware redundancy, a reliable FDI should detect faults
quickly and accurately. This is particularly important in aerial vehicles
where system states can change significantly in very short periods. More-
over, different faults produce different effects which must be dealt with
in specific ways. Parametric faults such as a shift in the centre of mass
can be addressed with robust feedback control. However, a stuck actua-
tor represents a discrete fault, which affects system dynamics and changes
the system mode or behaviour differently than parametric faults. Actuator
faults in a UAV must be detected and isolated very quickly, and detection
must be done among the continuous mode changes to ensure realtime
control reconfiguration and recovery of the aircraft. The fast isolation of
faults is in aerial vehicles is especially critical as recovery must be almost
immediate.
Moreover, it is typically required to maintain the aircraft close to some
desired or equilibrium trajectory. Actuator faults can significantly upset
the aircraft’s trajectory and nudge it into highly nonlinear behaviours,
which may cause linearly derived algorithms to fail. In this study, a linear
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analysis of the Meraka UAV reveals open-loop instability in the phugoid
and spiral modes as well as heavy coupling between the longitudinal
and lateral motions. If actuator faults are not detected and isolated very
quickly, the aircraft may assume highly nonlinear motions, resulting in
reduced control capabilities. A reliable and fast FDI system is required to
enable the FTCS to respond swiftly to faults and maintain vehicle control.
Moreover, unaccommodated faults cause unnecessary structural loads dur-
ing flight, which is undesirable for energy efficiency, aircraft life-cycle and
reliability. FDI allows the opportunity to power-down failed components
or optimise flight set-points, which can reduce structural load and im-
prove energy efficiency, thereby contributing to the European Vision 2020
directives aimed at "greening" aircraft [2].
The design considerations and limitations relating to the proposed FDI
approach are as follows.
• The FDI algorithms developed should be simple enough to imple-
ment in small, low-cost UAVs.
• The phugoid and spiral modes of the Meraka UAV show open-loop
instability. Unaccounted actuator faults will degrade closed-loop ca-
pabilities. Therefore, faults must be isolated quickly to ensure fault
recovery and stability.
• Additional redundant computing devices, actuators, and sensors will
increase the overall weight of the aircraft, which is undesirable for
small UAVs. Instead of hardware redundancy, this study considers
analytical redundancy, which relies on the mathematical character-
isation of the UAV and only requires the standard avionics already
available for guidance, navigation and control (GNC) to realise FDI.
• Although the positions of the actuators are not measured, their fault
statuses are tracked in realtime.
• The UAV is equipped with an autopilot which has a masking effect
on faults. An active FDI approach is developed to isolate masked
faults.
• The abrupt nature of actuator faults induce the strongly coupled be-
haviour between the longitudinal and the lateral axes. Moreover, the
redundant control surfaces have identical effects in the moments pro-
duced, which makes fault isolation in these surfaces nontrivial. How-
ever, the FDI developed can distinguish between faults occurring in
the left or right control surfaces.
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• The two rudders always produce identical moments due to being
mathematically equivalent. To distinguish between faults in the right
and left rudder faults requires active FDI strategies, which are devel-
oped in this study.
• The FDI proposed in this thesis can handle multiple faults, and by
making simple changes on parts of the analytical model, the FDI ap-
proach can handle different classes of faults, namely, bias, LoE, and
LIP actuator faults. Thus, the FDI can be tuned for varying systems
and classes of faults by basic adjustments in the model definition.
• In real-life application, the KF state can be affected by the intermit-
tent loss of sensor signals or spurious data. To add resilience and ro-
bustness to the FDI algorithm, sensor fault detection is incorporated
into the FDI design. Sensor faults are detected, regardless of type, so
that intermittent, unreliable sensor measurements can be discarded
to maintain accurate state estimates.
• Faults are by nature hidden or absent in the system until they appear
abruptly. Thus model-based FDI is a self-contradictory objective to
find an algorithm that tracks slow-changing and fast-changing pa-
rameters at the same time. Within the KF algorithm, this translates to
selecting an additive covariance matrix for the fault parameter, that is
neither too high nor too low. Solutions relying on the optimisation of
the two requirements may not always result in a reliable FDI where
fast decisions are needed. In this thesis, several adaptive techniques
are incorporate into the FDI to ensure both sensitivity and robust-
ness, based on the level of variation in the fault parameters.
Fault information computed by the FDI is not instantaneously avail-
able to the FTCS for control reconfiguration. The FDI requires a certain
amount of time to detect, isolate and reconstruct occurring faults. It is thus
necessary to define some parameters to evaluate the reliability, accuracy
and the time taken by the FDI to isolate faults. Performance indices are
defined to evaluate the performance of the proposed FDI strategy.
The previous FDI approaches proposed at ESL reviewed in preced-
ing sections are incapable of handling multiple-concurrent faults (faults
occurring at the same time). More precisely, these approaches assume a
single fault at any given time and require that the initial fault be rectified
before having the ability to detect the next fault. Indeed most techniques
available do not attempt to isolate multiple faults concurrently. The FDI
techniques presented in this thesis can isolate multiple faults occurring
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concurrently. Moreover, only two filters are required to track all the faults
in the UAV, which is advantageous from a computing and hardware point
of view.
1.7 Research Methodology
This research considers the problem of FDI for small-sized UAVs. The
project begins with a rigorous review of existing FDI and FTC methods
commonly encountered in literature. From among the FDI methods in-
vestigated, model-based FDI, also called analytical redundancy, is pre-
ferred due to meeting the main objectives of this research. Model-based
FDI offers opportunities for a low-cost, iterative design and testing in a
simulated environment, without significant hardware upgrades or instal-
lations, which would have been required in the case of hardware redun-
dancy. Without additional hardware, there is no added weight to the ex-
isting UAV. The FDI design can be cheaply tested in a simulated environ-
ment as many times as necessary before implementation.
The main drawback with model-based FDI is that a highly accurate
mathematical model of the aircraft is required. A six-degrees-of-freedom
(6-DoF) nonlinear model of the Meraka UAV is developed in MATLAB®
and Simulink® software packages, as a simulated testbed for the FDI. Dry-
den turbulence models, discrete gusts, and wind shears are added to the
nonlinear model to mimic real-world disturbances. A linearised version
of the UAV model is also developed to enable linear FDI design.
There are notable differences between the aircraft model developed in
this study, and the classical aircraft model formulation. Typically, fixed-
wing aircraft have multiple elevators and ailerons to the left and right of
the fuselage. However, their mathematical description usually combines
the effects of two or more related control surfaces to create some virtual
control surface equivalent. For example, the effect of the two right and
left elevators on the pitching moment are often combined to produce one
virtual elevator effect as follows:
q̄Sref c̄CmδE
δE = q̄Sref c̄CmδEr
δEr + q̄Sref c̄CmδEl
δEl (1.7.1)





2 . The classical formulation, which is on the LHS of
Equation (1.7.1), does not distinguish between pitching the moment con-
tributed by the right and left elevators separately, and is therefore not suit-
able for the FDI and FTC problem. A split-surface model, having the form
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on the RHS of Equation (1.7.1) is developed in this thesis to ensure that
moments induced by the left and right control surfaces are monitored sep-
arately and are distinguishable in real-time. For example, a negative (up-
ward) deflection in the right aileron will not only cause a positive rolling
moment but will also generate a small positive pitching moment. On the
other hand, the same negative (downward) deflection in the left aileron
will also generate a positive rolling moment, but produce a negative pitch-
ing moment in contrast. These subtle distinctions in aerodynamical effects
produced by each individual control surface are necessary to permit their
isolation based on the mathematical characterisation.
The FDI strategy developed in this thesis utilises Kalman filtering (KF)
techniques to estimate system states and the fault parameters jointly. Aug-
menting the fault parameters into the state vector will significantly in-
crease the computational load requirements and may cause numerical
problems in ill-conditioned systems. In the proposed approach, this prob-
lem is eliminated by estimating system states and fault parameters sepa-
rately in two parallel coupled Kalman filters, rather than by augmenting
the fault parameter into the state vector. This approach is called the Two-
Stage Kalman Filter (TSKF). Chapter 4 discusses the advantages of the
TSKF over the Augmented KF (AKF) approach in greater detail.
The control surfaces induce symmetric and identical moments that are
indistinguishable with a direct application of a single TSKF. In model-
based FDI, it is necessary to consider the concepts of detectability and
isolability. When parameters can be jointly computed and isolated using
one mathematical model, it is said that they are identifiable, or isolable
by that model. In references [34, 35] detectability and isolability were de-
rived for the Unknown Input Observer formulation based on the concepts
of observability and controllability.
For the case of the Meraka UAV studied in this thesis, the isolability
condition is not satisfied for all control surfaces when a single TSKF is
utilised to estimate all fault parameters. When all faults are not isolable,
multiple estimators may be utilised. Therefore, the FDI problem is split
into two separate filters, which in this thesis, are termed as the elevator-
aileron (EA) filter and an elevator-rudder (ER) filter. By applying the EA
and ER filters in parallel, all the control surfaces become isolable at all
times. The EA filter is capable of tracking and isolating all faults occurring
in the elevators and ailerons, including multiple faults occurring at the
same time. The ER filter is selected purposely to ensure fault isolation of
the left and right rudders using active FDI techniques.
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Unlike with the elevators and ailerons, all the moments generated by
the right and left rudders are always identical, making it challenging to
isolate rudder faults by only tracking their effects on the moments. This
is due to the two rudders being equivalent in their mathematical mod-
elling. To achieve rudder fault isolation, active FDI (AFDI) algorithms are
developed. In the case of a bias fault, the nonlinear relationship between
rudder deflection and pitching moment is assessed online to extract fault
signatures. Due to the rudders being located above the centre of mass on
the Meraka UAV, any rudder deflection in any direction will cause a posi-
tive pitching moment. The rudder-induced pitching moment is modelled
as a function of the absolute value of rudder deflection in this study, i.e.
Cm = f(| δR |), for the nonlinear simulation model.
The AFDI technique developed to isolate rudder bias faults functions
by tracking the effects the rudders on the pitching moment. A bias fault on
one of the rudders will offset trim and cause unwanted pitching. Because
the UAV is fitted with a feedback controller, the elevator will compensate
for the rudder induced pitch and find a new "biased" elevator trim setting.
As a result, the ER filter will falsely estimate an elevator bias (this "false"
elevator bias will henceforth be called a pseudo-elevator bias in this thesis),
which in truth, represents right or left rudder fault. Also, the ER filter will
still detect and reconstruct rudder faults, but attribute half of the actual
bias magnitude to both rudders, regardless of which of the two is faulty.
The AFDI approach monitors this behaviour in the pseudo-elevator bias to
determine which rudder is truly faulty.
Firstly, the FDI algorithm is able to identify the presence of pseudo-
elevator bias and distinguish it from a real elevator bias, given the fact that
the EA already correctly tracks the real elevator faults. In other words, if
there is a real (true) elevator fault, it will appear in the EA filter and will
be isolated correctly. In the case of the ER filter, observe that since a fault
in any of the rudders will induce the pseudo-elevator bias, the same faulty
rudder can be used to remove the pseudo-elevator bias by forcing the faulty
rudder to a correct trim setting that induces no pitch. This is realised with
an active FDI strategy which injects auxiliary signals into the rudders in
order to remove any rudder induced pitching moment.
The rudder whose auxiliary excitation restores or approximates the
original "pre-fault" elevator trim setting (the rudder whose auxiliary ma-
nipulation can eliminate the pseudo-elevator bias) is declared as the rudder
with a bias fault. Note that if the "healthy" rudder is actively injected, the
pseudo-elevator bias can only increase. In contrast, if the faulty rudder is in-
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jected with an auxiliary signal, the pseudo-elevator bias can either increase
or decrease down to zero. This is the distinguishing factor that allows the
active isolation of the faulty rudder. The decrease in the pseudo-elevator bias
to zero lets the FDI know that the biased rudder was deflected back to the
unbiased trim or zero deflection, resulting in the elevator reverting to the
original trim setting. With the elevator back at the trim setting, the pseudo-
elevator bias disappears, and the rudder that removed it is declared as the
one having a bias fault.
In the case of stuck rudders, the same isolability problem exists. The
AFDI approach for this case involves exciting each rudder with a precal-
culated auxiliary signal having a specific frequency, and monitoring the
presence of such frequency in the system states or computed signals. If
the healthy rudder is excited, the frequency of the excitation signal will
induce moments which propagate through the system and appear in mea-
sured signals and calculated parameters. If a stuck rudder is excited, there
will be no induced moments or system response, and the excitation signal
frequency will not be present in the processed signals. The rudder induc-
ing no response in the system is declared as faulty by the AFDI algorithm.
Performance indices are calculated to evaluate the effectiveness and
reliability of the FDI. Once developed, the FDI is tested on the nonlin-
ear stochastic computer-simulated UAV model. The three fault classes,
namely, bias, LoE and LIP, are routinely tested under single fault and
multiple fault scenarios for different fault sizes. With each test scenario,
the FDI performance indices are calculated, and the simulated results are
plotted. Furthermore, to test the robustness and reliability of the FDI, a
Monte Carlo (MC) campaign of 1000 fault cases (nMC = 1000), equal-
ity distributed between the six (6) control surfaces, is carried out. Each
MC run is performed with randomly distributed shifts in c.o.g, change in
mass, sensor errors, and aerodynamical coefficients. This procedure is car-
ried out for the bias, LoE and LIP fault cases. Simulation results from the
MC campaign are presented in this thesis. To conclude the research, re-
lated work which could not be completed within this thesis is considered.
Recommendations are made for future researchers who may be focusing
on similar problems considered in this study.
1.8 Contributions in the Thesis
The research project makes the following contributions.
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• A novel adaptation procedure (henceforth referenced as Qγ− Adap-
tation in this thesis) is developed to improve both the sensitivity and
robustness of the FDI. The additive covariance matrix for the fault
parameter estimates needs to be large enough to track abrupt changes
in the fault parameters, and at the same time, it needs to be small
enough to reduce sensitivity to disturbances in the "no-fault" condi-
tions to avoid high false alarm rates. However, a fixed (time-invariant)
covariance is not ideal because it is guaranteed to be either too small
or too large during different fault scenarios. That is, a covariance ma-
trix that is ideal for the "no-fault" scenario is not ideal for the "in-
fault" scenario. Moreover, the rate of variation of all parameters will
not be the same during the entire evolution of the controlled system.
Indeed, the rate of variation in affected parameters will grow signifi-
cantly during faults, while unaffected parameters remain slow vary-
ing. Thus a selective approach is needed to adaptiveQγ based on af-
fected parameters. An adaptive procedures based on a single scaling
(or forgetting) factor is unsuitable in a multivariate system, as is the
Meraka UAV, because not all fault parameters have the same varia-
tion rate. The adaptation procedure proposed is based on scaling the
eigenvalues of theQγ covariance matrix by multiple forgetting (scal-
ing) factors in the direction of parameter variations. The multiple-
factor approach is advantageous over a single factor approach, as
it avoids scaling all parameters equally which would lead the the
"blow-up" [36] phenomena due to the algorithm being too noise sen-
sitive.
• Typically, a single FDI system is designed and tailored to detect a spe-
cific, single type of fault. In this study, a multi-mode hybrid switch-
ing model is developed to track both bias, LoE and LIP faults within
a single model-based FDI design.
• A novel adaptive threshold technique is developed for enhanced fault
isolation. The rate of variation of faults is random and non-uniform
in time and space. If a static alarm (an alarm to flag the presence of
faults) threshold is set too low, there will be high false alarms rate
cause by noise in the parameters. If set too high, there will be high
missed detections. In highly coupled multivariable nonlinear sys-
tems, abrupt faults will induce transient behaviour, typically a spike
response, in the other system states and parameters. This transient
behavior can cause momentary jumps in fault parameters, which
would trigger false alarms. In this thesis, an adaptive threshold is de-
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veloped, based on the normalised innovation squared (NIS), which
represents the biasedness in the TSKF. The NIS allows setting the
fault isolation threshold probabilistically for a specific level of confi-
dence, owing to the NIS’s χ2 distribution properties.
• A novel active FDI strategy is developed to distinguish between bias,
LoE and LIP faults. The hybrid multi-mode model needs to switch
appropriately to reconstruct the correct magnitude of the fault pa-
rameter in the case of a LIP or LoE actuator fault. The nominal (de-
fault) FDI model is set up to detect bias, LoE and LIP faults. How-
ever, only the bias fault parameters will be reconstructed accurately
with the nominal model. To reconstruct LIP and LoE after their de-
tection, the hybrid model must switch appropriately. The switching
logic relies on the controlled system’s response to AFDI excitation
strategy. Whenever a fault is detected, sinusoidal auxiliary excita-
tion signals whose magnitudes are selected from the kernel of the
linearised input (B) matrix, at a frequency ω, are injected into the
controls. If the fault is a bias type, there will be no response in the
system due to the orthogonal signals cancelling each other out, in
which case a bias fault is declared and isolated using the procedures
described in Chapter 4. If the fault is a LoE or LIP type, the aux-
iliary controls cannot fulfil uex ∈ ker(B) and the excitation signal
frequency ω will propagate through the system and appear in the
measured signals and computed parameters. To distinguish between
LIP and LoE faults, another sinusoidal is injected into the faulty ac-
tuator’s input. If there’s no response the fault is declared as LIP type,
and otherwise an LoE type. Next the model switches appropriately
for LIP or LoE faults. In the case of a LIP fault, the switching removes
the effect of the stuck rudder from controls input by nulling the cor-
responding row in the B matrix, which allows the stuck position to
be estimated entirely as part of the system states.
• A novel active FDI strategy is developed to isolate rudder bias faults
As described in preceding sections, this procedure works by remov-
ing rudder induced pitching moment by deflecting the biased rudder
to the trim setting. The rudder with which this is achieved can only
be the one with a bias fault.
• An adaptive state estimation procedure based on multiple scaling
factors, adapting the KF’s estimate error covariance matrix is pro-
posed. This formulation improves on popular techniques that use
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a single scaling factor. A single factor is undesirable in large multi-
variate systems where state variations are not evenly spread. Once
biasedness is detected (once the NIS exceeds a preset threshold), the
algorithm generates multiple scaling factors based on matching the
sampled innovation covariance with the theoretical covariance within
the KF algorithm.
1.9 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents a general literature review in the field of FDI and
FTCS. The chapter focuses on FDI and FTCS techniques typically ap-
plied to aerial vehicles and UAVs. The chapter concludes with a re-
view of model-based FDI techniques commonly encountered the lit-
erature.
• Chapter 3 presents the nonlinear 6-DoF model of the Meraka UAV.
The chapter develops wind, gust and turbulent models to allow to
mimic real flight in high fidelity simulation. The chapter concludes
with a linearised version of the Meraka UAV model to which is utilised
in the proposed FDI designs.
• Chapter 4 defines the structure of the Two-Stage Extended Kalman fil-
ter (TSEKF), which is to be used to estimate bias, LoE and LIP actua-
tor faults. Formulations of the fault models for the three cases are pre-
sented. Adaptive techniques are proposed to introduce robustness
to the FDI. The Joint-Unscented Kalman filter and Dual-Unscented
Kalman filter are presented and tested for comparison with the TSKF.
The fault isolation technique used in this thesis is then presented.
• In Chapter 5, extensive simulations of fault scenarios of different types
and magnitudes of faults are carried out to validate the FDI approach.
The presented FDI algorithms are compared and evaluated.
• The thesis is concluded with Chapter 6, which makes recommenda-
tions for future research in related fields. Several appendices are in-




This chapter presents the literature review of some of the typical methods
encountered in the fault-tolerant control (FTC) and fault detection and
isolation (FDI). In aligning with the presented research work, this chapter
focuses mainly on model-based fault diagnosis and active fault-tolerant
control (AFTC). The chapter starts with a brief discussion of the various
terminologies in FTC that are used throughout this study.
The complete review of FTC and FDI techniques in research and in-
dustry is beyond the scope of this thesis. For complete coverage of these
techniques, the reader is referred to several survey papers which have ap-
peared since the 1990s [37–48].
2.1 Definition of Fault-tolerant Systems
2.1.1 Faults and Failures
There are some existing and established terminologies in the field of FTC
which are reviewed in this section. The International Federation of Au-
tomatic Control (IFAC) SAFEPROCESS Technical Committee has guided
standardisation efforts relating to FTC. IFAC proposed the below defini-
tions which are now accepted as standard.
• Fault: An unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic prop-
erty or parameter of the system from the acceptable / usual / stan-
dard condition.
• Failure: A permanent interruption of a system’s ability to perform a
required function under specified operating conditions.
In alignment with the above definitions, faults are understood in this
thesis as unwanted events that alter the aircraft at component or system
21
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level, inducing unexpected behaviour that impede the full operation of
the affected components of systems. Events that result in the airframe
completely losing its aerodynamical properties are considered catastrophic
failures and are not considered for FDI in this study. A stuck actuator is an
example of a fault treated in this study; however, a complete wing loss
represents a catastrophic failure that could result in a complete loss of air-
craft.
In large-scale control systems, faults may not manifest in the observ-
able system behaviour immediately, but may ultimately lead to system
failure if not corrected. Some faults have hidden or slow effects on the sys-
tem, which makes their detection difficult. Consequently, with the excep-
tion of accidents, most failures are usually a manifestation of undetected
or unattended system faults. A proven strategy to prevent system failures
is by implementing appropriate maintenance regimes. FDI can improve
maintenance regimes by enabling condition-based maintenance (CMB)
whereby maintenance is carried out on particular components once faults








Figure 2.1: Different sources of faults in control systems
In Figure 2.1 is shown three possible sources of faults in the controlled
system. A UAV can be considered a plant comprised of distinct subsys-
tems, namely, actuators, process components, and sensors. The malfunc-
tioning of a servo motor is an example of an actuator fault. A damaged
wing or other UAV structural changes indicate process faults, while overly
exaggerated sensor readings indicate sensor faults. The objective of an FDI
system is to detect and locate faults, distinguish between the system com-
ponents, and locate (isolate) the faulty component early enough to avoid
complete system failure. Faults can also be classified according to their
time-variant characteristics as follows (see Figure 2.2):
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(a) Abrupt Fault (b) Intermittent Fault (c) Incipient Fault
Figure 2.2: The types of faults in control systems
• Abrupt faults: an unwanted abrupt jump in the system parameter
value when the fault occurs
• Incipient faults: a gradual evolution of a fault into a significant a
value
• Intermittent faults: the fault appear and disappear repeatedly and/or
randomly
Abrupt faults are characterised by a step-like jump in the behaviour
of the system, while incipient faults drift gradually, typically at a slow
rate. Intermittent faults are the repeated occurrences of transient faults
characterised by appearing and reappearing randomly. An example of a
hidden fault is a fault on standby equipment, which can only be visible on
when this equipment is activated.
2.1.1.1 Sensor Faults
UAVs are typically fitted with several types of sensing equipment for sys-
tem identification, guidance, navigation and control. Unattended sensor
faults can lead to more severe failures of the UAV, especially in the absence
of redundancy. Figure 2.3 shows typical faults found in sensors, namely,
bias, accuracy loss or calibration error, drifting measurement and frozen
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Figure 2.3: Typical faults in sensors occurring at tF ; dashed - measured, and solid - true
state




xj(t) ∀t > tFj Fault
xj(t) + ḃj(t) ḃ(t) = 0, bj(tFj ) 6= 0 ∀t > tFj Bias
xj(t) + bj(t) |b(t)| = ajt, 0 < aj < ε ∀t > tFj Drift
xj(t) + bj(t) |b(t)| ≤ b̄j, bj(t) ∈ L∞ ∀t > tFj LoA
xj(tFj ) ∀t > tFj Frozen
(2.1.1)
where tF denotes the instant when the fault appears in the ith sensing
device, while bj is the coefficient of deviation such that bj ∈ [−b̄, b̄] where
bj > 0.
2.1.1.2 Actuator Faults
In control systems, actuators are used to generate forces or moments, drive
control system and achieve some desired dynamic behaviour. In an air-
craft, they are used to deflect control surfaces such as elevators, ailerons,
rudders, engine throttle or to operator the landing-gear mechanism. Par-
ticularly in UAVs, the failure to detect and recover from actuator faults
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Figure 2.4: Typical faults in actuators occurring at tF ; dashed - desired, and solid - true
actuator position
will lead to catastrophic events. Figure 2.4 shows the typical faults occur-
ring in actuators. These fault types in actuator are expressed as follows:
uai (t) =

uci (t) ∀t No Fault
γiu
c
i (t) 0 < γ < 1,∀t > tFi LoE
0 ∀t > tFi Floating
uimin ∨ uimax ∀t > tFi LIP
xi(tFi) ∀t > tFi HOF
(2.1.2)
This signal uai (t) is the actual actuation command to the ith control sur-
face, while uci (t) is the control command signal given for the same surface.
tFi denotes the instance when the fault occurs in the ith control surface. Fi-
nally uimin and uimax represents the saturation levels of the control surfaces.
The above faults can be represented mathematically as follows:
uai (t) = δiγiu
c
i (t) + (1− δi)ūi (2.1.3)
where δi = 1, γi = 1 during the no fault conditions, while δi = 1,
0 < γi < 1 during LOE type fault and δi = 0 during other type faults
(float, LIP and HOF). The ūi is the position at which the actuator is locked.
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2.2 Fault Tolerant Control System
The past four decades have seen growing demands for the safety, relia-
bility, maintainability, and survivability in control systems; the result of
which has been increased interest for research in fault detection and diag-
nosis (FDD) and Fault-Tolerant Control. Over the years, FTC has gained
recognition from both industry and academia due to allowing collabora-
tive research and technologies focused on improving safety, productivity,
efficiency, and permanence. While FTC was mainly aimed at traditionally
safety-critical systems, such as chemical, nuclear plants or aircraft, techno-
logical advancement has enabled FTC in a broader range of engineering
applications.
A fault-tolerant control system (FTCS) is a control system that is de-
signed with the ability to automatically accommodate (or tolerate) system
component faults while maintaining stability and safe operation, possibly
at some reduced performance levels. The primary goal of fault tolerance
is to prevent the prolongation and effect of system faults from causing ab-
normal or unsafe system behaviour. An FTCS compensates for the effects
of system faults by reconfiguring the control laws or adjusting the control
structure to recover system performance. To have fault-tolerant capabili-
ties, an FTCS may offer sub-optimal performance during normal system
operation. There are generally two frameworks for FTC, namely, passive
FTC and active FTC.
2.2.1 Passive Tolerant Control
Passive fault-tolerant control (PFTC) is analogous to robust control and
does not require fault detection and isolation (FDI) or control reconfigu-
ration for fault-tolerant capabilities. In PFTC, a single super robust con-
trol law is deployed with the ability to compensate for model uncertain-
ties, system parameter variations and system disturbances, and maintain
stability and acceptable performance levels for some class of expected of
faults. In complex control systems, the cost of deploying a robust con-
troller will be the sub-optimal performance of the system in the fault-free
conditions. Severe system variations due to sensor or actuator faults can
also lead to instability in some control systems. Active FTC strategies are
necessary to overcome these limitations.
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Figure 2.5: A general FTC architecture with FDI and control reconfiguration
2.2.2 Active Tolerant Control
In contract to passive FTC, an active fault-tolerant control (AFTC) system
actively adapts to occurring system faults on-line by reconfiguring the
controller to maintain stability and acceptable system performance lev-
els. An AFTC system can accommodate faults by either selecting precom-
puted control laws or synthesising new control laws in real-time based on
information about the health status of the system. Figure 2.5 depicts the
overall architecture of an AFTC system, which has four functional blocks
or subsystems. Generally, an AFTC can be categorised into four subsys-
tems.
• Fault detection and diagnosis (FDD) or fault detection and isolation
(FDI) system.
• Re-configurable controller.
• Controller reconfiguration mechanism.
• Reference governing system.
The main feature that differentiates the AFTCS from a PFTCS is the
incorporation of FDI and a reconfigurable control structure in the for-
mer, which are absent (or passive) in the latter. In AFTCS, the FDI de-
tects and isolates faults, estimates the fault parameters (timestamp, type
and magnitude). FDI may include fault diagnosis functionality which es-
timates some set of system parameters under fault conditions to enable
the reconstruction of a "post-fault" system model. This information must
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be estimated on-line in real-time and made available to the controller re-
configuration system. Based on the fault data, the FTCS must automati-
cally reconfigure its structure and maintain stability and desired dynamic
performance. Reconfiguration here does not merely refer to the controller
adjusting some parameters, but to also to changing its structure (type or
order) or transitioning to a different set of controllers. Next, a module is
needed to evaluate the performance capabilities of the entire system, con-
sidering the degraded conditions of the system after the fault. The refer-
ence governor system serves this function by setting reference trajectory
limits and adjusting control objectives to ensure the best possible system
performance.
2.2.3 Active Fault-tolerant Control Approaches
This section reviews some of the AFTC strategies commonly encountered













Figure 2.6: Multiple model based AFTC approach
A single robust controller may not always guarantee the desired sys-
tem performance or stability. In this case, a multiple-model (MM) ap-
proach AFTC may be implemented. In the MM approach, a set of pre-
calculated control algorithms are deployed in parallel, and each controller
is fine-tuned to handle a specific, type, set or class of expected faults.
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While each controller is designed to cater for the specific scenario, con-
trollers are typically deployed one at a time. Therefore MM approaches
also include a no-fault scenario controller that is designed to optimize
performance under the fault-free conditions. The ideas behind MM based
AFTC schemes are illustrated in Figure 2.6
A switching logic is required to oversee the transitioning between pre-
set control modes based on information regarding the system health sta-
tus. The MM approach can be extended to operate in an adaptive fashion.
The controllers should also have bumpless switching.
Adaptation and Learning Using Multiple Models, Switching, and Tuning
This approach relies on the control system switching between a set
of pre-calculated control laws depending on the detected fault condition.
The approach is depicted in Figure 2.7. A dedicated model from the MM
set describes the dynamics of each fault scenario. Each model is associ-
ated with a pre-computed control law, designed off-line. During a fault,
the control system reconfigures by selecting the model-controller pair pre-
designed to archive the desired system performance in that fault scenario.
A switching logic module computes a cost function based on matching the
real system with each model. Based on this function, the system selects the
model best describing current conditions in real-time.
A reconfigurable scheme may also include a system tuning based on
parameter identification techniques and the updating of the models on-
line. These algorithms have the advantages ca be efficient, fast and stable
provided occurring faults match the predefined fault scenarios. The main
drawback with the approach is that when unmodeled or multiple fault
scenarios appear, the method may fail. Moreover, for large systems with
many different possible faults, the number of models and controllers to be
designed may be impractical.
2.2.3.2 Automatic Design
This approach encompasses schemes which rely on performing a com-
plete re-design of the control algorithm after a fault has been identified.
This approach is different from the MM approach in that, rather than
switching to or adjusting a predefined controller, a complete controller
structure changes are carried out online. Various controller re-design meth-
ods have been proposed and are available in literature [49]. To mention a
few, these include Pseudo-inverse Method (PIM), eigenstructure assign-
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Figure 2.8: The Model Reference Approach
ment, Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) design, state-feedback H∞ con-
trol or model predictive control.
2.2.3.3 Adaptive Control: The Model Reference Approach
This approach can be effective in handling components and structural
faults. The method may be reliant on other complex control systems and
functions by integrating information generated from such systems. The
main idea in this approach is that the controlled system should track the
designed reference model. For the matching of the real system and its
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model, the controller must adapt and adjust online as depicted in Figure
2.8.
Model reference methods can be categorised into direct, indirect or
a combination of the two. In the indirect adaptive control technique, the
controlled system’s parameters are identified, based on which some certainty-
equivalence control schemes are derived. For parameter identification,
techniques such the recursive least-squares or neural networks have been
utilised. In the direct adaptive control techniques, the control system’s
parameters are directly adjusted without the explicit identification of the
plant’s unknown parameters.
2.3 FTC and FDI in Aerial Vehicles
Aerial vehicles can be considered mission-critical systems mainly because
failures and accidents can easily result in catastrophic or total destruction
if not managed. Disastrous failures result in loss of mission, investments,
and in the case of passenger vehicles, loss of life. As such, the aviation
industry utilises state of the art FDI and FTC architectures that are heavily
reliant on redundancy. In this section, FTC and FDI procedures typically
utilised in aviation systems are discussed.
2.3.1 Passenger Aircraft
Especially for passenger aircraft where human life is involved, the most
reliable and proven methods for FTC and FDI must be adopted. Such
methods have historically relied on hardware and software redundancy
to handle faults easily and quickly. Hardware and software redundancy
have been used extensively on aircrafts such as Boeing 777 and Airbus
A320/A330/A340 [50–52]. Another aircraft relying heavily on redundancy
is the Airbus A380, which is equipped with four engines, two rudders,
four elevators, six flaps, six ailerons, sixteen spoilers, eighteen slats and
a surplus sensing equipment and onboard computers. The main idea in
hardware redundancy is to compare parallel information generated by
multiple hardware and transition to redundant (spare) hardware during
faults and failures.
Boeing[53] and Airbus[54] have owned patents in hardware redun-
dancy technologies for several years. Due to the cost, weight, energy con-
sumption, increased installation and maintenance requirements associ-
ated with hardware redundancy, these organisations are actively engaged
in model-based approaches for FDI[2]. Hence the use of observer-based
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oscillatory failure detection scheme in the A380 aircraft[55]. However, even
model-based FDI level in larger aircraft must be broken down to compo-
nent level to improve reliability. In reference [2] for example, model-based
FDD is carried out on an Electro-Hydro Actuator (EHA) of the Airbus 380,
to diagnose it for oscillatory faults that appear due to malfunctioning of
actuator servo-loops. The architecture for the FDD is depicted in Figure
2.9. The FDD design requires sensors in three separate places (each with
redundancy), wiring to the sensors and computing equipment for mon-
itoring of the system. This FDD infrastructure monitors just one of the
many control surfaces in the Airbus A380, with each control surface hav-
ing its own independent FDD algorithm.
The above works sought to reduce the computational and installation
burdens associated with the traditional hardware redundancy approaches
in passenger aircraft; however, the computational and hardware require-
ments are still too demanding to deploy in small-sized UAVs. Further re-
ductions in hardware and computational capacity are necessary for FDI
designs suitable for small UAVs. To detect actuator faults, a potentiometer
based sensing device could be used to measure positions of control sur-
faces, or wired off the existing potentiometer on the aircraft servo, which
would greatly simplify the involved algorithms. However, this option is
not always available and is not considered in this study. In this thesis,
control surface faults are monitored by modelling tracking their aerody-
namical effects using the system states, and without the need to measure
the actual position of the actuators.
Figure 2.9: Model based FDD applied to Aibrus A380 Electro-Hydro Actuator (EHA) -
Adapted from [2]
It is noted that model-based fault diagnosis at a component level re-
sults improves the reliability of the FDI as it demonstrated with various
types of faults in reference [2]. This is because there is more variability or
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errors to be expected with a wholistic model describing the entire system,
than with a subcomponent modelling. Moreover, passenger aircraft make
use of high cost, state of the art system components (actuators or sen-
sors) whose analytical models have usually been studied extensively and
validated experimentally, and their technical specifications and data are
available. This may not be the case in UAVs, and model-based FDI should
be based on a "text-book" model representing the UAV’s flight dynamics.
2.3.2 Space Vehicles
Deep space vehicles may involve long communication delays, and as such,
would greatly benefit from automated FDD and FTC functionalities. Con-
sidering the high cost of re-initiating any single deep-space mission (which
typically follow a single-shot approach), there is unequalled need for space
vehicles to be equipped with fault tolerance capabilities. One of NASA’s
New New Millennium Program projects called The Deep Space 1, involved
investigating advanced technologies for onboard fault diagnosis and recovery[56].
In the same project, NASA also tested their remote self-repair software.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory called the Remote Agent (RAX), was the
first artificial intelligence control system to control a spacecraft without
human supervision[57, 58]. Remote Agent showed the capabilities to plan
its mission and accurately detect faults in the spacecraft components.
2.3.3 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
In UAVs, the FDI architecture mostly used is the integrated vehicle health
management (IVHM) which includes prognosis and maintenance plan-
ning [59]. The IVHM performs online system identification by tracking the
UAV’s time-varying parameters to monitor and estimate (identify) sys-
tem faults via FDI techniques. For fault tolerance, the IVHM is usually
deployed in conjunction with the automated contingency management
(ACM) layer. The ACM uses the vehicle’s health information to evaluate
system capabilities and set new constraints based on reduced system func-
tionality, which may include flight envelope adjustments, mission opti-
mization or complete re-planning, or emergency landing. With these new
constraints, the ACM will reconfigure the control laws and adapt them to
new constraints to achieve newly optimized mission objectives.
IVHM and ACM enable better autonomy and survivability during im-
paired operating conditions. Due to limited space and computing power
in low-cost UAVs, model-based FDI is an attractive option. A potentiome-
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ter based sensor could be fitted to the control surfaces to measure their po-
sition for FDI. However, deploying additional sensors on control surfaces
and servo actuators in small, low-cost UAVs require additional wiring and
processors. The proposed model-based FDI requires no additional sensing
equipment and uses the standard sensing equipment for guidance, navi-
gation and control (GNC)
2.4 Fault Detection and Isolation
Fault Diagnosis gained primary focus during the 1970s in the United States
after their Apollo program endured a series of equipment failures, which
led to the tragedy of April 1967 [60]. FDD and FTC have since been stud-
ied extensively in the field aviation, and a large body of literature is now
available. Surveys on the state of the art literature of FTC and FDD can be
found in [37–48].A review of FDI techniques applicable to aerial vehicles
can be found in [2, 61, 62].
A fault detection and isolation system is a system that can detect the
presence of a fault and determine its location within a reasonable time to
allow for control reconfiguration. When an FDI system is also capable of
estimating the severity of the fault, it is called a Fault Detection, Isolation
and Identification (FDII) system, or Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD)
system. Because the FDI developed in this study is capable of fault diag-
nosis, FDI and FDD are used interchangeably.
Below are more terminologies relating to FTC as defined by the IFAC
Technical Committee SAFEPROCESS
• Fault detection: Determination of the faults present in a system and
the time of detection.
• Fault isolation: Determination of the kind, location and time of de-
tection of a fault. Follows fault detection.
• Fault identification: Determination of the size and time-variant be-
haviour of a fault. Follows fault isolation.
• Fault diagnosis: Determination of the kind, size, location and time of
detection of a fault. Follows fault detection. Includes fault isolation
and identification.
Fault detection refers to the FDI making a binary decision on whether
or not a fault has occurred. Isolation is distinguishing faulty components
from fault-free ones and locating (isolating) their source. Identification is
determining the size, type, time or severity of the fault. Where redundant
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sensors/actuators are used for AFTC, identification may not be a prereq-
uisite for control reconfiguration. Moreover, identification may be inher-
ent within the isolation algorithms if the fault is estimated as part of its
detection, as is the case in this thesis.
FDI systems can also be categorised into two types, namely the passive
FDI (PFDI) and the active FDI (AFDI). PFDI simply monitors the system,
waits for the presence of a fault to be apparent within the system and
then performs necessary techniques to detect and isolate the fault. Thus
the PFDI is a reactive approach to FDI. A pro-active approach is the AFDI,
which actively excites the system using actuation or auxiliary signal injec-
tion with the purpose of “scanning” the system for faults and extracting
faults signatures.
2.4.1 Basic Requirements of an FDD System
A reliable FDI must be able to detect small (or hidden), abrupt, incipient
faults and isolate them within sufficient time to allow the FTC to coun-
teract the fault, such as reconfiguration, maintenance or shut-down. The
following performance criteria are for consideration when designing a re-
liable FDI.
• Detectability: Detectability refers to whether a fault can be detected
or not with the given sensing. This is a characteristic of the system
given the instrumentation available. Undetected faults may result in
catastrophic failure if untreated. A reliable FDI should detect faults
quickly to allow time for corrective action.
• Isolability: An FDI must distinguish between different faults to a
component level and correctly locate (isolate) them. Isolability is par-
ticularly difficult in a UAV in systems where symmetry and redun-
dant actuators exist.
• Identifiability/Diagnosis: An FDI system must accurately estimate
the severity of the fault. In the absence of redundancy, reconfigurable
controls may require a quantitative description of the fault to gener-
ate fault-tolerant controller.
• Sensitivity: An FDI system must be highly sensitive to reliably detect
even small (hidden) faults and incipient faults. However, and overly
sensitive FDI may also lead to robustness problems and report higher
rates of false alarms.
• Robustness: While being highly sensitive, the FDI system must also
be robust against measurement noise, system disturbances, model
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uncertainties and system variations. Robustness in FDI means max-
imising detectability, isolability and sensitivity to faults while min-
imising false detection. The key problem is distinguishing between
out-of-spec system behaviour induced by disturbances, noise, un-
modelled parameters from those induced by actual faults. Conse-
quently, robustness is a contradictory objective to minimise missed
detection and at the same time, false alarms. A good FDI solution is
the optimisation of these two requirements
• Multiple Faults: An ideal FDI should also detect and isolate multiple
faults. If temporal separation between faults is assumed, the design
of a multiple-fault detection and isolation algorithm can be simpli-
fied. In UAVs, the difficulty in detecting multiple concurrent faults
lies in the nonlinearities, coupling that exists between system states,
symmetry and redundant actuators producing identical moments.
2.4.2 FDD Systems Performance Evaluation
Before deployment for real application, an FDI system should be tested
and validated for effectiveness and reliability. An FDI will include a Boolean
decision logic used to decide the declaring of faults. The Boolean function
may be governed by a statistical analysis of generated residuals or fault
signatures, and the two processes should be tuned carefully. Nevertheless,
the Boolean decision logic will not 100 % effective in declaring faults, and
some false alarms or missed faults can be expected.
In this study, the FDI is tested for reliability by carrying out a Monte
Carlo (MC) simulation (nMC = 1000). With each run, some FDI perfor-
mance indices are calculated and recorded. To calculate the performance
indices, a benchmark zone is first specified (see Figure 2.10) , starting at time
ton and ending at the benchmark horizon thor. Before the benchmark zone,
a short period until ton is allowed for the FDI to startup and reach steady-
state behaviour.
• Detection Time (tdt): the time taken from the occurrence of a fault tF
to the true and permanent detection of the same fault tD. As can be
seen, the first three temporary detection are unsure and therefore are
not taken into account when determining tD
tdt = tD − tF (2.4.1)
• Detection decision (DD): a binary signal representing the decision
that a fault has been detected in the system.
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Figure 2.10: Benchmark diagram for FDI performance
• Isolation decision (ID): a binary signal representing the decision
that a fault has been isolated in the system.







where tifd is the period of the ith false detection during the fault-free
conditions. This index is used to quantify false alarms in the system.
In an ideal FDI system, this parameter should be close to zero.







where titd is the period of the ith true fault detection. This parameter
represents the efficiency of the FDI. In an ideal FDI system, this index
should be close to 1.
• Isolation Time (tit) : is the time spanned from when the fault occurs
to when it is isolated.







where tifi the period of the ith false fault isolation
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The above indices will be used to evaluate the FDI’s performance in this
study.
2.5 Classification of Fault Detection and Isolation
Methods
FDI techniques can be grouped into three categories, namely, hardware re-
dundancy schemes, analytical redundancy (model-based approach) and
data-based approach. Model-based and data-based techniques can both
be used to yield qualitative or quantitative fault information. The quanti-
tative approach relies on developing mathematical models, used to gen-
erate fault information in a quantified manner (such as elevator stuck at
1 degree). The quantitative approached employ techniques such as; fault
trees, trend analysis, fuzzy logics or pattern recognition to isolate or clas-
sify faults by type, levels of severity (such as moderate, severe or critical).
Next, the three categories of FDI are discussed.
2.5.1 Hardware Redundancy
In this approach, fault diagnosis realised by deploying auxiliary (redun-
dant) hardware, such as sensing devices, software, computing hardware
and actuators. The redundant hardware is deployed in parallel with the
primary hardware to perform the same operation or serve as a backup.
Fault detection and diagnosis is achieved by consistency checks by com-
paring measured data and trends using voting schemes between parallel
hardware. The main benefit of hardware redundancy is that direct and
fast isolation is archived very reliably, and redundant hardware is readily
available for FTC.
Hardware redundancy has become an industry standard for FDI and
conforms well into safety and industrial certification processes. The obvi-
ous disadvantages of this method increased complexity in hardware ar-
chitecture, increased weight, cost of installation, repair and maintenance
and thus it is unsuitable for low cost, low weight (limited space) UAV ap-
plications. Due to the drawbacks noted above, hardware redundancy is
usually dedicated exclusively for critical components in UAVs.
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2.5.2 Model-Free (Data-based) Approach
When an appropriate mathematical model of the system is unattainable,
data-based approaches are a powerful alternative for FDI. These meth-
ods rely on analysing data describing system behaviour measured either
in realtime or analysing historical data offline. The functionality of these
methods relies on expert knowledge on the expected behaviour to detect
the presence of faults. The applicable techniques include pattern recogni-
tion, fuzzy-logics, signal processing, neural networks (NN) and statistical
analysis.
Neural networks use either online or offline measurement data de-
scribing system behaviour under faulty and fault-free conditions to learn
the system modes. Trained NN can mimic system behaviour very accu-
rately, identify its fault symptoms and predict the system modes. Neu-
ral networks have shown high accuracy levels and robustness to distur-
bances even is large scale highly nonlinear systems. A major drawback
with the NN approach is that data collected during fault conditions may
be required to train the NN. Sometimes this requires failing the system of
interest several times to allow the NN to learn the failure modes, which
may take a considerable amount of iterations and failure scenario to allow
sufficient learning. Besides, NN is a black-box approach which limits the














Figure 2.11: Schematic description of the signal based FDI schemes
Signal processing techniques have been widely used especially in ma-
chinery components such as gearboxes bearings to extract fault signatures
[42] from these systems. The methods work by subjecting the system to
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some pre-defined signal processing techniques and observing the out-
come. The technique relies on the concept that the faults of interest in
the system will manifest in the processed signals. Popular techniques in-
clude time-domain analyses approaches, such as amplitude distribution,
limit or envelope checks, and trend analysis. The statistics of the mea-
surable states and outputs of the system are compared with nominal op-
erational limits. Frequency analysis of measured signals such as spectral
power densities and frequency spectral lines are evaluated to make con-
clusions about the presence of faults. A noteworthy drawback with these
strategies is that the mathematical models describing system dynamics
are disregarded, which may often be useful in quantifying the fault and
enabling FTC.
2.5.3 Analytical Redundancy Approach
Analytical redundancy is analogous to model-based FDI in the FDI lit-
erature. Beard is typically regarded as the first to have put forward the
idea of analytical redundancy in his PhD work in 1971 at MIT[63, 64]. The
idea relied on using a mathematical model to evaluate the system condi-
tions, rather than using redundant hardware. The key advantage of this
approach is that no additional hardware is needed to archive fault diagno-
sis. Figure 2.12 depicts the general structure of an analytical redundancy
based FDI schemes. The approach usually involves two stages, namely (i)
residual generation and (ii) residual evaluation.
The method generates residuals by comparing the output predicted by
the analytical model with the measured outputs of the system of interest.
The residuals are expected to be small under fault-free conditions. The
term "small" depends on the system and the FDI design. The residual is
expected to dramatically deviate from the "small" value in the presence of
faults.
In the residual evaluation stage, residuals are checked for signs of
faults. The presence of faults is determined based on some predetermined
decision algorithm. The typical procedures can range threshold checks on
the realtime values or rolling averages of the residuals, to generalised like-
lihood ratio (GLR) testing or sequential probability ratio test. The objective
is to provide a Boolean decision regarding the presence of faults.
Decision algorithms typically require threshold tuning, which is usu-
ally a trade-off between ensuring fault sensitivity (minimising missed faults)
and robustness (minimising false alarms). The reliance on an accurate
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Figure 2.12: Analytical redundancy based FDI scheme
model will often have a direct impact on the quality of the FDI in the ana-
lytical redundancy approaches, regardless of which techniques are utilised.
Unmodelled parameter variations and disturbances can trigger false alarms.
These factors may be addressed by appropriate fault isolation decision
rules.
There are two levels at which robustness to system disturbances can
be handled, namely, during residual generation or during its evaluation.
In the former case, the design shall ensure disturbances are decoupled
from the residual and the approach is robust to model uncertainties. In
the later, the decision thresholds may incorporate some adaptive scheme
using some statistical knowledge of the system to minimise the effect of
uncertainties, transient behaviour and effects of unknown inputs.
2.6 Model-based Fault Detection and Isolation
With the availability of modern computers, model-based fault diagnosis
offers a cost-effective, iterative, and easily implementable FDI systems de-
sign process. The section presents methods typically encountered in the
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field of model-based fault diagnosis. Due to the vast body of literature
available, the presented approaches are described briefly. Model-based
FDI techniques can be categorised into state estimation techniques, pa-
rameter estimation techniques, parity space techniques and decoupling
strategies.
2.6.1 Parity Space Approach
In the parity space methods, party checks are carried on the consistency
of the parity equation. The system equations are modified into the parity
relations, derived based on measured signals from the system. The idea
with the parity relations is to decouple the generated residuals from the
system states and each other. This gives the parity relations the ability to
detect faults by examining the parity relations for inconsistencies. Parity
relations can either be formulated with a state-space framework [65], or
formulated by the use of transfer function describing the system [66–69].
A comprehensive review and analyses of parity space methods are given
in [42, 70].
2.6.2 State Estimation
This approach relies on tracking the controlled system states and gener-
ating residuals by comparing calculated states with measured system sig-
nals. If the presence of a fault is detected in the residual, an isolation proce-
dure must distinguish one fault from another. While a single residual can
be sufficient for fault detection, a set of residuals are may be necessary for
fault isolation. If the condition is satisfied that a particular fault is dissim-
ilar from other faults by examining a single residual vector, fault isolation
can be archived evaluating that residual set. The generated residuals can
be thought to span some residual space [47]. There are two frameworks
for evaluation residuals for fault isolation, namely the residual directional
set and the structured residual set
1. Directional residuals. In this approach, the residuals are generated
within a geometric framework. The residual space spanned by a resid-
ual vector is expected to match fault-free residual space. Next, fault
isolation is facilitated by defining residual directional vectors such
that in the occurrence of a particular fault will characterise a specific
direction in the residual place, which is unique for each occurring
fault. By designating specific faults to unique directional vector, fault
isolation is archived.
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(a) Directional residuals (b) Structured residuals
Figure 2.13: Fault isolation by residuals. Adapted from [3]
2. Structured residual set. In this approach, a set of residuals are de-
signed to be sensitive to a set of faults, while maintaining insensitiv-
ity to other faults. Fault isolation is archived by specifying the sensi-
tivity and insensitivity association between residuals and faults.
The concepts of the directional and structured residual approaches are
depicted in Figure 2.13
2.6.3 Stochastic Approach
Most systems in practice, such as a UAV, exhibit nonlinear and stochastic
properties. Filtering techniques are a popular way if estimating stochastic
systems’ internal states, physical parameters or unknown inputs. Kalman
filtering can be used for system identification in stochastic systems. In
the fault-free conditions, the Kalman filter’s innovation is expected to be
white noise with a zero mean and a known covariance. To archive isola-
tion, multiple filters can be utilised in the multiple model (MM) frame-
work, the multiple model adaptive estimation (MMAE) or the interacting
multiple model (IMM) framework [71, 72].
In these MM approaches, a bank of filters, with each filter represent-
ing a unique fault condition (including the fault-free case), are designed
to run in parallel. The statistical information available in the KF algorithm
allows computing the probability of each fault as they occur, leading to
reliable isolation capabilities. MMAE has been successfully tested for FDI
in UAVs [72] and has also been studies on the Meraka UAV at ESL [3]. The
IMM approach, initially proposed in [73] also uses a bank of filter estima-
tors and modal probabilities to weight the input and outputs of a bank of
filters at each instant, switching between interacting models in a proba-
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bilistic way. The main drawback with the multiple model approaches is
high computational requirements. For the case of a UAVs, reference [42],
utilised a bank of 12 filters while reference [3], utilised a bank of 9 filters.
The Kalman filter’s limitations can be addressed by linearisation of
the controlled system around the current mean estimate, resulting in the
extended Kalman filtering (EKF) approach. The Unscented Kalman Filter
(UKF) also called the sigma point filter (SPF) (Julier and Uhlmann[74])
is a further and the latest extension to the Kalman filter. Instead of lin-
earising the system model, unscented transformation is used to compute
the statistic of a random variable as it undergoes a nonlinear transforma-
tion. The UKF characterises the mean and covariance of the GRV using a
set of sample points selected through a deliberate procedure and passed
through the nonlinear function to accurately capture posterior mean and
covariance the 3rd order for any nonlinearity. [74–77]. The algorithms for
the KF, EKF and UKF are presented later in this thesis.
The Kalman filtering techniques discussed above either assume or ap-
proximate a Gaussian probability distribution. The particle filter (PF) can
resolve nonlinearity and non-Gaussian distribution while accurately track-





This chapter presents detailed description of the nonlinear kinematic and
dynamic equations used to design the high fidelity simulation of the Mer-
aka UAV in Simulink ®. This simulation model will serve as a testbed to
test and validate the proposed FDI design. The aerodynamic coefficients
of the Meraka were determined by simulation in [3]. The nonlinear model
assumes rigid body dynamics. To mimic the UAV’s interaction with the
real world, atmospheric disturbances are incorporate into the model in
the form of; steady wind, turbulences, discrete gusts and wind shears. A
linearised version of the nonlinear model is derived, to allow the design
of the TSKF based FDI.
3.1 Reference Frames and Coordinate
Transformations
The translational and rotational motion of a rigid body aircraft can be de-
scribed by a set of nonlinear simultaneous differential equations [78]
ẋ(t) = f (x(t),u(t)) (3.1.1)
where x(t) is a 12-dimensional time-varying state vector and u(t) is
an l dimensional control vector. The observation equation describing the
measurements of the vehicle state is written as
y(t) = g (x(t),u(t)) (3.1.2)
where y(t) is a time-varying state observation vector. The equations
describing the motion of an aircraft can be formulated more broadly than
described above; however, the above formulation will be sufficient to de-
45
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. NONLINEAR AIRCRAFT MODEL 46
scribe the UAV accurately. For the UAV problem, the state vector is com-
posed of four 3×1 sub-vectors describing the vehicle’s translational veloc-




x1 = (V, α, β)
T (3.1.4)
x2 = (p, q, r)
T (3.1.5)
x3 = (φ, θ, ψ)
T (3.1.6)
x4 = (x, y, z)
T (3.1.7)
where x1 and x2 are defined in the body-fixed axis and x3 and x4 are
defined in the earth-fixed inertial frame for convenience. To accurately ex-
press the motion of a UAV, it is necessary to express the orientation and
motion of multiple bodies or systems with respect to each other. To speak
again, the orientation of the UAV ought to be expressed with respect to
the orientation of other systems, such as the runway or a ground station.
Thus, several coordinate systems are first defined to characterise the mo-
tion and orientation of the various UAV systems. The main reasons for
transformations between coordinate systems are:
• Newton’s equations of motion are founded in the inertial reference
frame. It is typically easier for various reasons, to express the UAV’s
motion in a body-fixed coordinate frame.
• It is also easier to express the forces and moments acting on the UAV
in a body-fixed coordinate frame
• The sensing equipment of the UAV, such as the accelerometers and
rate gyros are fitted and measure data in the vehicle’s body coordi-
nate frame. Whereas for UAV guidance navigation control (GNC),
the GPS measures position, course angle and ground speed with re-
spect to the inertial frame.
• Mission planning in controlled flight relies on trajectories and map
information which are typically specified in the inertial frame. This
information has to be resolved into the aircraft’s body-fixed frame to
be usable by onboard systems.
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Figure 3.1: Inertial reference frame. Adapted from [3]
3.1.1 Inertial Frame
By definition, Newton’s equations of motion are referenced to a fixed in-
ertial frame. The inertial coordinate frame is defined as an earth-fixed
frame with its origin at the location where the evaluation of motion begins,
which is typically the starting point in a runway for the case of aircraft.
It is common to approximate the inertial coordinate frame with a north-
east-down (NED) reference frame, with north, indicating the x−direction,
east indicating the y−direction, and down referring to the z−direction.
The NED coordinate frame is based on a flat non-rotating earth, which is
a valid assumption offering good approximation for short-duration low-
speed UAV applications. The inertial reference frame is depicted in Figure
3.1. The subscript and superscript (NED) will be used to denote this co-
ordinate frame.
3.1.2 Body-Fixed Frame
The body-fixed frame is an orthogonal frame that has its origin is at the
aircraft’s centre of gravity. This frame is fixed to the aircraft’s body and
always rotates with it. It is chosen to create symmetry about the body of
the aircraft. The positive x−axis of this frame points towards the aircraft’s
nose, along some convenient reference line, such as a zero angle-of-attack
line, or watermark line of the fuselage. The positive y−axis is pointed in
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Figure 3.2: Body fixed reference frame. Adapted from [3]
the direction of the right-wing. The positive z−axis is normal to both axes
and is pointed downward. The origin of the frame is located at the air-
craft’s centre of mass. The frame is denoted with the subscript and super-
script b. This frame is depicted in Figure 3.2
3.1.3 Euler Angles
In this thesis, Euler angles (ψ, θ, φ) are used to parameterise the UAV’s
attitude. Just before taking off, the UAV’s body reference frame will be
aligned perfectly with the NED reference plane. As the UAV begins to
move, its attitude is characterised by three Euler rotations ψ, θ, and φ,
representing the yaw, pitch and roll angles respectively, referenced to the
NED frame. The rotation angles are depicted in Figure 3.3. The complete
rotation comes about as follows:
• Transform the NED coordinate frame into an intermediate frame 1
by rotating the frame about the zE axis, with an angle φ indicating
the heading of the aircraft.
• Next, rotate the frame about the new y1 axis with an angle θ, which
specifies the aircraft’s elevation.
• Finally, a rotation about the new x2 axis by a bank angle φ completes
the transformation.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depicts the Euler rotations and the transformation
from the NED frame to the body-fixed frame
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Figure 3.3: Euler rotations. Adapted from [4]
Figure 3.4: Euler angles and frame transformation (from NED to body-fixed frame).
Adapted from [3]
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3.1.4 Direction Cosine Matrices
The transformation of the coordinate frames from one to the other is archived
through two mathematical operations: rotation and translation. The direc-
tion cosine matrix (DCM), which is also called the attitude transformation
matrix, is used transform vectors and point coordinates from the (NED)
coordinate frame to the aircraft’s body-fixed frame (b) and vice versa. The
three ordered sequence of Euler angle rotations depicted in Figures 3.3
and 3.4 can be represented by the following transformation matrices.
Rψ =




cos θ 0 − sin θ0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ
 (3.1.9)
Rφ =
1 0 00 cosφ sinφ
0 − sinφ cosφ
 (3.1.10)
The complete transformation from the inertial reference frame to UAV
body-fixed frame is given by the sequence product of the above matrices
as follows:
RNED→b = RφRθRψ (3.1.11)
=
 cos θ cosψ cos θ sin θ − sin θsinφ sin θ cosψ − cosφ sinψ sinφ sin θ sinψ + cosφ cosψ sinφ cos θ
cosφ sin θ cosψ + sinφ sinψ cosφ sin θ sinψ − sinφ cosφ cosφ cos θ

The DCM RNED→b and belongs to a class of orthonormal transforma-
tion matrices, able to rotate points without deforming them. The DCM is
used to transform a vector pNED expressed in the NED frame into a vector
expressed in the UAV body-fixed frame pb as follows:
pb = RNED→bpNED (3.1.12)
3.1.5 Wind Frame
As the UAV moves through its surrounding air, aerodynamic forces are
generated. The aircraft’s velocity relative to the surrounding air is called
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Figure 3.5: Wind coordinate axis, with a positive angle of attack and sideslip angle.
Adapted from [3]
airspeed vector VT , and its magnitude is called the airspeed VT . Lift is
produced when the aircrafts’ wings have a positive angle relative to the
airspeed vector. This angle is called the angle of attack and represented
with the symbol α. As depicted in Figure 3.5, the angle of attack is de-
fined as the angle produced between the projection of the airspeed vector
VT onto the (xb, zb) plane and the xb axis. The second angle is called the
sideslip angle β, which is the angle between the airspeed vector VT and
the projection of the airspeed vector onto the (xb, zb) plane. The wind co-
ordinate frame has its xw axis aligned with the airspeed vector VT . The
transformation of any vector from the body-fixed coordinate frame to the
stability axis is given by
ps = Rαpb (3.1.13)
where
Rα =
 cosα 0 sinα0 1 0
− sinα 0 cosα
 (3.1.14)
As shown in Figure 3.5, the wind frame is completed by a right-handed
rotation of β about the new z−axis from the first rotation by α. The wind
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axis xw is aligned with the airspeed vector VT . The transformation from
stability frame to the wind frame is given by:
pw = Rβps (3.1.15)
where
Rβ =
 cosβ sinβ 0− sinβ cosβ 0
0 0 1
 (3.1.16)
The complete transformation from the body-fixed coordinate frame to
the wind coordinate frame is given by
pw = Rb→wpb (3.1.17)
where
Rb→w = RβRα (3.1.18)
=
 cosβ sinβ 0− sinβ cosβ 0
0 0 1

 cosα 0 sinα0 1 0
− sinα 0 cosα
 (3.1.19)
=
 cosα cosβ sinβ sinα cosβ− sinβ cosα cosβ − sinα sinβ
− sinα 0 cosα
 (3.1.20)
3.1.6 Airspeed, Ground Speed, and Wind Speed
The inertial forces that the aircraft experiences depend on velocities and
accelerations relative to the inertial reference frame. On the other hand,
aerodynamic forces are dependent on the aircraft’s velocity relative to the
surrounding air. In the absence of wind, these velocities will be the same.
However, there will always be wind present, and thus it is necessary to
differentiate between airspeed VT , and the ground speed, defined as the
velocity with respect to the inertial frame Vg. The relation between the
airspeed and groundspeed is given by the expression
VT = Vg − Vw (3.1.21)
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where Vw represent the wind velocity describe with respect to the in-
ertial frame. The ground velocity Vg can be written componentwise along





Likewise, the wind velocity can be written in terms of the north, east,
and down components; wn, we, and wd respectively and an expressed in








Observe that when expressed in the wind coordinate frame, the air-





And by defining uT , vT , and wT as the components of the airspeed vec-





u− uwv − vw
w − ww
 (3.1.25)
Then the angle of attack and the sideslip angle can be directly used to









cosα cosβ − sinβ cosα − sinαsinβ cosβ 0
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Given that aerodynamic forces and moments are expressed in terms of




















3.2 Model of the Low Altitude Atmosphere






In the nonlinear simulation, the air density ρ computed in realtime at















where T0 = 288.15 K represents temperature, and the remaining pa-
rameters are R = 287.3m2K−1s−2, a = −6.5× 10−3 K/m, and p0 = 1013×
102 Nm−2. For the trimmed model at an altitude of h = 800 m, the value
of the air density is calculated as ρ = 1.1323 kgm−3.
3.3 Forces and Moments Acting on the UAV
This section describes the external forces and moments experienced by
the UAV. These forces and moments are generated primarily by gravity,
engine thrust, aerodynamics, wind disturbances and turbulence.
3.3.1 Gravitational Forces and Moments
The nonlinear simulation model developed in this study assumes a flight
altitude of the UAV is insignificant as compared to earth the’s radius.
Earth’s gravitational force is act on the aircraft’s’ centre of gravity (CG) in
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a downward direction. For convenience, the gravitational forces are writ-





The gravitation forces can be expressed in the other coordinate sys-
tems by transformation with the appropriate rotation matrix. Given that
the gravitational forces act on the CG, which is also chosen as that cen-







3.3.2 Engine Forces and Moments
The Meraka Modular UAV studied in this thesis has two engines that are
located on both sides of the aircraft and symmetrical about the (xb − zb)
plane. The thrust force vector produced by the two propellers always
points in the direction of the xb axis. The flight control system is designed
to generate thrust vectors that are always equal; therefore there is no thrust
vectoring used in the UAV. The thrust vector always acts through the air-
craft’s CG. The effects of the propellers on the moments very minimal, and











Several propulsion models can be found in the literature for the var-
ious types of aircraft engines; however, a simple first-order lag model is
utilised in the nonlinear simulation model in this study. This model suffi-
ciently captures the band-limited nature of the propulsive system in small








where Fprop is the magnitude of the propulsive force, δprop the propul-
sion command and τ the engine lag time constant.
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3.3.3 Aerodynamic Forces and Moments
The aerodynamic forces and moments are induced by airframe’s inter-
action with the incoming airflow. The amount of air diverted by the air-
craft during flight determines the magnitude and direction of the resulting
forces and moments. The total air-mass diverted by the airframe is deter-
mined by the following:
• the speed of the airflow and the air density (VT , ρ)
• the geometrical features of the aircraft (Sref , c̄, b)
• the deflections in the control surfaces
• the orientation of the aircraft with respect to the airflow (α, β)
• the aircraft’s angular rates (p, q, r)
where Sref denotes the reference surface area of the aircraft’s wing,
c̄ denotes the aerodynamic mean-chord and bref the reference wingspan.
The forces and moments are expressed in the reference frames that makes
their formulation the simplest. The aerodynamic forces, namely; drag, lift





where the parametersCL, CD andCY denotes the nondimensional aero-
dynamic coefficients of the lift force, drag force and side force respectively.
The aerodynamic force coefficients are obtained by a linear combination
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The deflections in the control surfaces and any asymmetric airflow
about the airframe will induce pitching moment M , rolling moment L
and yawning N moment. It is convenient to express these moments in the
body-fixed reference frame as follows:




where Cl, Cm and Cn denote the nondimensional aerodynamic coeffi-
cients of the rolling, pitching and yawing moments respectively. Again,
these coefficients are expressed as a linear combination of the control in-








































3.4 Kinematics and Dynamics
The nonlinear simulation in this study considers a short-range flight over
a small region of the earth. These flight conditions allow the following
simplifying assumptions to be presumed without significant loss of accu-
racy in the nonlinear model, which are:
• The Earth is locally flat (Rearth =∞)
• The earth is not rotating (there are no Coriolis accelerations from the
earth’s rotation). This assumption makes the earth an inertial refer-
ence frame where Newton’s laws apply.
• The aircraft has a constant mass
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• The aircraft is symmetric about the plane spanned by xb and zb.
• The aircraft has a rigid body
3.4.1 The Position and Propagation of the Aircraft
The realtime position vector of the aircraft in 3D space (xn, ye, zn) is ex-
pressed in the earth-fixed inertial frame. The position vector is obtained by
integrating the aircraft’s ground speed. However, the translational veloc-
ity vector of the aircraft is expressed in the body-fixed coordinate frame.
The expression of the position vector requires a rotational transformation














The aircraft’s angular rates are expressed in the body-fixed coordinate
frame. The Euler angles are derived from three coordinate frames rota-
tions as depicted in Figure 3.4. The angular velocities addition theorem
[79] states that; for angular velocity vectors in a common coordinate frame,
the resulting angular velocity of the total rotation is given by the sum of
the individual rotations. The rotating frame is given by time-varying an-
gles, (ψ, θ, ψ) and the angular velocity vector (p, q, r) can be determined as
if measured in the rotating frame. Starting with the initial stationary frame
and using the two intermediate frames whose relative angular velocities
are given by the Euler angle rates (ψ̇, θ̇, φ̇), the angular rates are given



















1 0 00 cosφ sinφ





1 0 00 cosφ sinφ
0 − sinφ cosφ

cos θ 0 − sin θ0 1 0






1 0 − sin θ0 cosφ sinφ cos θ





The above equation is inverted and to find the propagation of the Euler
angles (ψ̇, θ̇, φ̇) in time is as follows:φ̇θ̇
ψ̇
 =
1 sinφ tan θ cosφ tan θ0 cosφ − sinφ





3.4.3 Conservation of Linear Momentum
Newton’s second law of motion relates the mass m of an object and the












The subscript (NED) denotes that the time derivative in the expres-
sion is computed in the earth-fixed inertial reference plane. However, it is
convenient to express in the body-fixed reference (which rotates with the
UAV) frame for control and system identification. But the Newtons’ law
applies to a point mass located at the object’s CG in a non-rotating inertial
frame.
According to Coriolis’s theorem, the time derivative of any time-varying














+ ωF2/F1 × p(t) (3.4.5)
where ωF2/F1 is the rotational rate of the frame F2 with respect to the
frame F1.
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For the case of a manoeuvring aircraft, the expression (3.4.4) can be
rewritten in the form (3.4.5) and expressed in the body-fixed frame de-





















+ ωb/NED × Vg, (3.4.6)
where Vg = (u, v, w)T and ωb/NED = (p, q, r)T . The subscript in ωb/NED
is omitted in all expressions in the remainder of this thesis. By substitu-




















The gravitational and aerodynamical forces are most conveniently ex-
pressed in the (NED) and wind coordinate frames respectively. There-
fore, the gravitational and aerodynamical forces as given in equations
(3.3.1) and (3.3.6) are projected onto the body-fixed coordinate frame ac-
cording to the following two expressions:




 −mg sin θmg cos θ sinφ
mg cos θ cosφ
 (3.4.8)




cosα cosβ − sinβ cosα − sinαsinβ cosβ 0






By substituting Equations (3.4.8) and (3.4.9) into (3.4.7), expanding the




rv − qwpw − ru
qu− pv
+
 −g sin θg cos θ sinφ
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Resolving the above equations result in the individual nonlinear equa-
tions:





(−CD cosα cosβ − CY cosα sinβ + CL sinα)
(3.4.11)
v̇ =pw − ru+ g cos θ sinφ+ q̄S
m
(−CD sinβ + CY cosβ) (3.4.12)
ẇ =qu− pv + g cos θ cosφ+ q̄S
m
(−CD sinα cosβ − CY sinα sinβ − CL cosα)
(3.4.13)
It is convenient to express the body-fixed velocities in a polar form
by the airspeed magnitude, the angle of attack and the side-slip angle,
(VT , α, β), which are directly measured by sensing equipment fixed to the
UAV. The derivation of the corresponding nonlinear Equations is detailed
in Appendix C
3.4.4 Conservation of Angular Momentum











Newton’s second law describes rotational motion as follows: where
h denotes the aircraft’s angular momentum and
∑
j
Mj is the sum of all
external moments acting on the aircraft. The time derivative of angular










+ ω × h (3.4.15)
For the case of a rigid body, the angular momentum is the product of
the inertia matrix I and the rotational rate: h , I×ω. Assuming symmetry
about the place xb and zb, I is given by:
I =
 Ixx 0 −Ixz0 Iyy 0
−Ixz 0 Izz
 (3.4.16)
Expanding Equation (3.4.15) results in:
[Mgrav +Mprop +Maero] = İω + Iω̇ + ω × Iω (3.4.17)
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Based on assumptions made in Section 3.4, we haveMgrav ≈ 0,Mprop ≈


































where ID = IxxIzz − I2xz. The cross-product involving angular rates
in Equation (3.4.18) can be substituted with the cross-product equivalent
matrix of angular rates given by: 0 −r qr 0 −p
−q p 0














 0 −r qr 0 −p
−q p 0









Expanding the above results in the following differential equations:
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Ixz (Ix − Iy + Iz) pq −
(
Iz(Iz − Iy) + I2xz
)


















Ix(Ix − Iy) + I2xz
)








This section discusses atmospheric disturbances and how they interrelate
the dynamics of the aircraft. The UAV’s flight will experience atmospheric
disturbances in the form of wind turbulence, typically classified as wind
gusts and wind shear. The wind velocity in Equation (3.1.21) in terms of
steady wind and time-varying wind disturbances as:
Vw = Vws + Vwg (3.5.1)
where Vws represents the steady ambient wind component, and Vwg is
a stochastic process characterising wind gusts and other disturbances in






where wns , wes and wds denote the component of the steady wind in
the north, east direction, downward directions respectively. The gust com-





3.5.1 Atmospheric Turbulence Model Theory
Empirical data show that the non-steady gust portion of the wind model
can be accurately simulated by passing white noise through linear filters
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given by the von Karmen turbulence spectrum. However, von Karmen
spectrum models do not yield rational transfer functions. The Dryden
transfer functions are a good approximation of the von Karmen model











































where σu, σv, and σw indicate the turbulence intensities along the along
body-frame axes. The parametersLu, Lv,andLw represents the spatial wave-
lengths; and VT is the airspeed magnitude experienced by the aircraft. The
military specification MIL-F-8785C gives the parameters for the Dryden
gust model. Figure 3.5.1 is a depiction of how the atmospheric distur-
bances enter into the nonlinear dynamic equations. The gust components
in the body-fixed frame are produced by passing white noise through the
Dryden filters. The total wind in the body frame is obtained by first trans-
forming the steady wind vector from the (NED) frame into the body-
fixed coordinate frame, and adding the resulting vector to the gust vector.
.







where RNED→b is the rotation matrix from the vehicle to the body
frame given in equation. For computer simulation, the Dryden filters can
be written in state-space format as
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0 0 −VTLv 0 0


































where n(t) is zero mean, band-limited noise with unit variance passed
through the linear filters. A similar state-space model can be derived for
the rotational gusts velocities using corresponding Dryden gust transfer
functions. Dryden turbulence models can also be implemented using the
Simulink Aerospace Toolbox package..
3.5.1.1 Low Altitude Model
The military document MIL-F-8785C specifies turbulence scale lengths for
low altitudes (less than 1000 feet) according to the expressions:
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where h represents the altitude. The typical wind speed at 6 meters
height with the light intensity turbulence model is 7.7 m/s or 15.3 m/s












where W20 is the wind speed at measured at 6 meters (20 feet).
3.5.1.2 Medium/High Altitude Model
The scale lengths and of the turbulence model for medium-to-high alti-
tudes the are given by
Lu = Lv = Lw = 1750 ft
(3.5.13)
The turbulence intensities for each for the same model are given by:
σu = σv = σw (3.5.14)
The turbulence velocities and turbulence angular rates at altitudes from
1000 ft to 2000 ft are found by linear interpolation of values determined
with the low-altitude model and the high-altitude model.
3.5.2 Discrete Gusts
The discrete wind gust model is incorporated into the model to simulate
UAV’s response to large wind disturbances. The discrete gusts are imple-
mented with “1-cosine” build up as detailed in Equations (3.5.15)
Vw =










if 0 ≤ x ≤ dm
Vm if x > dm
(3.5.15)
where Vm, dm and x specifies the amplitude, the length and the dis-
tance travelled by the gust.
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Figure 3.7: Medium/High altitudes turbulence intensities plots above 2000 feet. Adapted
from [5]
3.6 Summary of the Nonlinear Aircraft Model
The complete set of 6-DoF nonlinear kinematic and dynamic equations




 cos θ cosψ cos θ sin θ − sin θsinφ sin θ cosψ − cosφ sinψ sinφ sin θ sinψ + cosφ cosψ sinφ cos θ
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(−CD cosα cosβ − CY cosα sinβ + CL sinα)
(3.6.2)
v̇ =pw − ru+ g cos θ sinφ+ q̄S
m
(−CD sinβ + CY cosβ) (3.6.3)
ẇ =qu− pv + g cos θ cosφ+ q̄S
m






Ixz (Ix − Iy + Iz) pq −
(
Iz(Iz − Iy) + I2xz
)


















Ix(Ix − Iy) + I2xz
)





[IxzL+ IxN ] (3.6.7)
φ̇ =p+ q sinφ tan θ + r cosφ tan θ (3.6.8)
θ̇ =q cosφ− r sinφ (3.6.9)
ψ̇ =(sinφ+ r cosφ) sec θ (3.6.10)
where θ 6= ±π2 . The values of the physical paramters of the Meraka
Modular UAV involved in the above equations are are given in Table A.1.
3.7 Linearisation of the Nonlinear Aircraft Model
In this section, the nonlinear equations described in the previous section
are linearised using small-perturbation theory. This approach assumes the
motion of the aircraft consists of small deviations from and relative to the
nominal flight conditions.
Some of the FDI techniques presented in this thesis are based on the
linear representation of the aircraft. The TSKF requires determining the Ja-
cobian associated with the nonlinear differential equations to characterise
the evolution of the system states. The nonlinear kinematic and dynamics
of equations detailed in (3.6.2) to (3.6.10) can be expressed more concisely
as:
ẋ = f (x,u) (3.7.1)
where system state x and the controls input u are chosen as:
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. NONLINEAR AIRCRAFT MODEL 69
x = (V, α, β, p, q, r, φ, θ, h)T (3.7.2)
u =
(
δprop, δEr , δEl , δAr , δAl , δRr , δRl
)T (3.7.3)
and the vector function f characterises the nonlinear dynamic equa-
tions, h = −z is the height of the aircraft’s flight and δprop is the propulsive
force setting. By replacing each state variable and control input as the sum
of their nominal values and a small perturbation we get:
x = x0 + ∆x (3.7.4)
u = u0 + ∆u (3.7.5)
where
∆x = (∆V,∆α,∆β,∆p,∆q,∆r,∆φ,∆θ,∆h)T (3.7.6)
∆u =
(
∆δprop,∆δEr ,∆δEl ,∆δAr ,∆δAl ,∆δRr ,∆δRl
)T (3.7.7)
Replacing the variables in (3.7.1) with their perturbed versions and
taking a Taylor series expansion yields














For small perturbations from the nominal flight, the higher-order terms
in the expansion can be ignored without a significant loss of accuracy. Fi-
nally, the fault-free linearised state-space model of the aircraft around the
nominal operating point (x0,u0), is written as:
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Since variation is fully captured in the perturbation variables (∆x0,∆u0)
and the nominal flight components are assumed to be constant, the follow-
ing contribution is set to zero:
ẋ0 = f(x0,u0) (3.7.12)
The linearisation problem is reduced to determining the finding the
vector partial derivatives of the nonlinear equations in (3.6.2) to (3.6.10).
For the state vector and controls input vector in (3.7.2) and (3.7.3), the A
andB are given by;
A =

AV V AV α AV β 0 AV q 0 AV φ AV θ 0
AαV Aαα Aαβ Aαp Aαq Aαr Aαφ Aαθ 0
AβV Aβα Aββ Aβp 0 Aβr Aβφ Aβθ 0
ApV 0 Apβ App Apq Apr 0 0 0
AqV Aqα 0 Aqp Aqq Aqr 0 0 0
ArV 0 Arβ Arp Arq Arr 0 0 0
0 0 0 Aφp Aφq Aφr Aφφ Aφθ 0
0 0 0 0 Aθq Aθr Aθφ 0 0





BV δT BV δEr BV δEl BV δAr BV δAl 0 0
BαδT BαδEr BαδEl BαδAr BαδAl 0 0
BβδT BβδEr BβδEl BβδAr BβδAl BβδRr BβδRl
0 BpδEr BpδEl BpδAr BpδAl BpδRr BpδRl
0 BqδEr BqδEl BqδAr BqδAl 0 0
0 BrδEr BrδEl BrδAr BrδAl BrδRr BrδRl
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(3.7.14)
where the individual matrix elementsAij andBij in (3.7.13) and (3.7.14)
respectively are given by Equations (D.1) to (D.1.67). The FDI procedures
considered in this thesis requires the use of a digital processor. To imple-
ment the proposed FDI algorithms in a digital environment requires the
discretisation of the continuous state-space model, which is a subject of
the next section.
3.8 Discretisation of the State Space Model
This section is dedicated to describing the discretisation of the continuous
state-space model discussed in the previous section. The onboard proces-
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sor in a digital environment will only sample the states of the aircraft at
discrete time instances. Suppose that the onboard microprocessor samples
the measurement y(t) and controls input u(t) signal at every Ts second.
Then the discretised version of the continuous state-space model in Equa-
tion (3.7.9), can be written as:
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk +wk (3.8.1)
To reconstruct the control input u(t) a sequence of discrete samples uk
are obtained with the zero-order hold technique, where the input signal












Meraka UAV Actuator and
Sensors FDD
This chapter is dedicated to the derivation of several Kalman filter (KF)
based FDD algorithms. The chapter begins with presenting the architec-
ture of the proposed FDD design. Next, the chapter introduces the Two-
Stage Kalman filter (TSKF) approach. TSKF relies on estimating a clean
(unbiased) state vector and the parameters in two separate KFs that op-
erate interactively in parallel. The TSKF is then parameterised to charac-
terise bias, LIP and LoE faults. As the UAV’s model is highly nonlinear,
the dual-unscented Kalman filter (DUKF), the nonlinear version of the
TSKF, is also presented. Next, the fault isolation algorithm is described in
detail. Active FDI algorithms to detect rudder faults, and to classify be-
tween bias, LIP and LoE faults are developed. The chapter concludes with
fault isolation strategies for sensors by extracting fault signatures in the
residuals of the KF algorithms.
4.1 The Architecture of the FDI Design
This section describes the architecture of the proposed FDD design. For
convenience, the FDI architecture is presented for the TSKF case. How-
ever, the nonlinear DUKF and JUKF FDI designs will have the same ar-
chitecture and structure. In the DUKF and JUKF designs, Euler’s Method
was utilised to propagate sigma points through the nonlinear kinematics
and dynamics equations (3.6.2) to (3.6.10). The TSKF design is based on
the linearised UAV model with the below state and input vectors:
72
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x = (V, α, β, p, q, r, φ, θ)T (4.1.1)
u =
(
δprop, δEr , δEl , δAr , δAl , δRr , δRl
)T (4.1.2)
The proposed FDI algorithm can detect, isolate and perform classifi-
cation of bias, locked-in-place (LIP), and loss-of-effectiveness (LoE) fault
types. These different fault types will be denoted as follows.





, δ∗Ar , δ
∗
Al




• Stuck actuator faults: denoted δ̄ =
[
δ̄Er , δ̄El , δ̄Ar , δ̄Al , δ̄Rr , δ̄Rl
]T
• Loss of effectiveness: denoted γ =
[
γEr , γEl , γAr , γAl , γRr , γRl
]T
As stated previously, in model-based FDI, the final design is dictated
by the available system model. Not all six (6) control surfaces of the Mer-
aka UAV are isolable or identifiable at the same time, when the FDI de-
sign relies on using a single model (see Section 4.2.1 on the concept of
Isolability). This is because the rudders are mathematically identical and
produce identical moments that cannot be distinguished. For this reason,
the FDI design is split into two separate TSKF estimators, each TSKF ded-
icated to a subset of the six control surfaces. The first is the elevator-
aileron filter, henceforth called the EA filter which monitors faults oc-










. The second is the elevator-rudder filter, hence-
forth called the ER filter. The purpose of the ER filter is to ensure isolation
of rudder faults. The ER filter estimates faults occurring in the all elevators









The EA filter satisfies isolability test and simulation show that it can
track all the three fault types investigated in this study, including faults
of the same type occurring simultaneously. On the other hand, the ER fil-
ter still does not satisfy isolability conditions due to containing the twin
rudders. Nevertheless, by employing active FDI (AFDI) techniques, the
rudders can be isolated. It is pointed out that even though the ER filter es-
timates elevator fault parameters, these are ignored by the FDI, since the
FDI relies on the EA filter to track elevator faults. The elevator parameters
are only included in the ER filter to allow the isolation of rudder using ac-
tive FDI procedures. The structure of the FDI is detailed in a flow diagram
in Figure 4.1
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Level 3: Sensor FDI (Mode 3)
Level 2: Fault Mode Identification
Initialise
Level 3.1: Component Level FDI
ER Filter (Update)
Level 3: Component FDI (Mode 1-EA)
Level 1: System Level HM
System Operating Healthy














System in Fault Mode






In Mode 1: Accept EA filter estimates as
correct and discard ER filter estimates
Fault Classification as Bias, LIP, LoE types by
auxiliary excitation
In Mode 2: Accept ER filter estimates as
correct and discard EA filter estimates
Fault Classification as Bias, LIP, LoE types by
auxiliary excitation




Decision and Final Parameter Values:
Declare surfaces as faulty where the
detection function         exceeds the
threshold function 
FDI generate value, location (control
surface) and type of all faulty surfaces
Decision and Final Parameter Values:
Declare surfaces as faulty where the
detection function         exceeds the
threshold function 
FDI generate value, location (control
surface) and type of all faulty surfaces
Fault is in aileron(s) or elevator
Fault is in rudder
Fault in sensor measurements
EA Filter (Update)
Then the faulty sensor is given by: 
Level 3: Component FDI (Mode 2-ER)
Iff:
Mode 3: Fault in on of the sensors
Sample covariance matrix of the normalized
innovation sequence is given by:
Figure 4.1: Architecture of the Fault Detection and Isolation System
4.1.1 Functionality of the FDI
The FDI design is made up of two TSKF estimators, the EA filter and the
ER filters. Both filters run simultaneously to estimate their respective state
vector and fault parameters online. The FDI process relies on the continu-
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ous monitoring and extraction of fault information at every iteration. The
processed information is analysed in three stages, which represents three
levels of analysis, where the next level is only triggered if fault signatures
are detected in the current level. The three levels begin fault detection at
system level, and ends with isolating a fault to a specific control surface.
In Level 1, the system detects a fault in the system, in Level 2, the FDI de-
termines which filter is generating the correct fault parameter estimates,
and in Level 3, the FDI isolates the fault to a specific control surface. See
Figure 4.1 for the complete flow diagram of the FDI design
• Level 1: Under the Level 1 analysis, the FDI algorithm checks the
normalised innovation squared (NIS) in both the EA and ER filters
against a preset threshold. The NIS is calculated from the innovation
sequence of the TSKF (see Section 4.9). The NIS is a χ2-distributed
random variable that indicates the unbiasedness of the innovation
sequence of the KF. Provided that the TSKF is properly tuned, the
NIS will have zero mean and a covariance equal to an identity matrix.
A fault in a sensor or actuator will shift the mean and variance of
the innovation sequence, causing the NIS to grow dramatically to
a larger value that is dependent on the magnitude of the fault. The
threshold set for the NIS to flag the presence of a fault can be selected
for any desired significance level (in this study, a significance level of
α = 0.05 is used). If the NIS in any of the two filters has exceeded
the threshold, the FDI algorithm flags a fault within the system and
triggers Level 2 analysis to diagnose the fault further. If the threshold
is not exceeded, the FDI does not initiate Level 2 diagnosis.
• Level 2: Once the NIS has flagged a fault in the system, the objective
of the FDI is to determine where the fault has occurred. The purpose
of the Level 2 analysis is to determine which fault Mode the system
is in. The FDI will transition from Level 2 into Level 3 under one of
three (3) possible Modes. Mode 1 indicates a fault detected with the
EA filter, Mode 2 indicates a fault detected with the ER filter, and
Mode 3 indicates a fault detected in one of the sensors. For actuator
faults (Modes 1 and 2), Mode identification equates to determining
which of the filters, EA or ER, is reconstructing the occurring fault
correctly. This is archived by comparing the NIS of the two filters.
The filter with the smallest NIS is the filter that is reconstructing the
occurring fault correctly. If the NIS of the EA filter is smaller, then
the system is in Fault Mode 1, the EA filter estimates are declared
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as correct, and the ER filter estimates are discarded as incorrect. If
the opposite is true, then the system is in Fault Mode 2, the ER fil-
ter estimates are declared as correct, and the EA filter estimates are
discarded.
Note that the EA filter will wrongly estimate rudder faults whenever
they occur, whereas the ER filter will wrongly estimate aileron faults.
This is because those faults are not modelled within the respective
filters. However, the NIS of the filter yielding incorrect parameter
estimates will be significantly larger than the filter generating the
correct fault parameter estimates. This is because the filter yielding
wrong estimates will be more "biased" than the filter yielding correct
estimates, which will manifest in the NIS. Thus whenever a fault oc-
curs, the NIS in both filters will exceed the pre-selected threshold.
However, the filter that is reconstructing the fault correctly will have
a smaller NIS than the filter reconstructing the fault wrongly, and
hence it will be selected as the correct estimator of the fault. Once the
Mode is identified, the system will transition to Level 3 analysis to
isolate the fault.
As stated in the previous bullet point, a sensor fault can also cause
the NIS to exceed the preset threshold because a sensor failure will
cause a shift in the mean and the variance of the innovation sequence.
Therefore, in addition to NIS checks, Mode 1 and Mode 2 are only
activated if the threshold function has exceeded within the selected
filter. If none of the parameters in the EA or ER filter has exceeded
the threshold function within a preset time, the FDI activates Mode
3, which indicates that the NIS shift was caused by sensor fault. In
this mode, the FDI carries out a procedure to check which sensor is
faulty within the Level 3 analysis.
• Level 3: During Level 3, the system will either be in Mode 1, Mode 2
or Mode 3, which represent faults in the EA filter, ER filter or faults in
sensors respectively (see Figure 4.1 for reference). For the case of an
actuator fault, the EA or the ER filter will be selected, while the other
is discarded and ignored. In Mode 1 and Mode 2, statistical analy-
sis is performed on the selected filter’s fault parameters to isolate
surfaces. The detection index function described in Section 4.8 is ap-
plied to all parameters. Briefly speaking, this function compares the
original (fault-free) statistics of the fault parameters to their online
statistics. The function is chosen to accentuate the variations in the
statistical quantities of every parameter from their fault-free values.
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If there are no shifts in the fault parameters’ statistics, this function
will remain in the close to zero. If there is a fault, the function will
vary dramatically from zeros by large orders of magnitude. A high
threshold value can be set for the detection index function, to avoid
false alarms to due variations caused by noise. All the parameters
that exceed this threshold in the active (selected) filter are declared
as faulty. Next, the fault classification procedure described in Section
4.6 is carried out to specify the type of fault that has occurred. If the
fault is in the ER filter, the active-FDI procedure described in Section
4.6.2 is finally carried out to isolate the specific rudder.
If Mode 3 is active, to isolate sensor faults, the FDI checks the statis-
tics of the innovation channel (the statistics of individual elements of
the innovation vector). The FDI computes a statistical variable that
is a ratio of a sampled innovation variance versus theoretical vari-
ance (see Section 4.10). If this function exceeds a preset threshold,
then a fault is declared in the sensor within the corresponding inno-
vation channel. The algorithm assumes one sensor fault at any given
time time. Therefore, only the largest statistical function to exceed the
threshold is declared to indicate a sensor fault.
4.2 Modelling Faults with the Kalman Filter
The FDD algorithms presented in the upcoming sections rely on the si-
multaneous online reconstruction of the system states and fault parame-
ters. Consider a discrete state-space linear representation of a healthy UAV
described in the form
xk+1 =Akxk +Bkuk +w
x
k
yk+1 =Ckxk+1 + vk+1
(4.2.1)
where, xk is the n× 1 state vector, yk is the m× 1 measurement vector,
and uk is the l × 1 control input. The Kalman filter (KF) could be directly
applied to Equation (4.2.1) to estimate system states for system identifica-
tion or FTC. However, the KF requires an accurate characterisation of both
the dynamical and statistical model parameters. Such a model is never
available in practice. In a UAV, degradation and malfunctioning in the
plant, actuators and sensors will cause changes in the modelled parame-
ters. Some changes can manifest as the unknown constant or time-varying
bias in the system dynamics and observations or as multiplicative varia-
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xk+1 + Fkbk + vk+1
(4.2.2)
The terms ∆Afk , ∆B
f
k , and ∆C
f
k , represent multiplicative faults in
the UAV whereas bk, represents additive faults, which enter the process
through the matrix Ek . Multiplicative faults are characterised by their
direct influence on system stability. Regardless, both additive and multi-
plicative faults will cause serious degradation of the Kalman filter, if pa-
rameter changes are not incorporated into the filtering problem. For most
systems, it is possible to make some simplifying assumptions to allow
modelling multiplicative as additive faults [42]. If only additive actuator
faults are of interest, the following simplified model is considered.
xk+1 =Akxk +Bkuk +Ekbk +w
x
k
yk+1 =Ckxk+1 + Fkbk + vk+1
(4.2.3)
and
bk+1 = bk +w
b
k
bk = 0 k < kFbk 6= 0 k ≥ kF (4.2.4)
Where bk is the p × 1 bias vector with an unknown magnitude. All
matrices have the appropriate dimensions. The noise sequences wxk , wbk ,
















To account for the unknown fault vector bk in (4.2.4), the augmented
state Kalman filter (ASKF) may be used to jointly estimate the state and
bias together by augmenting the bias into the state vector resulting in an





. This results in a new vector size of n+ p and
the following fault model:
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The above formulation is convenient because it models faults additive
bias terms and allows direct implementation of well-known algorithms,
such as the Kalman filter, to estimate the bias vector. The problem state-
ment is the design of the fault input matrices Ek and Fk. As pointed out
in [80], the design of a model-based FDI is highly dependent on the par-
ticular fault of interest, the plant system, and the availability of a mathe-
matical mapping of the fault to some measurable system behaviour. The
upcoming sections show how both bias faults, locked-in-place, and loss-
of-effectiveness (LoE) faults in the control surfaces can both be formulated
in the additive structure in (4.2.6).
4.2.1 Fault Detectability and Isolability
Characterising the plant in with respect to the expected fault parameters
is not sufficient to guarantee fault isolation. If the faults are not mutually
"isolable", then multiple models or a hybrid model is required. There are
several definitions of fault detectability and fault isolability in literature,
which are very similar. In [34, 35] detectability and isolability conditions
were derived for the Unknown Input Observers (UIO) based on the con-
cepts of observability and controllability. A more general definition is the
so-called structural fault identifiability derived in [42], which refers to the
same concept. Briefly, structural fault identifiability is the characterisation
of system structure that is required to reconstruct faults based on mea-
sured system output. Mathematically, this represents the mapping that
relates system outputs to the faults under consideration. If the mapping is
unique for each fault parameter, then the faults are identifiable.
This thesis is concerned with the isolability of the discrete state-space
structure in Equations (4.2.6) and (4.2.21), which are identical. For this
structure, when parametrised with additive faults of dimension l, then






= n+ l (4.2.8)
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where z to denotes the complex variable from the z−transform in a
discrete-time system. In this thesis, identifiability and isolability are used
interchangeably since these concepts are similar. It is pointed out that not
all the control surfaces are identifiable when treated jointly within one
model. This is because the rudders produce identical moments which can-
not be distinguished. For this reason, the FDI system is split into two sep-
arate EA filter and ER filter (See Section 4.1)
4.2.2 Saturation of Surfaces and Controller Assumptions
The FDI algorithms presented in this thesis requires that the aircraft main-
tains stability after the fault. If stability is maintained, the algorithm can
reconstruct LIP, LoE and bias faults. To counter the effect of actuator faults,
the feedback controller may saturate the healthy control surfaces, further
reducing the controller capabilities. Consider that the flight envelope of
the aircraft is given by:
χφ =
{
x ≤ Rn : xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax
}
(4.2.9)




, where u0 denotes
the trim deflections of control surfaces at the nominal state x0. At the time
tF when a control surface is biased by an internal fault or is locked-in-
place, the equilibrium state of the moments and forces are violated. A
failure will cause the state vector to transition from the nominal point






must exist, where xf0 and
uh0 represents a new post-fault operating point and the trim deflections
of the healthy controls surfaces respectively. If the control surface is stuck
a large deflection angle (such as hard-over fault), a saturation of healthy
surfaces may occur. During fault-free conditions, the actuator deflections
are bounded by Ui,min ≤ ui ≤ Ui,max. After a stuck fault, the post-failure
reduced saturation levels depicted in Figure 4.2.2 are given by:
ui+ = Uimax − uie (4.2.10)
ui− = Uimin − uie (4.2.11)
The FDI algorithm functions most reliably under the following condi-
tions:
• Stability is maintained automatically using the redundant (duplicate)
or remaining healthy control surfaces.
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Figure 4.2: Reduced saturation levels post- stuck fault failure
• The faulty actuator is stuck at an angle where the fault nominal con-
troller does not force the saturation of the other control surfaces. In
other words, the healthy control surfaces must cancel out the effects
of the failed control surface and still be able to maintain system sta-
bility (even at some reduced performance capabilities).
4.2.3 Actuator Bias Faults Model
Before a fault occurs, all control surfaces’ actual deflections will follow
their respective control command signals. Malfunctioning actuator servo-
loops can result in unwanted actuation, inducing biases between the com-
mand signals and the actual control surface deflections. An example is the
Oscillatory Failure Case (OFC) mainly caused by faulty electronic com-
ponents or actuator mechanical parts generating spurious signals [2]. The
bias could appear abruptly and then assume a constant value, or it could
be varying slowly. In the context of this thesis, "varying slowly" means
slower than the dynamics of the Kalman filter algorithm, such that the
moving bias can be tracked accurately. The fault parameter is modelled as
p−dimensional vector comprised of bias magnitudes of p actuators as:
The magnitudes of the biases are random and are independent of the
control command signal. Thus, the biases become part system states which
can be estimated. The faulty surfaces’ actual deflections are partly con-
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. MERAKA UAV ACTUATOR AND SENSORS FDD 82
tributed by the control command signals and partly by the bias vector δ∗.





























for the case of the ER filter. This leads to a state augmentation problem
of the same structure as (4.2.6). The fault input matrix Ek is submatrix




bi · · · bj
]
(4.2.15)
where bi, . . . , bj are the ith to jth columns of the input matrix Bk cor-
responding to the control surfaces whose bias faults are of interest (corre-
sponding to parameter vector δ∗ ). Since there’s no real knowledge about







Provided that the identifiability or isolability condition is satisfied in
the EA filter, the structure in (4.2.6) can be applied to the Kalman filter
to estimate all bias faults simultaneously without the need for the MM
approach.
4.2.4 Modeling Stuck Actuator Faults
The formulation of LIP faults relies on the duplex redundancy configura-
tion in the Meraka UAV’s control surfaces. In the absence of redundancy,
a stuck actuator fault, such as a hard-over, will cause a "jump" [80] in the
system mode, altering its behaviour differently than a parametric fault.
However, in a duplex or triplex redundancy configuration where backup
actuators can quickly correct the effects of a stuck actuator, a LIP actuator
fault will it will manifest as a gain and offset error which may be modelled
as a bias for constant commands using the same structure in (4.2.6).
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First, consider that an identical pair of healthy control surfaces (such
as two identical elevators) are given the same control command signal.
Then the control effort will be shared equally by the two control surfaces,
provided they have identical aerodynamic coefficients. If one of the sur-
faces "jumps" to an arbitrary position and gets stuck, the autopilot will
command a new trim-deflection setting to both control surfaces to correct
the resultant trim offsets. The stuck actuator will not respond, whereas
the healthy actuator will take over the effort of two control actuators to
correct the offset. This will result in a mismatch (bias) between the control
command signal and the stuck-position of the faulty surface. This obser-
vation allows the design of an FDI for LIP faults based on the same model
structure in (4.2.6) and (4.2.21).
Note that if this structure is applied to the case of a LIP fault, the TSKF
will compute a LIP position that is twice the true LIP position. This is due
to the healthy actuator carrying the duty of two control surfaces or re-
moving the moments induced by the stuck actuator, then finding a new
post-fault trim setting. This creates a separation angle (bias) between the
healthy and the faulty actuators, which is twice the faulty surface’s stuck-
position. To enable the TSKF model to estimate the stuck position cor-
rectly, a hybrid multi-mode switching model approach described in Sec-
tion 4.6 is utilised. Once a LIP fault has been detected and isolated to a
specific surface, the column corresponding to the stuck actuator in Bk is
nulled, such that the stuck position is completely estimated as part of the
augmented state. This results in the correct estimation of the stuck posi-
tion, provided saturation has been avoided.
4.2.5 Modeling Actuator Loss of Effectiveness (Gain Loss)
Faults
Next, the loss-of-effectiveness in the control surface actuators is consid-
ered. Under the fault-free conditions, the control surfaces’ true deflection
angles will follow the control command signals. In this case, it can be
said that the actuator is 100% effective. When a failure occurs, such as
partial mechanical blockage, voltage reduction, or amplifier saturation in
the servos systems, the actuators cannot entirely follow the control com-
mand signal. This represents a gain-loss that scales down the one-to-one
relationship between the command signal and control surface deflection
position. This fault is called loss-of-effectiveness. Revisiting the model in
Equation in (4.2.1), the control input matrix can be parameterised by mul-
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tiplicative fault parameters as follows:






x 100% reduction in effectiveness
Figure 4.3: Loss of effectiveness fault in a actuator





whereBfk represents the post-fault control input matrix, which can be
related to the nominal, fault-free control input matrix Bk with respect to
control effectiveness factors γik , i = 1, 2, · · ·, p as follows:
Bfk = Bk (I − Γk) , where Γk =

γ1k 0 · · · 0
0 γ2k · · · 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 0 · · · γlk
 (4.2.18)
where γik = 0 , i = 1, 2, · · ·, l represents the ith healthy actuator and
γik = 1 represents the total failure of the ith actuator. Therefore a partial
loss in control effectiveness of the actuator is represented by 0 ≤ γik ≤ 1
. This formulation is illustrated in Figure 4.3. When characterised as per
Equation (4.2.17), the control effectiveness parameter appears as multi-
plicative with respect to the input. It would be beneficial to characterise
the control effectiveness in vector or additive form such that it may be
estimated with the KF methods. By matrix multiplication in (4.2.17), we
get:
xk+1 = Akxk +Bkuk −BkΓkuk +wxk (4.2.19)
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Note that because the control effectiveness parameters matrix is diag-
onal, Γkuk and Ukγk are mathematically equivalent, where
Uk =

u1k 0 · · · 0
0 u2k · · · 0
...
. . . . . .
...
0 0 · · · ulk







By defining the time-varying fault matrix Ek = −BkUk , the loss-of-
effectiveness model can finally be written in the same format as (4.2.3) as
follows







γk = 0 , k < kF fault-free
γk 6= 0 , k ≥ kF under fault
yk+1 =Ckxk+1 + vk+1
(4.2.21)
The objective is to estimate control effectiveness parameter γk so that
reconfiguration controllers can be synthesised to eliminate the effects of
gain loss in the control loops.
4.3 The Two-Stage Kalman Filter
The Equation (4.2.6) describes the evolution of the fault parameter and its
interaction with system states and control inputs. However, in this thesis,
fault parameters will not be estimated within the augmented state Kalman
filter (ASKF), which relies on a larger augmented state vector x̄k with a
size n + p. If p is almost as large as n, as is the case in this study where
n = p = 8, the size of the augmented state vector is increased signifi-
cantly. The computational requirements of the ASKF will thus be exces-
sive. Moreover, numerical problems will arise in ill-conditioned systems
[81].
To address some of these problems, Friedland [82] proposed the two-
stage Kalman filter (TSKF) in which the state vector and the bias are de-
coupled and estimated in parallel, but separately. The approach employs
two reduced-order KFs to estimate the system state and bias separately.
In [83, 84], Ignani and Keller proposed an alternative derivation to Fried-
land’s TSKF for the case of an unknown constant bias. Later works de-
rived the TSKF approach for an unknown random bias [81, 85].
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Figure 4.2 shows a schematic flow diagram of the TSKF, and the com-
plete algorithm for its implementation is given in Equations (4.3.2) to (4.3.18)
below. Note how the TSKF follows the familiar "predict" and "update" se-
quence of the Kalman filter. The time-update equations are denoted with
the subscript (k + 1|k) , and the measurement-update equations are sub-
scripted (k + 1|k + 1)
In the time update stage, the TSKF predicts a "bias-free" state estimate
x̃ that is "oblivious" to faults in the system. This results in residuals r̃ that
are significantly larger in the presence of faults than the regular KF. This is
especially beneficial for the FDI problem, where residuals are used to de-
tect the presence of faults. The TSKF relies on coupling Equations (4.3.14)
to (4.3.16), which are calculated at every time step to "correct" the bias-free
state estimate. The last state estimate in Equation (4.3.18) is the corrected
state that should be used for feedback regulation or system identification,











Figure 4.4: The Two Stage Kalman filter flow diagram
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Bias-free state estimate
















x̃k+1|k+1 =x̃k+1|k + K̃
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Find the bias-free residual and its covariance


































The coupling equations are








Vk+1|k+1 =Vk+1|k − K̃xk+1Hk+1|k (4.3.16)
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Finally, the compensated state and error covariance are








The above TSKF equations are written with respect to the effective-
ness factor parameter γ, but they can be applied to bias and stuck faults
by simply substituting the fault matrix (−BkUk) in (4.3.14) with the input
matrix Bk. For convenience, the rest of the derivations and descriptions
relating to fault parameters will be presented with respect to the effective-
ness factor γ. However, the algorithms can be applied to any of the three
fault types studied in this thesis.
Since it is not possible to describe the evolution of faults determinis-
tically, they are modelled as a random vector with additive noise covari-
ance as shown in Equations (4.2.4) and (4.2.21). A small initial estimate
covariance of the fault parameter P γ0 should be selected because no faults
are expected at the start of the algorithm. When faults occur, the fault pa-
rameters will jump abruptly. This requires selecting a large process noise
covariance matrix Qγ to ensure the fast-tracking of such abrupt changes
in the fault parameter. However, a large covariance matrix will result in
the filter being too sensitive to external excitation from process noise and
measurement errors in the steady-state and initialisation phases. This will
result in erratic behaviour in the fault parameters, resulting in the FDI al-
gorithm being overly sensitive to external disturbances. The selection of
an appropriate Qγ is amongst the primary design objectives in the FDI
design that is based on the KF approach. A fitting parameter covariance
matrixQγ is a trade-off between desired filter convergence rate (mean de-
tection time of the FDI) and tolerable noise sensitivity (false detection rate
and parameter estimate accuracy).
Since Qγ influences P γ additively, a large Qγ makes the algorithm
extremely noise-sensitive resulting in the "blow-up" of the parameter es-
timate. Even slight excitation in the direction of large elements of the P γ
matrix may result in a dramatic behaviour in the parameter estimates. To
address this problem, the thesis proposes an adaptive procedure to esti-
mate the fault parameter, which is the subject of the next section.
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4.4 Adaptive Estimation of Fault Parameter
In this section, enhancements are added to the FDI algorithm to make
it more responsive to abrupt changes in fault parameters, while remain-
ing insensitive to external noise excitation in the absence of faults. Not all
control surfaces will always fail at the same time. There will be substan-
tial differences in the abrupt behaviour and variations rates between all or
subsets of parameters during faults. When a fault occurs, system param-
eters associated with the failed control surfaces will vary more rapidly
than parameters associated with healthy control surfaces. The adaptation
methods developed should be tailored to affect the individual or group of
parameters associated with the occurring faults.
4.4.1 P-Adaptation: by Parameter Estimate Covariance Matrix
Forgetting factor algorithms have been applied to tackle the adaptation
problem. These techniques involve discounting past information to allow
the filtering algorithm to maintain the ability to respond to fast changes in
the system. The covariance of the fault parameter determines the rate of
the filter in estimating such parameter. Thus the forgetting factor can be




+Qγk , 0 < λ ≤ 1 (4.4.1)
However, as single forgetting factor such as in (4.4.1) above will scale all
parameters uniformly in time and space. This is against the argument
made previously that fault parameters will vary in a non-uniform fashion
over time. A better solution is to introduce multiple forgetting factors tai-
lored to each parameter. This enables tuning the forgetting factors based
on knowledge about the rate of variations in each individual parameter.
There are many multiple forgetting methods in literature with varying
complexities and performances. However, the fundamental concepts are
similar. Briefly, the forgetting approach applied should avoid the loss of
tracking capability on the one hand, and unbounded growth of the P γ
matrix. This means that the covariance matrix should neither be too large
(aggressive and sensitive to noise) nor too small (nonresponsive to actual
abrupt faults). To this effect, in [36] it is suggested to constrain the covari-
ance within prescribed boundaries as follows:
σminI ≤ P γk+1|k ≤ σmaxI (4.4.2)
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where σmin and σmax are positive constants such that 0 < σmin <
σmax < ∞, and I is an identity matrix. The constrained matrix in (4.4.2)










, ‖e1k‖ = · · · = ‖elk‖ = 1 (4.4.3)
where α1k|k, . . . , αlk|k are the eigenvalues of P
γ
k|k and e1k|k, . . . , elk|k are the










, 0 < λik ≤ 1 (4.4.4)
In [36], it is shown that by selecting the forgetting factor λik as a de-
creasing function of the amount of information received in the direction
eik , these bounds are met. The eigenvalues αik of the covariance P
γ
k|k are
measure of the variance in the direction of eik . Therefore the forgetting
factor λik scales the eigenvalues without violating the bounds in (4.4.2)
λik =










if αik|k ≤ αmax
(4.4.5)
Replacing (4.3.9) with (4.4.4), will turn the TSKF into an adaptive TSKF
(ATSKF). The forgetting factor causes the filter to lose its steady-state op-
timality, resulting in reduced estimation accuracy. Nonetheless, this is a
fair trade-off as the filter is now more responsive to abrupt changes by
not learning the parameter too well. It is highlighted that the bounds in
(4.4.2) get rid of the off-diagonal elements of the parameter covariance
matrix. This causes the filter to lose its ability to quickly estimate fault
parameters that are dependant on the cross-correlations characterised by
the off-diagonal elements. Moreover, when there is high coupling between
surfaces, as is the case with the Meraka UAV, eliminating the off-diagonal
elements of P γk+1|k results in the loss of all information about coupling be-
tween state variables. In this thesis, the forgetting factor presented in this
section worked well in isolating and distinguishing between the right and
left elevator faults. The next section presents a novel multiple forgetting
factor approach, which preserves the cross-coupling between all parame-
ters.
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4.4.2 Q-Adaptation: by Additive Noise Covariance
As pointed out in [73], the forgetting factors as given in the expression
(4.4.5) is equivalent to adding a noise term with a time-varying covariance
to the algorithm. If we denote the equivalent noise covariance as Q̂γk , then














T ≥ 0 (4.4.6)
This observation justifies developing an adaptation technique based
on a time-varying noise covariance. The novel approach proposed in this
study is based on monitoring the evolution of the fault parameters and
scaling the additive covariance matrix Qγk in directions along which the
parameter variations are most significant. The TSKF already has the abil-
ity to detect changes and estimate fault parameters. However, parameter
estimates may be too slow or too sensitive to noise, depending on the
size of the Qγk matrix. By experimentation, a conservative (not too small
and not too large) is usually found. Suppose that there exists a conserva-
tive Qγ0 matrix that is sufficiently small to minimise noise sensitivity in
steady-state, and sufficiently large to track changes in fault parameters,
yet not aggressive enough to track faults as quickly as required for FDI
purposes. Actually, such a matrix needs to be found by experimentation
as part of the normal KF design process in any case. This matrix can then
be scaled in the direction of parameter variation whenever the FDI algo-
rithm detects a fault, allowing the KF to track occurring faults faster. To
this effect, the following realtime statistics of the fault parameters are de-
fined to quantify parameter variations.
• Firstly, the initial variances of the fault parameters during the fault












where µ̄γ̂i0 are the means of the fault parameters over the initial sam-
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The sample size should be selected to be long enough to collect suf-
ficient statistics in the variation of the fault parameters during fault
free conditions.












• Next we define a function ϑγ , as the ratio between the initial fault-free









The moving variance tracks variation rates over the evaluation win-
dow N2, and thus old data outside the evaluation window is dis-
counted or "forgotten". If there are no abrupt changes in the parame-
ter statistics within the moving windowN2, the ratio ϑγ is expected to
be close to unity. This ratio ϑγ is here called the normalised moving
variance, normalised by the system’s "original" fault free variance.
This parameter is expected to be close to unity when there are no
significant changes in the parameter’s second moment statistic and
larger than unity when there are high variations. This provides a ba-
sis for a scaling factor based on this ratio.
SinceQγk is a symmetric positive definite matrix, by spectral factorisa-










with eigenvalues σ1k|k, . . . , σlk|k and corresponding orthonormal eigen-
vectors q1k|k, . . . , qlk|k. Then an adaptiveQ
γ
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In application, the ratio ϑγ may vary in the fault-free mode for other
reasons than faults, such as noise disturbances. However, in the pres-
ence of faults, the variations will be much more significant since the noise
statistics are already captured in σ2
γ̂i0
. Therefore, the FDI does not trig-
ger the Qγk − scaling algorithm unless significantly large values of ϑγ are
detected. The scaling limits are ϑγimax included to avoid over-scaling Q
γ
k
which would lead to blowing up of estimated fault parameters.
4.5 Adaptation Filtering of the State
For similar reasons discussed in the previous section, adaptive procedures
for the state estimation equations in the TSKF are developed.
4.5.1 State Adaptation Based on a Single Factor
The innovation of the TSKF can be affected by several factors, includ-
ing unmodelled dynamics, measurement errors, poor approximations or
shifts in the system. From (4.3.7), it is clear that the covariance of the inno-
vation sequence is affected by the estimate covariance and the measure-
ment covariance. If the system dynamics are known precisely, the theo-
retical innovation covariance will closely approximate the real innovation
covariance. However, in practice, the true nonlinear model is never avail-
able, and a simplified model is typically used. Consequently, the innova-
tion covariance may grow when affected by the state estimation error or
measurement errors. This observation provides the basis for comparing
the real and theoretical covariances of the innovation sequence online to
construct adaptive procedures. Let the sampled innovation sequence co-
















When the theoretical innovation covariance increases due to unmod-
elled behaviour, the true sampled innovation covariance S̄k, could be used
to find the scalar αk. The effects of incomplete knowledge in the dynamic
equation can be compensated by increasing the magnitude of P̃ xk+1|k. Thus
the adaptive approach could be based on increasing the predicted esti-
mate error covariance by defining P̄ xk+1|k ≡ λxk P̃ xk+1|k. Then λxk ≥ 1 and
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serves as a forgetting factor by scaling up the predicted covariance. The
















































The solution given by (4.5.8) is an approximation of λxk . However, if we
trust the sensing devices more, then the scaling should be limited to the
predicted estimate error covariance and Rk+1 does not form part of the
adaptation. In this study, we trust the sensing equipment more due to their
high accuracy, and we opt to adapt to modelling errors in the stochastic
model. When Rk+1 is ignored, the above equation becomes λxk = αk. Re-
gardless, the adaptation (scaling) philosophy typically requires to trust
either the process and adapt for measurements errors or vice versa. As
pointed out in [86], the simultaneous adaptation of both the process and
measurements based on matching covariances is questionable since these
covariance matrices affect each other. Then the estimates error covariance
is P̄ xk+1|k ≡ λxk P̃ xk+1|k. The value of λxk should be estimated online using
(4.5.2) and plugged into Equation (4.3.3) to add state estimate adaptation.
4.5.2 Multiple Forgetting Factors by Q-Adaptation
The previous section derived adaptation procedure based on a single for-
getting factor. Following arguments made previously in sections 4.4.1 and
4.4.2, in complex multivariate systems, adaptation procedures should be
tailored in the direction of flow of information, such that each state weighted
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the differently depending on observations. Thus a matrix of multiple for-
getting factors should be used. Similar to the single factor case, the ap-














This time, aQ− adaptation procedure is derived by finding an appro-
priate multiplier matrix for the Q−matrix such that the sampled innova-
tion covariance matrix closely matches the theoretical one. A matrix Σ is

























For a specific case in this thesis, where the the observation matrix is



















The sampled covariance is nevertheless an approximation over a mov-
ing window of length L. Also, Σ is evaluated using an online computer
which can have round-off errors; causing the resulting matrix to be non-
diagonal or have diagonal elements that are smaller than one or negative.












, i = 1, · · · , n (4.5.13)
The scalar Σii are taken from the diagonal elements of the matrix Σ.
This matrix multiplier is incorporated into (4.3.3) for adaptive state esti-
mation.
4.6 Hybrid Switching Model Formulation
It was shown in sections 4.2.3, 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 that the bias fault, LIP fault
and the LoE fault can be tracked using the same structure in (4.2.4) and
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(4.2.21). The only difference in the models for estimating bias, LIP and
LoE faults is the fault entry matrix Ek, and the fact that the column in the
controls input matrix Bk corresponding to the stuck actuator is nulled in
the case of a LIP fault. Instead of having three designs for bias, LIP and
LoE faults, and hybrid, multiple mode switching model is utilised to track
all fault types. The Hybrid approach eliminates the need for multiple de-
signs or models and reduces computational requirements. The approach
is based on the assumption that the UAV can be sufficiently expressed at
any given time by a stochastic hybrid system denoted as H
H :
xk+1 = Ak(pk+1)xk +Bk(pk+1)uk +wkyk = Ck(pk)xk + vk (4.6.1)
where pk ∈ H ⊆ Rl represents the unknown plant parameters which
may vary in time in an abrupt fashion and represents the various failure
scenarios. Suppose that a set of finite p linear models can be designed to




M1, . . . ,Mp
}
(4.6.2)
such that the model in (4.2.3) is re-written as a hybrid jump ("switch-
ing") model as follows:
M :
xk+1 = Akxk + (Bk − Bj,k)uk + Ekbk +wxkyk+1 = Ckxk+1 + vk+1 (4.6.3)
where Bj,k and Ej,k corresponds to the parameter set pi ∈H represent-
ing mode changes in the system for every actuator failure. In this thesis,
Bj,k is chosen as a matrix of the same dimensions as the control input ma-
trix Bk. The hybrid system’s nominal model is chosen to match the bias
TSKF estimator in Section 4.2.3. Thus the nominal (initial) value of Bj,k is a
zero matrix, and the nominal value of Ej,k is a submatrix of the controls in-
put matrixBk chosen appropriately for the EA and ER filters as described
in section 4.2.3.
In the event of a LIP fault, the matrix Bj,k is chosen annihilate the ap-
propriate column of the control matrix. To speak again, Bj,k is chosen with
zero values in all elements with the exception of the jth column, corre-
sponding the jth stuck actuator, which is chosen as equal to the jth col-
umn in matrix Bk corresponding to the same stuck actuator. The arith-
metic difference between Bk and Bj,k matrices results in the effects of the
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failed actuator being completely removed from the Bk matrix, such that
it is completely estimated in the "augmented" state parameter vector. This
formulation is fitting because after the actuator is stuck, it no longer re-
sponds to control commands and therefore no longer forms part of the
control input dynamics. In the event of an LoE fault, the switching occurs
in Ej,k. Following the explanation in Section 4.2.5, the fault input matrix
will transition to Ej,k = −BkUk.
The next problem is to select a switching logic for the hybrid system.
The detection index function dik described in section 4.8 already reliably
isolates all considered faults. The detection index function and the classi-
fication technique described in section 4.6.1 are used to isolate the faulty
surface and determine the type of fault. Based on this information, the
hybrid model switches appropriately to reconstruct the fault correctly.
4.6.1 Active FDI for Fault Classification and Hybrid Switching
This section describes the active FDI strategy utilised for the classification
of bias, LIP and LoE faults. The model structure in 4.2.6 can detect bias,
LoE and LIP faults. The nominal (default) model is chosen as the bias esti-
mator. Therefore, if a bias fault occurs, it will be isolated and reconstructed
without any switching in the hybrid model. In the event of a LIP fault, the
nominal model will also isolate the fault correctly; however, the fault pa-
rameters estimates will be exaggerated and incorrect. For the case of an
LoE fault, the fault parameter will be time-varying and incorrect, coupled
into the input. To reconstruct the LoE and LIP faults correctly, the hybrid
model needs to switch to a different mode by adjusting either the Bk ma-
trix or the fault input matrix Ek.
At time tD, when a fault is detected with the detection function, the
active FDI procedure is triggered and initiates the fault classification pro-
cedure. Auxiliary excitation signals are injected to extract fault signatures
from the system. The excitation signals are chosen as sinusoidal with a fre-
quency ω and amplitudes chosen in the kernel of theB matrix as follows:
uex =
(
δEr , δEl , δAr , δAl , δRr , δRl
)T
sinωt (4.6.4)
whereuex ∈ ker(B). The null space will always exist under "fault-free"
conditions due to the duplex redundancy configuration and symmetric
surfaces. In the case of a bias fault, uex represents orthogonal signals in-
jected into the controls, which will cancel out each other in the aircraft’s
dynamic behaviour. If the fault is a LIP or LoE type, the auxiliary controls
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 4. MERAKA UAV ACTUATOR AND SENSORS FDD 98
excitation signals cannot fulfil uex ∈ ker(B) because of a stuck surface
or a partially responsive surface. Consequently, the excitation frequency
ω will propagate through the system and appear in the measured signals
and parameter estimates. The classification process consists of detecting
the presence of the excitation frequency in any of the measured signals or
calculated signals, for example, the estimate of the faulty control surface
δ̂∗k. If the frequency is absent in δ̂∗k over the excitation window, the fault
is declared as bias type, and no mode switching occurs. If the excitation
frequency ω is present in δ̂∗k, then the fault is either LIP or LoE type.
To determine if the fault is LIP or LoE, a new excitation signal which
can be of the same frequency ω is now injected into a single surface that
failed. If the fault is LIP type, there will be no response in the system. If
the fault is an LoE type, the excitation frequency ω will be present again
in the δ̂∗k parameter. In this way, the FDI distinguished between the three
types of control surface faults.
Note that the classification and the FDI algorithm can run in parallel.
Indeed the auxiliary sinusoidal excitation allows the TSKF to learn the
new state and parameters faster, which improves the reliability of the FDI.
4.6.2 Active Fault Detection and Isolation for Rudder Faults
The two rudders in the Meraka UAV are mathematically identical and are
not isolable within one structure. Nevertheless, due to the similarity, when
there is a fault on one rudder, the ER filter will estimate a parameter that
is half of the true fault size but in the correct direction of deflection in both
rudders. This is useful information that can be used to isolate the failed
rudder actively by using the following approach.
4.6.2.1 For Bias Faults
This approach relies on the observation that the ER filter will estimate a
false elevator bias whenever there is a rudder bias fault. Unlike with the
elevators and ailerons, all the moments generated by the right and left
rudders are always identical, making it impossible to isolate rudder faults
by only tracking their effects on the moments. This is due to the two rud-
ders being equivalent in their mathematical characterisation. To achieve
rudder fault isolation, active FDI (AFDI) algorithms are developed. In the
case of a bias fault, the nonlinear relationship between rudder deflection
and pitching moment is assessed online to extract fault signatures. Due to
the rudders being located above the centre of mass on the Meraka UAV,
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any rudder deflection in any direction will cause a positive pitching mo-
ment. The rudder-induced pitching moment is modelled as a function of
the absolute value of rudder deflection in this study, i.e. Cm = f(| δR |)
,for the nonlinear simulation model.
The AFDI technique developed to isolate rudder bias faults functions
by tracking the effects of the rudders on the pitching moment. A bias fault
on one of the rudders will offset trim and cause unwanted pitching. Be-
cause the UAV is fitted with a feedback controller, the elevator will com-
pensate for the rudder induced pitch and find a new "biased" elevator trim
setting. As a result, the ER filter will estimate a false elevator bias (pseudo-
elevator bias ), which in truth, represents right or left rudder fault. The ER
filter will still detect and reconstruct rudder faults but attribute half of the
actual bias magnitude to both rudders, regardless of which of the two is
faulty. The AFDI approach monitors this behaviour in the pseudo-elevator
bias to determine which rudder is truly faulty.
Firstly, the FDI algorithm is able to identify the presence of pseudo-
elevator bias and distinguish it from a real elevator bias, since the FDI relies
on the EA filter to track elevator faults. In other words, if there is a real
(true) elevator fault, it will appear in the EA filter and will be isolated
correctly.
In the case of the ER filter, since a fault in either of the rudders will in-
duce the pseudo-elevator bias, the same faulty rudder can be used to remove
the pseudo-elevator bias by forcing the faulty rudder to a correct trim setting
that induces no pitch. This is realised with an active FDI strategy which
injects auxiliary signals into the rudders to remove any rudder induced
pitching moment.
The rudder whose auxiliary excitation restores or approximates the
original "pre-fault" elevator trim setting (the rudder whose auxiliary ma-
nipulation can eliminate the pseudo-elevator bias) is declared as the rudder
with a bias fault. Note that if the "healthy" rudder is actively injected, the
pseudo-elevator bias bias can only increase. In contrast, if the faulty rudder
is injected, the pseudo-elevator bias can either increase or decrease down to
zero. This is the distinguishing factor that allows the active isolation of
the faulty rudder. The decrease in the pseudo-elevator bias to zero lets the
FDI know that the biased rudder was deflected back to the unbiased trim
or zero deflection, resulting in the elevator reverting to the original trim
setting. With the elevator back at the trim setting, the pseudo-elevator bias
disappears, and the rudder that removed its effect is declared as the one
having a bias fault.
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4.6.2.2 For Stuck Faults
Once a locked-in-place fault is detected in either of the rudders and classi-
fied as such, the stuck-actuator isolation procedure is triggered. This pro-
cedure works by injecting the excitation signal into any of the two rud-
ders. The excitation is chosen at a frequency ωR. If the excitation is injected
into the stuck rudder, there will be no response observed from the systems
states and parameter estimates, in which case the injected control surface
will be declared as the stuck surface. On the other hand, if the excitation
is injected on a healthy rudder, the excitation signal frequency of ωR will
propagate through the system and be observed in the measurements and
the fault parameter estimates. If the frequency ωR is detected in the sys-
tem, then the opposite rudder will be declared as stuck.
4.7 Joint Unscented Kalman Filter (JUKF) and Dual
Unscented Kalman Filter (DUKF)
The Kalman filter and the Extended Kalman filter (EKF) have been widely
applied to nonlinear dynamic systems in various applications and have
gained popularity among researchers and industry [3, 71, 73, 80, 87]. In
KF and the EKF, the state distribution is approximated by Gaussian ran-
dom variable (GRV), relying only on first-order statistics of the system.
Moreover, the approach may require large Jacobian matrices, which may
be challenging to attain. The KF approach also requires that the chosen
system model is differentiable.
The UKF characterises the mean and covariance of the GRV differ-
ently, using a set of sample points selected through a deliberate procedure,
and passed through the nonlinear function to accurately capture posterior
mean and covariance to the 3rd order for any nonlinearity. [74–77]. In this
thesis, the application of the UKF to simultaneous state and parameter es-
timation for FDD is investigated. The TSEKF yielded good results for fault
parameter estimation and faults isolation. Nevertheless, highly coupled
behaviour was observed between the left and right ailerons, which re-
quired intricate bias adaptation techniques to improve their isolation. The
Dual Unscented Kalman filter and Joint-Unscented Kalman filter initially
investigated in [76], are applied to a nonlinear stochastic aircraft model
with split control surfaces.
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4.7.1 Unscented Transformation (UT)
The unscented transform (UT) is a technique for estimating the statistics
of a random variable after it has gone through a nonlinear transformation
[74, 75]. The basis for the UT is the very intuitive idea that it should be
easier to approximate a given distribution than it is to approximate an ar-
bitrary nonlinear function. Consider transforming a random variable x of
dimension L through a nonlinear function, y = f(x). If the random vari-
able x has a known mean x̄ and covariance Px, then the transformation is














i = L+ 1, · · · , 2L
(4.7.1)






















i = 1, · · · , 2L
(4.7.2)
where λ = ρ2(L+ κ)−L is a scaling parameter and ρ determines the how
the sigma points are spread around the mean x̄ . The κ is a secondary
scaling parameter and σ is to incorporate prior knowledge of the distri-





is the ith column of the matrix square
root of the weighted covariance matrix . Secondly, sigma points are prop-
agated through the nonlinear function to yield a cloud of transformed
points from which ȳ and Py can be determined:
Y i = f(X i) , i = 0, · · · , 2L (4.7.3)
and the mean and covariance for y are approximated using a weighted












i (Y i − ȳ)(Y i − ȳ)T (4.7.5)
where ȳ is the mean and Py is covariance of y .
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4.7.2 State Estimation with Unscented Kalman filter
The unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) follows directly from the unscented
transformation. The UT technique is simply adopted in the familiar recur-
sive Kalman filter framework to estimate the state:
x̂k = xpredicted,k + Kk(yk − ypredicted,k) (4.7.6)
where Kk = PxkykP
−1
ỹkỹk
, and the state random variable is augmented





The unscented transformation is now applied to the augmented state
random variable by applying the Equations 4.7.1 and the sigma points are
calculated based on this augmented state RV. The dimension of the aug-
mented state and matrices are increased according. The complete equa-
tions for the implementation of the UKF procedures is given in Table 4.1
for iterations, k ∈ [1, . . . ,∞] . Rather that finding the true matrix square
root of ηP in (4.7.1) and Tables 4.1 and 4.2, an alternative definition of the
matrix square R =
√
P computes a result such that P = RRT is utilized.
This yields a numerically stable solution found as the lower-triangular
Cholesky factorisation provided that P is positive definite.
4.7.3 Parameter Estimation with Unscented Kalman filter
To estimate parameters with UKF procedure requires a nonlinear function
that maps yk = G(xk,w) where xk is the known input variable andG(.) is
the nonlinear map which has been parameterised by the unknown vector





. The error between the observations and
the nonlinear mapping function is given by
ek = dk −G(xk,wk) (4.7.8)
The UKF algorithm provides an estimate of the parameters wk which
minimises the expected squared error of (4.7.8). With the, we write an new
state transition function to estimate the unknown parameter set as follows
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Table 4.1: State Estimation with Unscented Kalman filter
UKF algorithm for state estimation
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L+ λ, xa = [x,wx,v] , X a = [(X x)T , (Xwx)T , (X v)T ] λ is the composite
scaling parameter, L is the dimension of augmented states, N is the total number of
sample dataQx is process noise covariance matrix,R is measurement noise
covariance matrix and Wi indicates the UT weights
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Table 4.2: Parameter Estimation with Unscented Kalman filter
UKF algorithm for parameter estimation
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For k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, calculate the time update of the parameter vector and covariance

















































L+ λ, λ is the composite scaling parameter, L is the dimension of
parameter being estimated, N is the total number of sample data.Qw is the artificial
process-noise covariance andRek is the observation-noise covariance and Wi indicates
the UT weights
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wk+1 = wk + rk (4.7.9)
dk = G(xk,wk) + ek (4.7.10)
Again, since there’s no information about the evolution of the un-
known parameter wk , we define it as a stationary process with identity
state transition matrix, with additive process noise rk. The complete pa-
rameter estimation UKF procedure is detailed in Table 4.2
4.7.4 Joint and Dual UKF
The conjoint state-parameter problem consists of simultaneously estimat-
ing the clean state xk and the model parameters w from the noisy data
yk. In the preceding sections, the case of separate state and parameter was
presented. This technique is also available in the UKF environment, in
the forms commonly known as the Joint-UKF and Dual-UKF. Briefly, the
Joint-UKF is analogous to the Augmented-EKF, whereas the Dual-UKF
[76, 77] is similar to the TSKF where two filters run simultaneously to es-
timate the state and unknown parameters.
States & Parameters





Figure 4.5: A comparison between the Joint-UKF and the Dual-UKF
The key to the DUKF approach is that the state filter utilises the pre-
vious estimate of the parameter ŵk−1, generated by the parameter UKF
that is running in parallel with the state UKF. The DUKF see the param-
eter estimate as a known input rather than a random variable. Likewise,
the parameter filter utilised the previous estimate of the state, x̂k−1 which
is treated as a known input in the observation equation. This result is the
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iterative online exchange of estimates between the filters in Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2.
With the joint-UKF [76] filter, the system states and unknown parame-






Then the standard algorithm for UKF state estimation in Table 4.1 is ap-

















Because the joint-UKF augments the state variable and unknown pa-
rameter into one vector, the UKF captures the cross-covariance between







With this formulation, the Joint-UKF to computes cross-correlation be-
tween the states and the parameter estimates. Per contra, the DUKF de-
couples the dual estimation problem by treating the parameter estimate
as a known fixed value and not as a random variable in the state fil-
ter, and the state estimate as a fixed, known value (and not as a random
variable) in the parameter filter. This effectively equates the off-diagonal
blocks Pwkxk = Pxkwk = 0. Consequently, the DUKF filters are each less
sensitive to erratic behaviour in the other, which is an attractive property
for reliable FDD design.
4.8 Actuator Fault Isolation
The fault isolation algorithm is a simple statistical hypothesis test based
on preselected thresholds. The TSKF and DUKF already provide estimates
of fault parameters, including their magnitude and direction, and can dis-
tinguish between control surfaces by tracking their influence on the mo-
ments. Therefore, only basic threshold-based isolation techniques are re-
quired. The isolation scheme is based on comparing the evolution of the
statistical quantities of the fault parameters, calculated online during sys-
tem operation, to their known initial statistics under fault-free conditions.
Firstly, the system has a trial period where the statistics (mean and vari-
ance) of each parameter are collected under fault-free conditions. Once
known, then the realtime variations in the statistics of the fault parameters
can be compared to their initial values. Enough time should be allowed
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to capture accurate statistics of the fault-free conditions. This can be eas-
ily done both in simulation and on the real control system. The fault-free
statistics must be collected under worst-case scenario to capture for sys-
tem variations in the extreme direction.
• Fault-free Statistics
In the first stage, the mean and variance of the fault the parameters
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are the mean and variance of the fault parameter respectively. These


















whereN1 is the sample size, which is selected to ensure capturing the
accurate statistics of the normal (fault-free) conditions
• Online Statistics & Isolation Decision
In the second part of the analysis, the same statistical quantities are
determined under online to detect abnormal (faulty) conditions. We






































































where εik = γ̂ik−N2 − γ̂
i
k, and N2 is the length of the moving window.
The quantity σ2
γ̂ik
I represents the variance of "fault-free" of parame-
ters, and σ2
γ̂ik
II is the variance from the moving mean, i.e. moving
variance of fault parameters.
Now we define the following detection index function, which is cho-
sen to accentuate the variations in the statistical quantities of parameters













− 1, i = 1, · · · , l (4.8.10)
This index is calculated at every time-step k and is used to declare fault in
the ith actuator whenever a preset threshold is Ji exceeded
H0 :system operates normally, and (4.8.11)
H1 :fault has occurred in the ith actuator. (4.8.12)
H0 : dik ≤ Ji ∀k (4.8.13)
H1 : dik > Ji ∃k (4.8.14)
where H0 indicates that no significant statistical shifts observed in the
ith actuator and thus no fault declared in the actuator; and H1 indicates
that significant statistical shifts observed in the ith actuator and thus a
fault is declared in that actuator.
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4.8.1 Adaptive Isolation Threshold
It noted that the function 4.8.10, when simplified, has the form x2−lnx2−1
and dik grows both quadratically and logarithmically as a function of fault
size. Faults of small magnitudes will generate smaller dik and vice versa. If
Ji is set too high, then small faults will be missed resulting in high missed
detection rates. If set too low, there will be high false detection rates due
to transient jumps in the strongly coupled parameters or jumps caused
by noise. Simulations show that a fault in any control surface will cause
a transient response in the rest. The related surfaces (e.g. right and left
ailerons) will particularly induce large transients that eventually disap-
pear. These transients trigger false alarms if Ji is set too low. Consequently,
it is impossible to set a static threshold of Ji that works for all fault sizes.
To solve this problem, the thesis proposed the following adaptive thresh-
old function.




where J i0 is the minimum isolation threshold selected for the ith to
ensure that small-sized faults can be isolated. In 5.8, βk represents the
normalised innovation squared (NIS) which is a χ2− distributed random
variable and is a measure of the unbiasedness of the innovation. When the
KF is set correctly, the NIS will have zero mean and covariance equal to
identity (I). If there is a fault present in the system affecting the mean and
variance of the innovation, the NIS will grow and a larger value depen-
dent on the fault. Since βk varies as a function of fault size, when larger
faults occur, J ik will grow significantly, and a higher alarm threshold will
set due to the variables νiβk. This greatly improves the reliability, sen-
sitivity and robustness of the FDI by reducing false alarms and missed
detections.
4.9 Normalised Innovation Squared
As stated in the preceding section, the FDI utilised the normalised innova-
tion squared (NIS), to detect the presence of an actuator or sensor fault in
the system. Under the Level 1 analysis, the FDI algorithm checks the nor-
malised innovation squared (NIS) in both the EA and ER filters against a
probabilistically preset threshold. The NIS is calculated from the innova-
tion sequence of the TSKF. The NIS is a χ2-distributed random variable
that represents the unbiasedness of the innovation sequence of the KF.
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Provided that the TSKF is tuned correctly, the unbiased NIS will have zero
mean and covariance equal to the identity matrix.










If the Kalman filter has been correctly tuned by the appropriate selec-





= I (a unit matrix). Both actuator and sensor fault faults will in-
fluence the mean of the innovation sequence, and to the detect that shift,


















where M above is the rolling window in which the normalised inno-
vation squared is evaluated every at every iteration. It turns out that this
function has a χ2 distribution with M × n degrees of freedom, where n is
the vector size of the innovation sequence (See Appendix E.1). Since this
function is affected by both actuator or sensor faults, we use it to detect a
system-level (which we call Level-1 analysis) by setting up the following
two hypotheses:
H0 :system operates normally, and (4.9.4)
H1 :fault occurs in the system. (4.9.5)
To evaluate the hypotheses, we use the select a desired significance






= α; 0 < α < 1 (4.9.6)
If the calculated value of βk is greater than the threshold value χ2α,M.s
then the hypothesisH1 is true as follows
H0 :βk ≤ χ2α,M.s ∀k (4.9.7)
H1 :βk > χ2α,M.s ∃k (4.9.8)
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4.10 Sensor Fault Isolation Algorithm
To isolate the sensor faults in the innovation channel affecting the charac-
teristics of the sequence η̄k, we construct the following sample covariance






(ηj − η̄k) (ηj − η̄k)T (4.10.1)
where η̄k = 1M
∑k
j=k−M+1 ηj is the moving average of the innovation
sequence, sample over M iterations
To isolate the faulty sensor, we define a statistical variable as the ratio
between the sampled and theoretical variances σ̂2i /σ2i . This function can
then be used to detect changes in each channel of the innovation sequence
to isolate the failed sensor. Since ηk ∼ N (0, σi), it follows that
vi
σ2i
∼ χ2α,M−1, ∀i, i = 1, 2, · · ·, n (4.10.2)
where vi = (M − 1)σ̂i . Since σ2i = 1 for normalized innovation se-
quence it follows that,
vi ∼ χ2α,M−1, ∀i, i = 1, 2, · · ·, n (4.10.3)






= α; 0 < α < 1 (4.10.4)
The above equation allows selecting an appropriate threshold χ2α,M−1
for a desired significance level. If a fault occurs, it will change the mean
and variance of the innovation sequence, and the statistics vi will exceed
the threshold value χ2α,M−1 depending on (1 − α), and degree of freedom
(M − 1).
As detailed in Appendix E.2, as soon as the statistical function vi ex-
ceeds the threshold χ2α,M−1 the fault should be immediately detected, be-
cause once N reaches M (N = M) , the statistical function will start to
decrease.
The sample variances of each innovation channel σ̂2i are simply the
diagonal components of the sampled covariance normalised innovation
matrix Ŝk. Thus there is no need to individually calculate these statistics
for each measurement in the innovation vector. However, the diagonal of
the normalised innovation matrix Ŝk need to be multiplied byM−1 to get
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the correct values. For fault isolation, these values should be compared
with χ2α,M−1 and with one each other. The algorithm assumes only one
sensor fault at any given time, so only the largest statistical function to
exceed the threshold is declared to reflect a sensor fault. The decision logic
is as follows; if Ŝmax,k > χ2α,M−1, where Ŝmax,k = max
{
Ŝii,k|i = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
,
the hypothesis H1 is true for the ith sensor associated with Ŝmax,k . Ŝii,k




In this section, the proposed FDD algorithms are tested and evaluated for
reliability and robustness in a high fidelity nonlinear simulated environ-
ment. Firstly, a description of the nonlinear stochastic aircraft model is
given. A layout of the simulation campaign to validate and test the re-
liability of the FDD algorithm is outlined. Simulation results for various
fault scenarios and fault types are presented. Performance results from
1000 Monte-Carlo simulations are presented for the three fault types con-
sidered.
5.1 Nonlinear Simulation Environment
The high-fidelity nonlinear aircraft model was designed with software
packages MATLAB® and Simulink ® and incorporates the nonlinear kine-
matic and dynamic equation presented in Chapter 3. Figure 5.1 shows the
nonlinear model is embedded with atmospheric disturbance models, in-
cluding turbulence, gusts and wind shear, sensor noise model, actuator,
and control surface nonlinearities such as saturation and abrupt, discon-
tinuous failures.
In practice, there are multiple sources of error in UAV sensors. These
may be random, such as electrical noise, or maybe caused by nonlinear-
ity, temperature sensitivity, or cross-axis sensitivity which are more deter-
ministic. To simulate sensor measurement noise, Gaussian noise with zero
mean and sensor dependant variance is superimposed onto the system
states. The sensor variances are chosen based on typical industry stan-
dard specifications for commercially available sensors used in low-cost
UAVs for each sensing device. The sensors modelled includes rate gyros,
pressure sensors, and magnetometers.
113
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Figure 5.1: High-fidelity nonlinear dynamic model simulation, with autopilot controller
and FDI module
The wind is modelled as having a steady component plus atmospheric
disturbances. Gust components are produced by passing white noise through
the Dryden filters. The Dryden gust model parameters are defined in the
MIL-F-8785C specification. Angular rates turbulence, discrete gust buildup,
and wind shear models are embedded into the nonlinear equation using
the Aerospace Blockset in Simulink. Steady wind components are rotated
from the inertial frame to the body frame and added to the gust compo-
nents to produce the total wind experienced by the UAV model. The non-
linear simulated aircraft is fitted with an autopilot controller, and faults
are routinely introduced during straight and level trimmed flight.
5.1.1 Simulation Tests Methodology
During each failure scenario, system states, system inputs, and estimates
of the reconstructed fault parameters are captured and recorded for pre-
sentation in this section. Based on this data, performance indexes are cal-
culated to evaluate the performance and reliability of the FDD design.
Firstly, the chapter presents selected demonstrative results to illustrate the
robustness introduced by the proposed FDI algorithm. Secondly, a valida-
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tion campaign is performed in a Monte Carlo framework to truly test the
reliability of the FDI and expose the FDD algorithm not only to fault sce-
narios of different types and magnitudes, but also to scenarios where all or
a subset of the aircraft model parameters and disturbances are scattered,
each with its own statistical distribution (means dispersion). The valida-
tion campaign is performed for bias, LoE and LIP actuator faults. The
FDD’s reliability is evaluated through a Monte-Carlo statistical analysis
from a set of 1000 fault scenarios that occur randomly in the left or right
elevator, aileron or rudder. Each of the six control surfaces has an equal
probability of failure during each run, and only one controlled surface
failure can fail at a time during the MC campaign. Each failure scenario is
performed with randomly distributed turbulence profiles, aircraft mass,
centre-of-gravity locations, aerodynamic coefficients, trimmed height and
speed. The characteristics of the parameter distributions are given in Table
5.1
Table 5.1: Distributions of the Meraka aircraft parameters, an fault magnitudes during MC
simulations
Parameter Distribution mean α min max
Long. wind normal 6m/s 2m/s N/A N/A
Lat. wind normal 6m/s 2m/s N/A N/A
Mass uniform N/A N/A 23 kg 27 kg
CG uniform N/A N/A 95% 105%
Aero. coeffs. uniform N/A N/A 98% 102%)
Bias uniform N/A N/A 1° 5°
LIP uniform N/A N/A 1° 5°
LoE uniform N/A N/A 40% 95%
5.2 Simulation of Bias Faults
In this section, bias faults are simulated, and the results are presented.
If a bias fault is detected, the hybrid FDI model remains in the nominal
state, and no switching occurs. As pointed out in the preceding sections,
for the case of a bias fault, the orthogonal excitation signals in the AFDI
will cancel each other out, and the frequency of the test signal will not be
present in the parameter estimate. This phenomenon is illustrated through
simulations in this chapter.
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5.2.1 Single Elevator Fault with and without Adaptive
Procedures
In this simulation test, a single bias fault of 5° is induced in the right ele-
vator at time tF = 20s, and the results are presented. The main purpose of
the simulation test is to demonstrate the capabilities of the FDI algorithm
in isolating and reconstructing a single bias fault. The second objective is
to compare the FDI’s performance with and without the proposed Qγ -
adaptation technique.
Thus, a total of three simulation tests are carried out in this experi-
ment. The first experiment is carried out without any adaptation proce-
dure. The second carried out with the P γ - adaptation procedure pro-
posed by Wu[73], and the third is carried out with the novel Qγ - adap-
tation procedure proposed in this thesis. The experimental setup for all
three scenarios are identical. In all test cases, a 5° fault is induced in the
right elevator while the simulated flight conditions and aircraft parame-
ters are kept the same.
The simulations’ test criteria is to compare effectiveness in fault iso-
lation and accuracy in reconstructing the fault parameter. Figures 5.2, 5.3
and 5.4 show the the first, second and third experiments respectively. The
















Figure 5.2: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right elevator. The fault is recon-
structed with the EA filter without any forgetting factor adaptation
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Figure 5.3: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right elevator. The fault is recon-
structed with the EA filter with the forgetting factor applied to the P γk matrix
results in Figure 5.2 are based on the non-adaptive TSKF. The results in
Figure 5.3 are based on the P γk covariance matrix of the bias estimate er-
ror in accordance with Equation (4.4.4). Finally, the results in Figure 5.4
are based on the Qγk additive noise covariance matrix fault parameter in
accordance with Equation (4.4.11).
As seen in Figure 5.2 plot (a), the 5° bias fault in the right elevator is
sufficiently reconstructed by the EA filter. Moreover, the fault is tracked
at a fast rate. Note also, the left elevator parameter estimate in 5.2 plot
(b), remained insensitive to the presence of the fault in the right surface.
Nevertheless, all fault estimates show noise sensitivity, which is more pro-
nounced in the aileron parameters, appearing as a common-mode bias. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, in the non-adaptive TSKF, the Qγk matrix has to
be set high enough to ensure the TSKF tracks the abrupt faults. However,
this results in noise sensitivity during steady state. This phenomenon can
be observed in Figure 5.2 plots (c) and (d), where the aileron estimates
continually blows-up symmetrically around zero.
A closer inspection of plots in 5.2 (a) and (b) reveal that a common-
mode drift is also present in the elevator fault estimates. However, this be-
haviour is prevalent in the aileron parameters estimates due to the strong
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Figure 5.4: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right elevator. The fault is recon-
structed with the EA filter with the forgetting factor applied to theQγk matrix
coupling effect in the ailerons. The noise sensitivity is induced by strong
excitation from wind disturbances as well as sensor noise. It is noteworthy
that in small UAVs, winds can amount to 15 to 60% of the vehicle airspeed
and atmospheric disturbances represent significant system noise. A study
in [88], shows a correlation between size reduction and reduced handling
capabilities in small UAVs.
Two adaptive methods were considered to address the noise sensitiv-
ity. From plots in Figure 5.3 it is evident that the forgetting factor described
in Equation (4.4.5) is capable of removing noise sensitivity and reconstruct
parameters with higher accuracy and resolution. However, a minor loss in
tracking ability can be observed in Figure 5.3 plots (a) and (b), and a larger
and wider jump is observed in the healthy elevator in Figure 5.3 plot (b),
as the FDI tries to figure out which elevator has failed.
As detailed in Chapter 4, the forgetting factor proposed by Wu [73] is
based on constraining the fault estimate error covariance matrix within
some bounds given by σminI ≤ P γk+1|k ≤ σmaxI . These constraints ulti-
mately removes the off-diagonal components from the covariance matrix,
needed to capture any cross-correlation (interaction between surfaces and
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aircraft dynamics) between parameters needed to allow correct tracking
of parameters.
In this thesis, an adaptation technique that does not reduce the filter’s
tracking ability is proposed. Moreover, the algorithm also reduces the sen-
sitivity to noise during steady-state. The technique relies on adapting the
Qγk in the direction of information flow during the evolution of the fault
parameters. The P γk matrix is kept intact to ensure cross-correlation be-
tween all parameters is tracked by the TSKF algorithm (see 4.4.2).
The simulation results for the same single fault scenario considered
before are shown in Figures 5.4. Again, the only difference between the
simulation and preceding ones is the adaptation technique. The approach
relies upon selecting a small initial Qγk to ensure noise insensitivity and
bumping up the same matrix in the direction of parameter variation. Note
that parameter variations will increase signification during faults.
In Figure 5.4, we see increased activity just after time tF , especially
in the faulty control surface in plot (a). After a fault is detected, the Qγk
becomes more aggressive in the direction of the faulty surface, allow-
ing faster tracking in proportion to parameter variation. This is archived
by scaling up the eigenvalues of Qγk corresponding to normalised unit
eigenvectors in the direction of variation. Because the adaptation algo-
rithm is based on moving variances, this gives the algorithm the ability
to discount old data outside the evaluation window. When the moving
window’s variation ceases, adaptation will also cease, by which time the
TSKF would have hopefully found the true estimate of the fault param-
eters. This algorithm greatly enhances the weaknesses observed in the
non-adaptive TSKF and in the P γk forgetting factor approach. This im-
provement will be more evident in the case of an aileron fault, which is
discussed in the next section.
5.2.2 Single Aileron Fault with and without Adaptive
Procedures
In this simulation test, the setup, simulated environment, flight conditions
and aircraft parameters are the same as the previous section, except that
test bias faults of 5° are injected into the right aileron. Again, a total of
three simulation tests are carried out. The first experiment is carried out
without any adaptation procedure. The second carried out with the P γ -
adaptation, and the third is carried out with theQγ - adaptation procedure
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proposed in this thesis. For three tests, a 5° fault is induced in the right
aileron.
















Figure 5.5: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right aileron. The fault is reconstructed
with the EA filter without any forgetting factor adaptation
Figure 5.5 shows simulation results where the test was carried out
without any adaptation procedure. Similar to the previous section, the
fault estimates display noise sensitivity. The FDI is reconstructing the fault
in the right aileron, with slower tracking capabilities than it was the case
for the elevator fault. The ailerons dynamics appears to be highly coupled
with high symmetry. This results in a significant spike in the "healthy"
aileron as seen in Figure 5.5 plot (d). The FDI also takes longer to distin-
guish between the failed (right) and the healthy (left) aileron, has high
noise sensitivity and is subject to a significant common-mode-bias super-
imposed on the aileron parameters. The fault parameter reached the cor-
rect value in 10s, as compared to the elevator (previous section), which oc-
curred within less than 1s. This slower performance is simply a property
of the ailerons owing to their dynamics. Nevertheless, the performance
may be improved with adaptation procedures.
Figure 5.6 shows simulation results where the test was carried out with
the P γ - adaptation procedure incorporated. As seen, the common-mode-
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. SIMULATIONS 121
















Figure 5.6: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right aileron. The fault is reconstructed
with the EA filter with the forgetting factor applied to the P γk matrix
bias and noise sensitivity have been significantly reduced in the steady-
state. The FDI has lost its ability to distinguish between the right and the
left ailerons and wrongly assigns half the true magnitude to both ailerons.
To state again, this is due to the P γ - adaptation procedure constrain-
ing parameter estimate error covariance matrix within the boundaries σminI ≤
P γk+1|k ≤ σmaxI . This constraint makes the off-diagonal zero, removing in-
formation about the evolution of the parameters needed for correct track-
ing of faults. The P γ - adaptation procedure improves robustness against
noise but greatly degrades the filter’s tracking abilities and affects the sys-
tem’s isolabilty properties as seen in Figure 5.6 plot (c) and (d), where the
FDI can no longer distinguish between the left and right ailerons. The ob-
servation of these deficiencies motivated developing the proposed Qγ -
adaptation procedure in this thesis.
Figure 5.7 shows simulation results where the test was carried out with
Qγ - adaptation. The algorithm shows excellent robustness against noise
during steady-state. After the fault occurs at time tF = 20s, there is in-
creased activity in the right aileron’s fault parameter due to the activation
of the adaptation procedure until the variation of parameters has reduced.
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Figure 5.7: Single fault scenario of 5° bias fault in the right aileron. The fault is reconstructed
with the EA filter with the forgetting factor applied to theQγk matrix
The Qγk - adaptation procedure proposed in this thesis enhanced the
filter’s tracking ability, and isolability aileron is preserved. The approach
displays great robustness against noise, parameter tracking ability, selec-
tivity between opposite surfaces and sensitivity to faults. Now that the
superiority of the Qγk - adaptation procedure has been demonstrated, it is
noted that most of the upcoming simulations are based only on the Qγk -
adaptation procedure.
5.2.3 Fault Detection Function and Adaptive Threshold
The purpose of this test is to demonstrate the performance of the fault
detection function dk in Equation (4.8.10), the evolution of the NIS dur-
ing faults, and the adaptive isolation threshold function, which is derived
based on the NIS. The simulation plots presented in this section were ex-
tracted from the same simulation trial in the previous section, where a 5°
was injected into the right aileron.
In the previous section, the simulation for the case of an aileron fail-
ure in Figure 5.5, with a non-adaptive FDI, represents the worst perfor-
mance observed with this FDI configuration. The parameter estimates
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were noisy, and there was a significant jump in the healthy (left) aileron
parameter, which could potentially cause false detections by exceeding
the threshold function. Therefore, this case is ideal for testing the effec-
tiveness of the adaptive threshold function.











Figure 5.8: (a) Evolution of the fault detection function and adaptive isolation threshold
during a right aileron fault at 20 seconds (b) normalised innovation squared functions for
EA and ER filters with right aileron fault at 20 seconds
Figure 5.8 (b) depicts the evolution of the detection function, the NIS,
and the adaptive threshold during the right aileron fault scenario in Figure
5.5. At time tF = 20s, a fault occurs in the right aileron. Observe in the
bottom plots of Figure 5.5 (b) that NIS for both the EA and ER filter rise
to large values after tF = 20s. We know that the EA filter will estimate
aileron faults correctly. Thus even though the NIS for both filters exceed
the threshold χ2α,M.s, the NIS for the ER filter assumed a significantly larger
final value because the ER filter is more biased (that is, it is giving wrong
estimates because there is no fault in the ER). This behaviour enables the
FDI to select the correct filter during the Level 2 analysis by comparing
their NIS.
Observe in Figure 5.8 (b) in the top plots that at tF = 20s, the fault de-
tection function dAr,k of the right aileron grows much higher value than in
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its pre-fault state. The function remains large and grows or declines based
on the evolution of the δ∗Ar fault parameter. It is noted that the fault param-
eter for the left (healthy) aileron also had a significant jump at tF = 20s
(Figure 5.5 plot (d)). Therefore its corresponding detection function dAl,k
in Figure 5.8 jumped to larger values after tF = 20s, and after peaking, it
started to decline in response to the left aileron’s fault parameter δ∗Al. It is
this momentary rise in the function dAl,k that can cause false detections if
a static threshold is selected.
Observe that the adaptive threshold function (represented by the blue
line) was a small value before tF = 20s. Indeed, the additive constant in
the threshold function must be set to a small value to ensure that small
faults are not missed. However, at time tF = 20s, the adaptive threshold
function sets a new threshold dependent on the fault size. More precisely,
the new threshold is dependant on the biasedness in the Kalman filter,
which is th
5.2.4 Multiple Fault Scenarios and Fault Isolation
A major advantage of the proposed FDD approach is its ability to detect
multiple faults occurring simultaneously. The purpose of the simulation
tests in the section is to demonstrate the proposed FDI’s ability to detect
multiple faults. While the FDI can detect multiple faults occurring at dif-
ferent timestamps, the simulations consider faults occurring simultane-
ously. Faults of different magnitudes are injected into the two ailerons and
two elevators simultaneously at time tF = 20s.
Simulations reveal that the detection of multiple faults may be sim-
pler with this approach. Part of the reason is that; multiple faults result
in larger perturbation in the system, which results in significant excitation
and coupling effects, enabling the TSKF to learn the new system states
and parameters quicker.
Figure 5.9 depicts simulation results for the case where a non-adaptive
FDI was used, while Figure 5.10 depicts the case where Qγk - adaptation
was used. Comparing Figures 5.9 and 5.10, it is clear that the adaptive FDI
once again displays significant improvement in noise sensitivity, with-
out loss of tracking capabilities or accuracy in reconstructing parame-
ters. Moreover, due to each fault parameter having individual adaptive
thresholds, multiple faults of different sizes are isolated without com-
puting probabilities, which is typically required with MM and IMM ap-
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Figure 5.9: Multiple faults scenario both ailerons and elevators for the non-additive FDI
case. See plot titles and legends for identification.
proaches. The simulation shows that the FDI is sensitive and robust with-
out complex MM algorithms.
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Figure 5.10: Multiple faults scenario both ailerons and elevators for the Qγk - adaptation
case. See plot titles and legends for identification.
In this section, the FDI’s ability to detect and isolate the faults is demon-
strated in the simulation plots. The algorithm for detecting and isolat-
ing faults was presented in section 4.8, and demonstrated in Figure 5.8.
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As seen in Figures 5.9 and 5.10, all faults are detected and isolated very
quickly within 3s. As seen, each fault is isolated at a different time be-
cause each parameter evolves independently. Within 1 − 3s, four control
surfaces are detected for faults and their fault magnitudes reconstructed
with high accuracy. In this section, simulations confirmed fast fault de-
tection and isolation, while the FDI does not lose its noise-insensitivity,
robustness and accuracy in reconstructing the fault parameters.
5.2.5 DUKF and JUKF Simulations
The purpose of this section is to make basic comparisons between the four
KF approaches discussed in this thesis; namely, the TSKF, the adaptive-
TSKF (ATSKF), the DUKF and the Joint-UKF. For this comparison cam-
paign, each KF approach is subjected to an identical simulated environ-
ment with a single fault. Moreover, the UKF and the KF approaches were
given the same initial covariance matrices. An elevator bias fault of 5° was
injected at time tF = 20s in each of the four cases. During each test, simu-
lation data were collected for analysis.
Figure 5.12 shows the results of the four simulated cases on the same
plot. Note that only the faulty (right) elevator parameters are plotted in
the figure. As expected, the non-adaptive TSKF displays high sensitivity






Figure 5.11: A comparison between the TSKF, ATSKF, JUKF and DUKF with elevator bias
fault of 5°
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to noise. Nevertheless, the performance levels appear acceptable for prac-
tical use (for the case of an elevator fault).
The DUKF and Joint-UKF show similar performances, with high accu-
racy in reconstructing the fault parameter and tracking ability. The ATSKF
displays superior performance in comparison with the other three tech-
niques. The ASTKF signal is insensitive to noise in the steady-state. How-
ever, during the transition after the fault occurred, it shows aggressive
behaviour, which disappears once the fault has been sufficiently recon-
structed. This is a clear indication that the FDI adapts theQγk matrix when-
ever it searches for the change in the parameters. This characteristic makes
the ATSKF very sensitive to occurring faults.
In the presented simulation, there is minimal difference between DUKF
and JUKF, which appear to generate better results than the non-adaptive
TSKF. Due to its adaptive behaviour, the ATSKF displays greater tracking
during the transition to find the new parameter value. This quality gives
it improved sensitivity and robustness.
5.2.6 Sensitivity and Specificity Test of the FDI
The purpose of the following simulations is to test the algorithm for its
sensitivity (a measure of true positive detection capability) and specificity
(a measure of true negative detection capability). Not only is it important
to correctly detect the faults, but it is also critical to detect the absence of
faults correctly. High false alarm rates in automated systems will result in
unnecessary response based on wrong information, and in complex sys-
tems, may result in severe or catastrophic failures.
To test the sensitivity and specificity of the FDI, faults are injected in
the two elevators and two ailerons sequentially. In this simulation test, at
every 50 seconds interval, a positive bias of 5° or negative bias of −5° are
injected and cleared sequentially, starting with the right elevator and end-
ing with the left aileron. The simulation of sequential faults that appear
and disappear is a good way to test the FDI’s ability to detect and clear
faults.
Figure 5.13 depicts the simulated results with the non-adaptive TSKF,
while Figure 5.14 depicts the adaptive counterpart. Figure 5.12 depicts
the system states’ responses under the sequential fault scenario. In Fig-
ure 5.13, from t = 450s to t = 500s a positive bias occurs in the right
aileron, which is isolated relatively quickly. When the fault clears, the FDI
algorithms correctly clears the fault. From t = 550s to t = 600s when a
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True State State Estimate Targeted
Figure 5.12: Response of the system states in the presence of elevator and aileron faults
negative bias fault occurs in the right aileron, there are multiple intermit-
tent false detections in the left aileron just after 550s. Moreover, the deci-
sion logic does not isolate the true fault in the right aileron until halfway
through the fault, at approximately 575 seconds. This observation indi-
cates that the TSKF based FDI is expected to have high false detection
rates and missed detection rates for faults occurring in the aileron.
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Figure 5.13: Sequential faults in the elevators and ailerons simulated with the non-adaptive
TSKF
From Figure 5.14, it can be seen that there are no missed detections
or false alarms, despite the transient behaviour in the aileron parameters
after 450s. The transient responses in the aileron during no-fault condi-
tion are not large enough to cause false detections. Moreover, a much
cleaner evolution of the fault parameters is observed in both the elevator
and aileron parameters. This indicates that the root-mean-squared error
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(RMSE) associated with these signals is small. This is particularly impor-
tant for FTC, where accurate parameter estimates will improve control
reconfiguration capabilities. This section demonstrated that the adaptive
TSKF proposed in this thesis has greater sensitivity and specificity than
the standard TSKF.
































Figure 5.14: Sequential faults in the elevators and ailerons simulated with the adaptive
TSKF
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5.3 Active Fault Detection and Isolation
This section presents the simulation results of the two distinct active-FDI
designs are proposed in this thesis for two purposes. The first AFDI design
ensures the isolation of the two identical rudders, which do not satisfy the
isolability condition within the ER structure. The second AFDI design is
intended for fault classification as either bias, stuck actuator or LIP faults.
5.3.1 AFDI for Rudder Isolation
The purpose of the simulation tests in this section is to validate the effec-
tiveness of the AFDI rudder isolation technique for bias faults. Recall that
the AFDI for rudder isolation relies on randomly selecting one of the rud-
ders, assuming that it is faulty, and attempting to extract fault signatures
from it. If the AFDI’s initial guess is incorrect, it will move on to the next
rudders and attempt to extract the same fault signatures. Therefore two
cases were considered in the simulation tests in this section. The first case
simulates the scenario where the AFDI’s initial guess was correct (that is,
the AFDI diagnosed the failed rudder first), depicted in Figure 5.15, and
the second case is where the initial guess was incorrect, depicted in Figure
5.15
As stated previously, the algorithm utilised the NIS to determine that
the system is in Mode 2; that is, the ER filter is generating the correct fault
parameter estimates. As seen in Figure 5.15, a fault of 5° occurs at time
tF = 20s in the right rudder. Recall that the ER filter also estimates the
pseudo-elevator bias, which the FDI algorithm knows is not the true ele-
vator bias because the system is in Mode 2 (it is only the elevator bias
parameters generated with EA filter that are considered correct by the al-
gorithm). As discussed previously, at this point, the FDI algorithm knows
that the ER filter is estimating half of the true rudder bias and attributing
it to both rudders equally.
Almost immediately after tF , left and right rudder faults are detected
by adaptive threshold function (the green line in the plots indicates the
detection signal). After the detection of a rudder fault, the AFDI module is
triggered for fault isolation. Firstly, the AFDI allows 3s for the rudder bias
estimate to settle, then samples its value and stores it in its memory. Next,
the AFDI commands a deflection equal to twice the negative of the stored
value in one of the rudders in an attempt command the biased rudder
to a true zero (trim) deflection, to eliminate the pseudo-elevator bias from
the ER filter. If the AFDI’s initial guess is correct, the absolute value of
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Figure 5.15: Correct isolation of a 5° rudder fault where the AFDI algorithm’s initial guess
was correct
the pseudo-elevator bias will start to decrease towards zero. As soon as the
pseudo-elevator bias reaches the zero mark, the AFDI declares the surface as
faulty, and isolation occurs.
Figure 5.15 depicts the first scenario where the AFDI’s initial guess
was correct. In Figure 5.15 (a), it is seen that the pseudo-elevator bias starts
to move towards a zero value approximately 3s after detection, without
increasing first. This indicates that the AFDI’s initial guess was correct. As
soon as the pseudo-elevator bias reaches zero, the right rudder is isolated as
faulty (the yellow line in plot (g) indicates the isolation signal)
Figure 5.16 depicts the second case where the AFDI’s initial guess is
wrong. As the right rudder (healthy) is deflected, the rudder induced
pitch increases the pseudo-elevator bias in the ER filter (note the increase ab-
solute value of pseudo-elevator bias in plot (a) of Figure 5.16). The increase
in the magnitude of the pseudo-elevator bias indicates that more rudder in-
duced pitch is introduced due to diagnosing and manipulating the wrong
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Figure 5.16: Correct isolation of a 5° rudder fault where the AFDI algorithm’s initial guess
was incorrect
(healthy) rudder. After failing to remove the pseudo-elevator bias at the ini-
tial attempt, the AFDI switches to the left rudder and attempts to reduce
the pseudo-elevator bias with it. As observed, the pseudo-elevator bias is re-
duced after the initial increase, and a fault is isolated in the right rudder.
In this section, the AFDI for rudder isolation was demonstrated. Sim-
ulation reveals that the rudder bias isolation technique by eliminating the
5.16 yields reliable FDI and high isolation rates. The AFDI requires 3s to
sample the half-rudder bias, which results in increased isolation times.
However, the procedure displays high detection rates and low false de-
tection rates.
5.3.2 AFDI for Classification of Stuck Actuators
The purpose of this section is to test the fault classification capabilities
of the AFDI. As discussed, the model structure in Equation (4.2.6) can
detect bias and LIP faults. The nominal (default) model is chosen as the
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bias estimator. Hence, in previous sections, bias faults were reconstructed
without any switching to the hybrid model. LIP faults will also be detected
with the nominal model. However, the parameter estimates will be twice
the true fault size (see section 4.2.4)
To reconstruct LIP faults correctly, the hybrid model needs to switch
to a different mode by adjusting the Bk matrix appropriately. At time tD,
when a fault is detected with the detection function, the active FDI proce-
dure is triggered and initiates the fault classification procedure. Auxiliary
sinusoidal excitation signals with a frequency ω and amplitudes chosen in
the kernel of theB are injected into the control surfaces.
If the fault is a bias type, uex represents orthogonal signals injected
into the controls, which will cancel out. If the fault is a LIP, the auxiliary
controls excitation signals cannot fulfil uex ∈ ker(B) and the excitation
frequency ω will propagate through the system and appear in the mea-
sured signals and parameter estimate δ̂∗k.












Figure 5.17: Classification of a LIP fault in the right elevator, stuck at 5°
Figure 5.17 shows the fault classification AFDI technique in action for
the case of LIP fault in the right elevator, stuck at 5° ( 0.0873 rad). In plot
(a), it is seen that at tF = 20s the right elevator gets stuck at 0.0873 rad.
The nominal model detects that a fault has occurred. The plot (a) shows
that the estimator generates approximately twice the true fault magni-
tude. Note there is some activity in the fault parameter signal shortly after
tF = 20s. Plot (b) is a zoomed-out version of plot (a) between 18s and
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28s. A closer look reveals that there is a sinusoidal signal with a fixed
frequency superimposed on the parameter estimate δ̂∗k. This is the propa-
gation of the auxiliary excitation signal injected into the controls for fault
classification. This indicates that the kernel test uex ∈ ker(B) has failed
due to the fault being LIP type. If the fault was a bias type, the observed
sinusoidal excitation in the parameter estimate δ̂∗k would be absent due
to the orthogonal signals cancelling out. Indeed, all previous bias simula-
tions had the AFDI classification active after a fault detection. However,
the excitation frequency was not present in the parameter estimates due
to orthogonal cancellation in the case of bias faults
Once the AFDI detects the excitation frequency in δ̂∗k, the fault is clas-
sified as a LIP type, and the hybrid model switches by eliminating the col-
umn corresponding to δ̂∗k from theB matrix. In the simulation, switching
occurs at approximately 25s. As seen in the plots in Figure 5.17, the correct
stuck position of the right elevator is estimated after 25s.












Figure 5.18: Classification of a LIP fault in the right aileron, stuck at 5°
Figure 5.18 depicts the same simulation but with the fault in the right
aileron instead. As seen in plot (b), the excitation signal frequency is even
more pronounced and appears in both left and right ailerons due to the
heavy coupling between the two surfaces.
This section presented simulation results that validated the fault classi-
fication procedure and the hybrid switching model. The approach retains
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the bias estimator’s reliability features and incorporates auxiliary excita-
tion and switching with the hybrid model. The method shows better ac-
curacy of the reconstructed signal than MM or IMM approaches (see [3])
where a single parameter is augmented in a MM environment, in contrast
to augmenting multiple parameters in a single model environment. By
augmenting multiple parameters, the KF can track their interaction and
cross-correlations within the system and account for the effect of multiple
parameters in the system, thereby generating accurate estimates.
5.4 Loss of Effectiveness Faults
The purpose of the following simulations is to test the FDI design in de-
tecting and isolating LoE faults. At the same time, the sensitivity speci-
ficity of the FDI is tested. Faults are injected in the two elevators and two
ailerons sequentially. In this simulation test, at every 50 seconds interval,
a loss-of-effectiveness of 40%, followed by 80% are injected and cleared
from the surfaces sequentially, starting with the right elevator and ending
with the left aileron.
Recall that the to correctly estimate LoE faults, the EA and ER filters
rely on having a time-varying fault entry matrix given by Ek = −BkUk
(see section 4.2.21). Figure 5.19 depicts the simulated results of the LoE se-
quential fault simulation. The presented results were obtained using the
novel adaptive procedure proposed in this thesis. Similar to previous ob-
servations in previous sections, the parameter estimates for the elevator
faults yield better tracking ability, robustness against noise, and sensitiv-
ity to occurring faults and specificity.
On the other hand, significant transient responses can be observed in
the opposite healthy aileron during any aileron fault triggers. As a result,
there are three false alarms in the ailerons during the 850s long simulation.
However, these false alarm periods are very brief and could be avoided by
adding a delay in the isolation algorithm. However, a delay will increase
the mean time required to isolate a fault, which may be more undesirable.
Consequently, the designer must choose if the FDI will accept some level
of false detections, or if isolation can be delayed to avoid false alarms by
carrying out consistency checks.
The presented simulations reveal that LoE fault can be tracked accu-
rately with a single EA filter. The FDI design displays high sensitivity to
occurring faults and specificity.
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. SIMULATIONS 138









































Figure 5.19: Sequential LoE faults in the elevators and ailerons simulated with the adaptive
TSKF
5.5 Monte Carlo Simulation
In this section, a Monte Carlo simulation campaign is carried to test the
FDI design. The purpose of the Monte Carlo campaign is to validate the
proposed FDI algorithms’ performance and reliability. During each failure
scenario, estimates of the reconstructed fault parameters are recorded. The
performance indexes defined in section 2.4.2 are calculated with each MC
run to evaluate the performance and reliability of the FDD design. The
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MC simulation exposes the FDD algorithm to different faults, while the




















Figure 5.20: FDI Performance indices for the six control surfaces over nmc = 1000 simula-
tions of bias faults
The validation campaign is performed for bias, LoE and LIP actua-
tor faults separately. The FDD’s reliability is evaluated through a Monte-
Carlo statistical analysis from a set of 1000 fault scenarios that occur ran-
domly in the left or right elevator, aileron or rudder. Each of the six control
surfaces has an equal probability of failure during each run, and only one
surface can fail at any given time. Each failure scenario is performed with
randomly distributed turbulence profiles, aircraft mass, centre-of-gravity
locations, aerodynamic coefficients, trimmed height and speed. The char-
acteristics of the parameter distributions are given in Table 5.1
Figure 5.20 depicts the calculated FDI performance indices of all con-
trol surfaces over the nmc = 1000 simulations for the case of bias faults.
From plot (a) in Figure 5.20, it is evident that the rudder has the highest
true isolation rate. In previous simulations, it was observed that the rud-
der had the least sensitivity to noise, and faults were detected quickly (and
isolated late due to AFDI tests). The less noisy the parameter signal is, the
less false detections can be expected. The rudder is already detected at a
high rate. Once a rudder fault is detected, AFDI techniques are applied
to the ER filter by analysing the pseudo-elevator bias until the failed rudder
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Figure 5.21: FDI Performance indices for the six control surfaces over nmc = 1000 simula-
tions of bias faults depicted in histograms
is isolated. For this reason, the rudder has the highest true-isolation rate.
The elevator has the second-best isolation rate because the elevator fault
parameter is less sensitive to noise than the aileron, which results in better
accuracy when reconstructing the fault parameters.
False isolation rate is the can be explained in the same way. When true
isolation rate is high, false isolation rate must be low. From examining the
boxes and whiskers’ lengths, it is observed that performance indices for
the aileron have the highest variations. This is expected, given that aileron
parameters display high variations and common-mode-bias. Figure 5.21
depicts the same FDI performance indexes in histograms. The histograms
also show the mean and standard deviation of all the performance indices
within a kernel distribution.
Considering plot (c) in Figure 5.20, it is noted that the rudder has the
shortest detection time, followed by the elevator. Detection is particularly
fast in the rudder because the ER filter does not have to distinguish be-
tween the left and right rudders. More precisely, it cannot distinguish
between them, which leads to fast isolation. Recall how the aileron fault
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Figure 5.22: FDI Performance indices for the six control surfaces over nmc = 1000 simula-
tions of LIP faults
parameters slowly tracked the occurring fault due to the high coupling
between the right and left surfaces. This problem is absent in the rud-
der. While the rudders are detected the fastest, they are isolated very late
(see plot (c) in Figure 5.20), due to the delays associated with the AFDI
algorithm. As expected, the elevator has the second-best detection time,
followed by the aileron with the worst (plot (c)). Note how the aileron’s
isolation time is faster than the rudder’s. This is because there are no de-
lays introduced by AFDI in the aileron isolation process. The ailerons are
only isolated using the adaptive threshold function without AFDI.
Figure 5.22 depicts the same performance indices for the case of LIP
faults. The detection time, true isolation and false isolation rates are simi-
lar to the results obtained for bias fault MC simulations. Note the increase
in isolation time. The increase is due to the AFDI step required to switch
the hybrid model and reconstruct the fault parameter correctly. Figure 5.23
displays similar results to the bias MC simulation case.
In this section, the performance and reliability of the FDI were tested
and found perform with reliability. The highest average for true isolation
rate is 92%, while the smallest average for isolation time is approximately
2.9s. Note that these are averages, and there are cases where isolation oc-
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Figure 5.23: FDI Performance indices for the six control surfaces over nmc = 1000 simula-
tions of LoE faults
curs within less than 1s. The FDI displays excellent sensitivity and selec-





This thesis presented the design, implementation and validation model-
based approaches to fault detection and isolation applicable to small-sized
unmanned aerial vehicles. This chapter is dedicated to providing a sum-
mary of the findings and conclusions made from simulation tests.
6.1 Conclusions
This thesis provided theoretical analyses and simulation results in the
fault detection and isolation of faults in UAVs. The study presented var-
ious model-based FDI approaches in detail to establish a foundation for
the research and aid in selecting the most efficient methods for FDI design
in this thesis. Model model-based FDI was preferred because it offers a
cost-effective, iterative and efficient FDI design process, verifiable in high
fidelity computer-aided simulation (CAS) without additional hardware.
The scenarios discussed in this thesis show that the FDI design de-
veloped can detect and isolate faults in all the control surfaces, including
faults of different magnitudes, type, and multiple faults are isolated con-
currently. Moreover, the algorithm only relies on two TSKF filters. The
TSKF solves deficiencies faced with the augmented state Kalman filter
(ASKF), namely, numerical instability in ill-conditioned systems, and com-
putational inefficiency where large parameter vectors are augmented. The
TSKF approach utilises two parallel reduced-order KFs to estimate the
system state and the parameter vectors separately.
To further reduce computational loads in the FDI design, a multi-mode
hybrid switching model was developed to track bias, LoE and LIP faults
143
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within a single model-based FDI design, rather than using the MM or
IMM approach. The UAV’s two rudders were found not to be "isolable"
because they produce identical moments. A novel active AFDI method
was developed to isolate rudder actuator faults.
The FDI displayed high noise sensitivity under the severe Dryden tur-
bulence model, resulting in high false detection and missed detection rates.
To tackle this problem novel adaptive technique was developed to im-
prove the robustness and sensitivity of the FDI. Unlike most methods that
rely on a single scaling factor, the method developed in this thesis adap-
tation technique employs multiple factors to weight the spread of fault
parameter covariance matrix in the flow of information, resulting in selec-
tive adaptation.
All fault parameters vary independently throughout their evolution
since surfaces will not always fail at the same time. Thus parameter vari-
ations are nonuniform in time and space. While conducting the research,
it was found that a static alarm threshold induced extremely high false
alarms or missed alarms when set to low or too high, respectively, which
made the original FDI design impractical. A novel adaptive threshold
function based on the normalised innovation squared (NIS) was devel-
oped. The adaptive threshold function resulted in significant improve-
ment of the true isolation rate and reduced false isolation rates.
A Monte Carlo test campaign was carried out to test the FDI’s perfor-
mance and reliability. The presented KF based algorithms show great ca-
pabilities in reliably isolating faults and reconstructing fault parameters.
The highest average for true isolation rate is 92%, while the fastest average
for isolation time is approximately 2.9s. Again, these are averages, mean-
ing the algorithm is capable of achieving higher detection rates and faster
detection times in other fault scenarios. The adaptive methods developed
in this thesis display great robustness against noise, sensitivity to faults
and selectivity in the absence of fault. Having met these requirements, it
can be said that the FDI design is reliable.
6.2 Recommendation for Future Work
The methods developed here were only tested on a trimmed straight and
level flight as the nominal. However, lading and take-off represent the
most challenging stages in flight, with various safety challenges due to
ground effects and shear. The methods developed here and other FDI
methods should be investigated for landing and take-off scenarios.
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The ailerons show heavy coupling and symmetry in dynamic behaviour.
Under severe turbulence models, aileron parameter estimates suffer from
a common-mode-bias and the "blow up" effect. Algorithms should be de-
veloped to detect and filter out the common-mode-bias in similarly cou-
pled and symmetric parameters.
The AFDI methods developed in this thesis assume that the auxiliary
signals will not saturate the control surfaces. However, during a fault, the
aircraft’s control capabilities are already reduced, and some control sur-
faces may be close to their saturation levels. Auxillary AFDI methods that
take into account the saturation levels of the controls surfaces must be de-
veloped. In other words, the FDI shall compute new post-fault saturation
levels based on the post-fault trim settings. These saturation levels are not
to be exceeded when auxiliary excitation or control reconfiguration is car-
ried out. The saturation levels can also be part of the data that the FDI
feeds to the FTC.
The FDI developed in this thesis can detect multiple faults concur-
rently, provided they are of the same type. AFDI strategies must be de-






Meraka UAV Physical Model
Parameters
The physical parameters of the Meraka Modular UAV as shown in Table
A.1. These parameters are adopted from previous works at ESL as detailed
in [3, 26]
Table A.1: Meraka Aircraft Physical Model Parameters
Parameter Value Unit Definition
m 26 kg aircraft mass
I I =
8.53 0 0.950 11.58 0
0.95 0 13.67
 kg.m2 aircraft inertia matrix
S 1.44 m2 Wing Reference Area
c̄ 0.36 m Mean Aerodynamic Chord
b 4 m Wing Span
AR 11.11 [-] Wing Aspect Ratio
e0 0.85 [-] Oswald Efficiency Factor
147
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Table A.2: Aerodynamic Coefficients of the Meraka Aircraft Model
Drag Force Value Lateral Force Value Lift Force Value
CD0 0.06 CY0 0 CY0 0
e0 0.85 CYβ −0.3894 CLα 5.5579
















Roll Value Pitch Value Yaw Value
Cl0 0 CM0 0 Cn0 0
Clβ −0.0715 CMα −2.7695 Cnβ 0.1022









−0.4752 CMδAl 0.0151 CnδAr −0.0099
ClδAl












B.1 Analytical Solution of the Continuous Model
Suppose the controlled system can be expressed as follows:
ẋ(t) =Ax(t) +Bu(t) +Gw(t) (B.1.1)
y(t) =Cx(t) + v(t) (B.1.2)
Let x(0) ∼ (x̄0,P0), w(t) ∼ (0,Q), v(t) ∼ (0,R), where w(t) and
v(t) are white uncorrelated noise processes. Several problems in control
systems require estimating the state x(t). Suppose the digital computer
samples the input signal u(t) and measurement signal y(t) at a sampling
rate of Ts second. The discrete Kalman filter requires the discretization of
the continuous plant. This requires a solution to (B.1.1)
Its is known that the matrix exponential is given by:
d
dt
eAt = AeAt = eAtA (B.1.3)
and by pre-multiplying the model we get
e−Atẋ(t) = e−AtAx(t) + e−AtBu(t) + e−AtGw(t) (B.1.4)
which becomes
e−Atẋ(t)− e−AtAx(t) = e−AtBu(t) + e−AtGw(t) (B.1.5)
d(e−Atx(t)
dt
= e−AtBu(t) + e−AtGw(t) (B.1.6)
149
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This last expression is the solution to B.1.1
B.2 Discretisation of the Continuous Model
The state propagation between samples is expressed by letting t0 = kT
and t = (k + 1)Ts where k is an integer. The sampled state is then define
as xk
∆










If the control input u(t) is reconstructed from the discrete control se-
quence uk by using a zero-order hold sampling, then u(τ) has a constant
value of u(kTs) = uk over the integration interval. The third term in the
above can be thought of as smoothed out (low-pass filtered) version of the
continuous white process noisew(t) that has been scaled by the matrixG.
It can be shown that this term indicates a discrete white noise sequence.










eA[(k+1)Ts−τ ]Bdτ · uk +wk (B.2.3)





eAτBdτ · uk +wk (B.2.4)
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This is the sampled version of B.1.1, which we can write as








B.3 Propagation of Covariance Matrices



























= Qδ(τ − α) (B.3.3)





T [(k+1)T−τ ]dτ (B.3.4)











1, −1/2 ≤ t ≤ 1/2
0, otherwise
(B.3.6)
It is notefd that the limT→0(1/T )Π(t/T ) = δ(t), is the Kronecker delta.
Thus covariance associated with vk is expressed as:
Rv(k) = Rkδ(k) (B.3.7)
As δ(k) is equal to one (1) when k = 0, then the covariance will equal
Rk, wich is a finite matrix. The noise parameter v(t), has a covariance

















B.4 Numerical Evaluation of Discrete Matrices
The discretisation presented in previous chapters may not be trackable
because of the errors associated with the matrix exponential and integral
calculations. However, there are some elegant tricks to evaluate these inte-
grals if they are needed once-off. With respect to the Ak and Bk matrices,













Charles F. Van Loan’s article in 1978 presented a technique for calcu-
lating the integrals in (B.2.7) and (B.3.5) using matrix exponentials. The
computation relies on Q being positive semi-definite which is already a
property of the process noise covariance matrix. The technique requires a)
calculating the exponential ofM , which a triangular block matrix formed
with matrices representing the relation of the forms in (B.2.7) and (B.3.5)
and b) combing the resultant matrices to find the integrals. The formula-


















For the stochastic model in (B.1.1), Van Loan’s results can be implemented
with the MATLAB function expm() by choosing Qc as GQGT and ex-
tracting partitioned matrices from the result. WhenAk andBk do not need
not to be calculated at every iteration k, the MATLAB function expm()can
be used. The discrete transition, input and process noise covariance ma-
trices as derived in this Appendix ?? can be approximated as the first few
terms of the infinite series expansions for the sampled matrices as
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+ · · · (B.4.6)
The terms with the order T 2 or higher can be neglected, which is Eu-
ler’s approximation. With Euler’s method, it is noted that noise covariance
matrix Qk is a result of multiplication by Ts and measurement noise co-
















The subscript i denotes the inertial reference frame, which in this study












+ ωb/i × V (C.0.2)
Coriolis’s theorem allows the characterisation of motion within a frame
of reference that rotates with respect to an inertial frame. In the case of the
aircraft, the body reference frame is rotating with the aircraft, with respect












+ ωw/b × V + ωb/i × V (C.0.3)
By the same principle, the above call all be projected to the wind refer-












+ ωww/b × V w + ωwb/i × V w (C.0.4)
Expanding the different contribution to the net force acting on the air-















−ωww/b×V w−ωwb/i×V w (C.0.5)
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Finally, the three differential equation for the airspeed, angle of attack














q̄SCY − Fprop cosα sinβ +mgwy
)
+ p sinα− r cosα (C.0.15)
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Appendix D
Linearisation of the Aircraft
Model







































































=− Fprop cosα0 sinβ0
m
(D.1.3)
+ g(− sinα0 sinβ0 cosφ0 cos θ0 + cosβ0 sinφ0 cos θ0 + cosα0 sinβ0 sin θ0)
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[q̄SCLα + Fprop cosα0 +mg(sinα0 cosφ0 cos θ0 − cosα0 sin θ0)]
(D.1.11)
+ (p0 sinα0 − r0 cosα0) tanβ0
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[q̄SCL + Fprop sinα0 −mg(cosα0 cosφ0 cos θ0 + sinα0 sin θ0)]
(D.1.12)



































































































+ p0 cosα0 + r0 sinα0 (D.1.22)
− g
V0





































· CYr − cosα0 (D.1.25)
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Ixz(Ix − Iy + Iz)p0 −
(































































































































































































Ix(Ix − Iy) + I2xz
)










































































=− q0 sinφ0 − r0 cosφ0 (D.1.57)
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=V0 (cosα0 sinβ0 sin θ0 + cosβ0 sinφ0 cos θ0 − sinα0 sinβ0 cosφ0 cos θ0)
(D.1.65)
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=V0 (sinβ0 cosφ0 cos θ0 − sinα0 cosβ0 sinφ0 cos θ0) (D.1.67)
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Appendix E
The Kalman Filter Innovation
Sequence
E.1 Normalised Innovation Squared
For a multi-output model, define
ηk = Mkr̃k (E.1.1)




















Since it is a linear ηk is a combination of Gaussians, then it is also Gaus-
sian
IfMk is defined such thatMTk Mk = S̃
−1
k , then
• Mk is the lower-triangular Cholesky factor of S̃−1k










k = I (E.1.2)










then βk is the sum of squares of independent N (0, 1) random variables.
Then, βk is a chi-square random variable with n degrees of freedom, where
n is the dimension of the innovation vector.
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E.2 Sensor Isolation and NIS Shifts
Using (4.10.3), it can be shown that the NIS’s variation is predictable. Con-
sider a shift in NIS at time τ , and that η̃k signify the unchanged normal-
ized innovation sequence, then the changed normalized innovation se-
quence is given by
ηk =η̃k k = 1, 2, . . . , τ − 1 (E.2.1)
ηk =η̃k + µk−τ k = τ, τ + 1, . . . (E.2.2)
where µ(.) is an unknown change and may vary with respect to time, but
there exists a quantity L > 0 such that |µ(j)| < L, ∀j . The above yield,
ηk ∼ N (0, 1) k = 1, 2, . . . , τ − 1 (E.2.3)
ηk ∼ N (0, 1) + µk−τ k = τ, τ + 1, . . . (E.2.4)
Consider that the window from j = k`M + 1 to k is given by N . Given




= M`1 In the event of a fault,
this expectation of can be determined by the following theorem. Theorem:


















0 j < τµ∗ = constant j ≥ τ
The proof is given in
Let the number of shifted innovation values fromj = k`M + 1 to k in













and a shift in the innovation sequence will cause an asymptotic in-
crease in the expected value of the statistics vk , and vk will exceed the
threshold χ2α,M−1 . The larger µ∗ the faster detection is.
The optimal (maximum) value N is N = M/2
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